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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE EUROPEAN UNION'S POLICY REGARDING PEACE
AND SECURITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR:
CONCEPTS AND IMPLEMENTATION**

by

Stephan Döring

June 2007

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR:
CONCEPTS AND IMPLEMENTATION**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the policy of the European Union towards sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the Cold War. The main research question is: has EU policy toward Africa changed fundamentally, and, if so, what are the motivating factors? This thesis argues that there indeed is a paradigmatic change in the Africa policy. Especially since the formation of the European Security and Defense Policy in 1999, the EU has become more active and capable in implementing its missions in the region.

The author looks first at basic guiding documents, especially the European Security Strategy and the EU Strategy for Africa, in order to trace the evolution of the EU's concepts. Then he investigates institutional, military, and civilian crisis management capacities available today to operate in that region. A case study on EU intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2003-06 analyzes the scope and effectiveness of the EU's actions. It is shown that the EU has a unique variety of instruments available which enable it to operate in a broad mission spectrum. Military and civil operations complement one another. The EU's policy is guided by its norms, by a new threat perception and by France's national interests in that region.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
AOO	area of operations
APF	Africa Peace Facility
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BLNS	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland
CCM	Civilian Crisis Management
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIVCOM	Committee for Civil Aspects of Crisis Management
CMO	Crisis Management Operation
COMESA	Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
CPCO	Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations
CRT	Civilian Crisis Response Teams
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
EAC	Eastern African Community
EC	European Community
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECDPM	European Center for Development Policy Management
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EU	European Union
EUBG	EU Battlegroups
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
EU-POL Kinshasa	European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC)
EUSFA	EU Strategy for Africa
ESS	European Security Strategy

ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EUSEC DRC	EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo
FARDC	Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPG	global public goods
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICG	International Crisis Group
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
MCM	Military Crisis Management
MDG	UN Millennium Development Goals
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MS	Member States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OpCen	Operations Center
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PSC	Political and Security Committee
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SR	Special Representative
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ

TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TDCA	Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement
UN	United Nations Organizations
UNITA	Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UN MDG	United Nations Millennium Development Goals
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

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I. INTRODUCTION

The interaction between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa has a long history. European discoverers opened sub-Saharan Africa for European influence. This contact had serious consequences for Africa. Except for Ethiopia and Liberia, the whole continent was colonized by European powers and carved up in spheres of influence; the “scramble of Africa” divided Africa into several states, regardless of ethnic belonging. The end of the Second World War initiated a new phase, the struggle for independence. Decolonialization was, though, superposed by the Cold War. New spheres of influence emerged. At the same time, some European states tried to maintain their influence in the former colonies.

Despite the close and lasting relations of some of the Member States of the European Union (EU) with sub-Saharan Africa, this region was for a long time not a focus of the EU’s external relations. Economic and developmental issues dominated.

Four significant developments changed this. First, the end of the Cold War very much reduced the interest of external actors in Africa. The continent was marginalized regarding security issues. That enabled the EU to link its developmental aid to the political performance of the recipient sub-Saharan African States. Second, the failure of the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia and the genocide in Rwanda were clear signals that economic and developmental support alone was not sufficient to stabilize this region. Humanitarian disasters and the refugees arriving at the EU’s frontiers demanded external action. The EU needed capacities for that purpose. The EU’s political focus shifted from normative values to conflict prevention. Third, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the Iraq war in 2003 increased the awareness of the European governments that Europe needed to define its own security interests. In December 2003 the EU adopted the first European Security Strategy (ESS) Key threats for the EU’s security were identified, some of which are prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. The fourth development shaping the EU’s relation towards sub-Saharan Africa was the initiation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999. Intra-institutional changes

strongly affected the relations with sub-Saharan Africa. The EU began to create capacities to act in crises and to gain more leverage for effective action, which allowed it to initiate several missions in DR Congo since.

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

Given this background, this thesis addresses the question: Has the EU's policy toward Africa changed fundamentally since the end of the Cold War, and if so, what are the motivational factors stimulating this policy-turn? Is there a paradigmatic change in the policy towards sub-Saharan Africa? Or is continuity dominating? Has the EU really become more active, more capable and more cooperative, or are its strategies and concepts still mere political declarations without a major effect?

In order to answer these questions, subordinate questions are posed:

- Why does sub-Saharan Africa matter for the EU? (rationale)
- What are the basic security concepts, strategies and aims of the EU's policy towards sub-Saharan Africa and how did they evolve? (concepts)
- What means, including capabilities and programs, are available, or in the process of development, to promote the EU's aims? (instruments)
- How is the EU deploying its assets in the field to implement its policy? (implementation)

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

This thesis will have to draw on several strands of literature normally not combined: EU policy towards Africa in general, ESDP and EU security policies in Africa, and case studies of the EU operations in Congo.

First, no prior work could be identified to provide an analytical overview of the EU's policy toward sub-Saharan Africa, including concepts and implementation as they have changed over time. Despite this lack, there is a substantial number of publications which are, unfortunately, very fragmented concerning this topic. Due to the rapid evolution of both the ESDP and the EU's policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in recent years, the literature often provides only a snapshot of current events and is quickly

outdated.¹ Scholars have published many studies covering parts of this thesis. Most of them have a limited focus, but offer profound analysis. Combining them, the author has been able to obtain some excellent sources to build on for this research.

Academic literature providing a comprehensive analysis of the EU – sub-Saharan relations is rare. It usually consists of journal articles, due to the fact that new strategies have been adopted and new capacities acquired by the EU since 2004.² In an essay written in 2003, Alexandra Krause, analyzing the EU's role as an international actor in Africa, argues that the “policy of the EU towards sub-Saharan Africa – seen from a cross-pillar perspective *including* the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – has barely caught the attention of students of European integration.”³ This thesis hopes to redress this critique.

The EU orients its policy towards conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa based on two principles: “African ownership” and European-African “partnership.” Stephen Hurt argues that the use of the term partnership is “merely rhetorical.”⁴ This thesis argues that the EU's policy has evolved and that this partnership is more than rhetoric. How the partnership is implemented in reality will be discussed. In order to realize “ownership” and “partnership” in security affairs, the EU needs willing and capable partners in sub-Saharan Africa. Partnership is the guiding principle between the EU and African regional and sub-regional organizations such as the AU or the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This is in line with another important principle for the EU's policy towards sub-Saharan Africa: effective multilateralism, defined as “the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule based

¹ Catriona Gourlay, “European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management.” *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 404-421.

² Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, “The European Union,” in *From Cape to Congo. Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*, edited by Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (London, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 301-316.

³ Alexandra Krause, “The European Union's Africa Policy: The Commission as Policy Entrepreneur in the CFSP,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 8, no. 2 (2003): 221.

⁴ Stephan R. Hurt, “The European Union's External Relations with Africa after the Cold War: Aspects of Continuity and Change,” in Taylor and Williams, *Africa in International Politics*, 171.

international order.”⁵ The EU is willing to cooperate with the UN on a global level, with the AU on a regional level and, for example, SADC on a sub-regional level. The relations between the EU and the AU concerning peacekeeping are discussed by Mark Malan, who argues that the EU is the most important partner for the AU in establishing its own crisis management capabilities – a necessity for “African ownership.”⁶

Fernanda Faria argued in 2004 that the “lack of financial resources and weak operational capabilities are well-known problems” of the AU.⁷ Significant progress has been made regarding these problems: the EU supports the establishment of African capacities and provides significant funds for the conduct of “African owned” peacekeeping operations through the African Peace Facility (APF), an institution designed by the EU to finance African crisis management operations. Rory Keane, as well as Sebastian Wadle and Corinna Schukraft, have come to the conclusion that the EU facility is a very important institution for the support of the AU and other African sub-regional organizations. Kingha argues that this facility is “vital for the operations of the AU troops in Sudan.”⁸ A formal evaluation of the facility was conducted by the Neimacro Consortium and resulted in a very positive assessment.⁹ An important African

⁵ Javier Solana, *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Union Security Strategy*. Brussels, December 12, 2003, 9.

⁶ Siegmund Schmidt, “Prinzipien, Ziele und Institutionen der Afrikanischen Union.” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 4 (2005), <http://www.das-parlament.de/2005/04/beilage/004.html> (accessed May 22, 2007); Mark Malan, “The European Union and the African Union as Strategic Partners in Peace Operations: Not Grasping the Planning and Management Nettle” Paper presented at “The European Union in Africa: A Strategic Partner in Peace Operations,” 5th Seminar on Peace Operations by the International Peace Academy and the Geneva Center for Security Policy, Geneva, July, 6-7, 2006, http://www.gcsp.ch/e/meetings/CM_Peacebuilding/Peace-Ops/Seminars/EU-Peace_Ops/2006/Malan.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

⁷ Fernanda Faria, *Crisis Management in sub-Saharan Africa. The role of the European Union* (Paris: L’Alenconnaissance d’Impressions, 2004) :14, <http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ51.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

⁸ S.S. Kingah, “The European Union’s New Africa Strategy: Grounds for Cautious Optimism,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 11 (2006):539.

⁹ Rory Keane, “The EU’s African Peace Facility Uncovered: Better Late than Never,” *ISIS European Security Review*, no. 24, (October 2004), <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/ESR%2024%20-%20APF.PDF> (accessed May 22, 2007); Sebastian Wadle and Corinna Schukraft, “Die Peace Facility in Afrika – Europas Antwort auf die Krisen in Afrika?” *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 4 (2005): 99-119; Neimacro Consortium. *Mid Term Evaluation of the African Peace Facility Framework-Contract. Final Report*. Maastricht, January 2006, http://www.dgroups.org/groups/CoOL/docs/APF-Evaluation-Final_Report-ECDPM_version_for_ECORYS_190106.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

capability under development is the African Standby Force (ASF), a topic discussed by Benedikt Franke, Theo Neethling and Johannes Regenbrecht.¹⁰ They argue that the ASF is an important tool for African states in order to intervene in African conflicts, but they also present evidence that this force will be confronted with many basic problems, such as command and control capabilities or logistics.

Second, the literature concerning the European Security and Defense Policy (launched in 1999) is vast and rapidly growing. ESDP has a serious impact on Europe's crisis intervention capacities and policies on a global scale. Significant decisions and programs to increase the EU's capacities were adopted and much progress can be noted. This is reflected in the academic literature.

Important literature is available regarding the core EU strategy, which is also of central relevance in this thesis, the European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted in December 2003. The literature varies from mere description to critical assessment.¹¹ There is no explicit analysis of the relevance of the ESS for sub-Saharan Africa; however, the literature offers an important frame for this thesis as the EU Africa policy is embedded in the larger ESDP evolution. Stefanie Flechtner has written about the ESDP in general and Reinhart Rummel about the civil components of the ESDP. He argues that these instruments offer the EU different options for crisis management beyond military

¹⁰ Benedikt Franke, "A Pan-African Army: The Evolution of an Idea and its eventual Realization in the African Standby Force," *African Security Review* 15, no. 4 (December 2006): 2-16; Theo Neethling, "Shaping the African Standby Force: Developments, Challenges, and Prospects," *Military Review*, 4-5 (2005): 68-71; Johannes Regenbrecht, "Afrikanische Bereitschaftstruppe für Friedenseinsätze: Neue Perspektiven für Konfliktbewältigung in Afrika?" *SWP Diskussionspapier* (July 2003), http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=678 (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹¹ Erich Reiter, "Die Sicherheitsstrategie der EU," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 3-4, (2004): 26-31; Asle Toje, "The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal," *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10, no. 1 (2005): 117-133; Alson J. K. Bailes, "The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History," no. 10 *SIPRI Policy Paper*. (February 2005), http://www.sipri.org/contents/editors/publications/ESS_PPrapport.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007); Klaus Becher, "Has-Been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe's Role in the World after the 2003 European Security Strategy," *European Security* 13, no. 4 (2004): 345-359; Sven Biscop, "The European Security Strategy: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security," *Sécurité et Stratégie* no. 82 (March 2004), <http://www.forum-europe.com/publication/Artikel.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

interventions.¹² Hauser and Kernik edited a volume comprising several essays regarding the development of ESDP which present evidence that the EU launched a significant program to improve its capacities.¹³ The volume includes an essay of Sven Biscop, who argues that the foundations of the ESS are a concept of “global public goods.” These goods are identical to those public goods that the state is supposed to provide on a national level.¹⁴

Third, not much literature is available that covers the importance of Africa for European security. However, there are helpful seminar reports by the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna.¹⁵ These volumes edit the presentations of several conferences and offer a variety of opinions on the topic. The relevance of developments in sub-Saharan Africa for the EU’s security is covered by several authors. Their common conclusion is that there are no threats emerging in sub-Saharan Africa which can be tackled by the tools of classical territorial defense. Arno Meinken presents convincing evidence that African states possess neither the political will nor the military capabilities to threaten the EU with military means.¹⁶ This does not mean that there are no security threats emanating from the region to which the EU has to pay attention. Stefan Mair argues that state failure, protracted conflicts, and war economies can prepare the ground for international terrorism and that African warlords are an integral part of worldwide

¹² Flechtner, Stefanie. “European Security and Defense Policy: Between Offensive Defense and Human Security.” *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 4 (2006): 157-173; Reinhardt Rummel, “Die zivile Komponente der ESVP: Reichhaltiges Gestaltungspotential für europäische Krisenintervention.” *SWP-Studie* 16 (July 2006), http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3128 (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹³ Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernik eds, *European Security in Transition*. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006).

¹⁴ Sven Biscop, “From Reflections to Power: Implementing the European Security Strategy,” in Hauser and Kernik eds. *European Security*, 87-101.

¹⁵ Diplomatic Academy of Vienna ed, “Peace Operations in Africa,” *Favorita Paper* 3 (2004), http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/16_ipa_2004.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007); Diplomatic Academy of Vienna ed, “Developing Peace Partnership in Africa,” *Favorita Paper* 2 (2005), http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/16_ipa_02_2005.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁶ Arno Meinken, “Militärische Kapazitäten und Fähigkeiten afrikanischer Staaten. Ursachen und Wirkungen militärischer Ineffektivität in Sub-Sahara Afrika,” *SWP-Studie* 4 (February 2005), http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=1929 (accessed May 22, 2007).

organized crime, sometimes involved in spoiling peace processes. He assumes that these developments could create serious challenges for the EU's internal security.¹⁷

The EU committed itself to support the implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and argues that security is the prerequisite for sustainable development – without security, the MDG could not be achieved. This argument is supported by Guido Schmitt-Traub and Prateek Tandon, but they also allege that only development in sub-Saharan Africa can prevent the emergence of security threats to Germany and other developed countries.¹⁸

Last, there is some academic writing both on the DRC as a war-torn country in general and on the ESDP crisis management operations there in particular. A seminal academic work is the book of Crawford Young and Thomas Turner.¹⁹ It covers the rise and decline of Zaire, the former name of the DRC, between 1965 and the early 1980s. A historical introduction is provided by Edgerton.²⁰ Economic dimensions of the lasting conflict are examined by Michael Nest.²¹ The involvement of African neighbors is the focus of a book edited by John F. Clark.²² The topics of Michaela Wrong's book are the internal weaknesses and social problems of the DRC, today and in its past.²³ By studying

¹⁷ Stefan Mair, "Konfliktpotentiale in Afrika. Eine Bedrohung Europäischer Sicherheit?" *Reader Sicherheitspolitik* 12 (2003): 106 -112.

¹⁸ Schmidt-Traub and Prateek Tandon, "Security and the Millennium Development Goals," *BICC Bulletin* no. 27 (October/November 2005).

¹⁹ Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

²⁰ Robert B. Edgerton, *The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of the Congo* (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 2002).

²¹ Michael Nest, Francois Grignon and Emizet F. Kisangani, *The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).

²² John F Clark, ed. *The African Stakes of the Congo War* (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).

²³ Michaela Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz. Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu's Congo* (New York: Perennial, 2002).

these works, it became clear that the root causes of state failure, protracted conflict and the involvement of seven Central and South African states in “Africa’s First World War”²⁴ are manifold.

Despite the problematic structure of this conflict, the EU conducted its first fully autonomous military crisis management operation, ARTEMIS, in an eastern province of the DRC. James Miskel and Richard J. Norton argue that although this intervention came late, it was successful. They allege that “the use of traditional tools of diplomacy and peacekeeping are not appropriate for areas such as DRC” and that ARTEMIS is “a ‘blueprint’ for conducting successful operations in such an environment.”²⁵ The second military ESDP operation, EUFOR DRC, was terminated in 2006. Only a few articles cover that issue, such as an essay by Hans-Georg Ehrhart who argues that this mission has to be interpreted in the light of overall EU strategies regarding sub-Saharan Africa.²⁶

Much of the material on the Congo operations is published by the EU via its official webpage. In some media articles, the EU’s mission is portrayed as necessary and successful in implementing its mission goals, but criticized in general because of its limited effect and its focus only on short-term engagement.²⁷

There are several controversies discernable in the literature. Authors concentrating more on developmental issues of the EU’s policy argue that the subordination of development under security minimizes the importance of that issue. The interpretation of development as a tool to tackle the root causes of violent conflicts and to increase the security of the EU also reduces the available funds and detracts from the core

²⁴ Emizet F. Kisangani, “Legacies of the War Economy: Economic Challenges for Postconflict Reconstruction,” in Nest, Grignon and Kisangani, *The Democratic Republic of Congo*, 99.

²⁵ James F. Miskel and Richard J. Norton, “The Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” *Civil Wars* 6, no. 4 (2003): 10; Stale Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay, and Catriona Mace, “Operation Artemis. The Shape of Things to come?” *International Peacekeeping*, 11, no. 3 (2004): 508-525.

²⁶ Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Was soll die EU im Kongo? Die Europäische Afrika-Strategie zwischen Symbolik, Realpolitik und Kosmopolitischem Engagement,” *Internationale Politik* 61, no. 6 (2006): 84-89.

²⁷ Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Nichts wie weg? Zum Ende des EU-Militäreinsatzes im Kongo,” *Hamburger Informationen zur Friedensforschung* 41 (December 2006), <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?lng=en&id=26893> (accessed May 22, 2007); Atlantische Initiative, *Der Einsatz für Stabilität im Kongo. Die EUFOR-Mission und die Wahlen im Kongo. Lessons Learned*, http://www.global-agenda.org/files/a-i/kongo_reader.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

tasks of development policy. Evidence supporting that critique is the design of the African Peace Facility, an instrument to fund African owned peace keeping operations. It is financed through the European Development Fund (EDF). Others like Stefan Mair disagree:²⁸ They plea for less altruism and more engagement in the EU's Africa policy. This thesis will argue that the EU has shifted, indeed, from an altruistic development policy to a policy that has to serve the EU's security interests.

The motives for the conduct of the first military ESDP operation are controversial among academics. Fernanda Faria presents evidence that the EU's first autonomous military crisis management operation was considerably influenced by France, since the preparations for a unilateral French intervention had been nearly complete.²⁹ Stefan Mair argues the converse, that France had no national interests in Ituri to pursue.³⁰ Catherine Gegout conducted research concerning the motives of the EU to intervene in the DRC in 2003. She argues with a realist explanation, that "the EU is only likely to intervene in areas of strategic and economic importance, and at the low cost of military casualties" and that "the ARTEMIS mission can be considered as a 'one off' mission, and not as the first EU military intervention of a series of interventions." She concludes it is unlikely "that the EU is ... to act primarily for humanitarian reasons."³¹ Despite the fact that her prognosis is vitiated in general by the 2006 EU military crisis management operation EUFOR DRC, she was correct in that the EU Member States were reluctant to participate, as Peter Schmidt also purports.³²

Representative for another repeatedly discussed issue is Gorm Rye Olsen's proposition, that the EU has indeed an Africa policy but that this policy is not clear cut

²⁸ Stefan Mair, "Weniger Altruismus, mehr Engagement: Doch wie genau soll ein solches Engagement aussehen?" *Internationale Politik* 61, no. 4 (April 2006): 34-41.

²⁹ Faria, "Crisis Management," 14

³⁰ Stefan Mair, "Einsatzgebiet Kongo. Die EU Friedensmission in der Ituri-Provinz." *SWP-Aktuell* 22 (June 2003): 1-2, http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=128 (accessed May 22, 2007).

³¹ Catherine Gegout, "Causes and Consequences of the EU's Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Realist Explanation." *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10, no. 3 (2005): 429, 442.

³² Peter Schmidt, "Freiwillige vor!" *Internationale Politik* 61, no. 11 (November 2006): 68-77.

and may lack “consistency and coherence.” He worries about the danger that the EU will not “implement all policy declarations and policy intentions.”³³

C. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

This thesis will determine which factors cause change and continuity in the EU’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. The African conflicts and their escalation since 1989/90 are the independent variable (IV). The EU’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa is the dependent variable (DV). Conditional variables (CV) are three factors that influence the EU’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa: first its foundations, i.e., the EU’s normative values and its past Africa policy; second, exogenous factors such as the experience of recent humanitarian disasters in central Africa, the perception of threats emanating from sub-Saharan Africa and the experience with ESDP operations in other regions; and third, the particular interests of Great Britain and France in sub-Saharan Africa.

This thesis combines qualitative content analysis, process tracing and a single case study. At the beginning the author will examine several central documents, issued by the Council of the European Union and the European Commission between 1990 and 2005, in order to trace the evolution of the EU’s basic concepts for sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter will examine concepts, declarations and communications regarding peace and security in sub-Saharan Africa, adopted since the 1990s. The examination will be based on qualitative content analysis. The main concepts are the Council Communication *The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa* and the Council Communication on *Conflict Prevention*; the EU Council document *Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa*, *The European Security Strategy* (ESS), the *EU Strategy for Africa* (EUSFA), the EU Council document *EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform*; the Commission Communication *A Concept for the European Community Support for Security Sector Reform* and the *EU Concept for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*.

³³ Gorm Rye Olsen, “Challenges to Traditional Policy Options, Opportunities for New Choices: The Africa Policy of the EU,” *The Round Table* 93, no. 375 (2004): 425.

Security issues are at the center of this analysis. The author will also explore the relevance of the “key threats” for the EU’s security, mentioned in the ESS, for sub-Saharan Africa.

The next chapter introduces the EU’s concept of “effective multilateralism” as a way to promote its policy, but also as a norm per se. The author will present not only the EU’s understanding of this concept but also two of its major partners in sub-Saharan Africa. The survey is limited to two African organizations, the African Union (AU), which is the major partner for the EU in Africa, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), whose member states were involved in the DRC conflict as well as in its solution.

The following chapter analyses the influence of two EU Members States on the EU’s policy toward sub-Saharan Africa. It will be shown that France and Great Britain directed ESDP decisively towards sub-Saharan Africa.

The next chapter will study the implementation of the EU’s concepts towards sub-Saharan Africa. The main intention is to find out how, and to which extent, the EU is in fact implementing its political declarations of intent. The author investigates successively institutional, military and civilian crisis management capacities available today for the EU for sub-Saharan Africa. It will be shown that the EU has a unique array of instruments available which enable the EU to operate as a single actor in a broad mission spectrum. Military and civil operations complement one another.

This chapter will close with the case study: the analysis of the EU’s engagement in the DRC since 1990. Process tracing again is the primary method. The intention is to find out which factors determine the EU’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis is restricted to this single case because the EU’s ESDP crisis management operations in Africa are, with the exception of supportive measures of the AU operation in Darfur, limited to the DRC. Nevertheless, the EU has accomplished two ESDP military crisis management operations and is conducting two civil crisis management operations in the DRC. The case study will demonstrate that all three conditional variables had their impact on the EU’s policy toward the DRC: first, the EU’s normative values in the form

of the EU's obligation to effective multilateralism; second, exogenous factors in the form of a new threat perception; and third, France's interests in that region.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EU'S BASIC CONCEPTS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SINCE 1990

This chapter presents the basic driving factors for the EU's policy towards sub-Saharan Africa: Why is the EU engaged in crisis management in that region? The author argues that three external triggers changed significantly the EU's sub-Saharan Africa policy. First, the end of the Cold War; second, the experience of mission failure in Somalia and of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994/1995; and third, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath culminating in the Iraq war in 2003.

The author will show that the EU's motives are, on the one hand, the European's determination to promote their normative values in order to build a "better world" and, on the other hand, the realization that they have to engage in conflicts before they escalate violently. The political aims of the Cold War period did not fade away, but they lost importance in favor of security issues.

A. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE EU'S POLICY TOWARDS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The interaction between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa has a long history. European discoverers seeking personal or national benefit opened sub-Saharan Africa for European influence. This contact had serious consequences for Africa. Except for Ethiopia and Liberia, the whole continent was colonized by European powers and carved up in spheres of influence; the "scramble of Africa," conducted at the Berlin Conference in 1884-85, divided Africa into several states, regardless of ethnic belonging. The end of the Second World War initiated a new phase of African-European relations, the struggle for independence. Decolonization was superposed by the Cold War and wars were fought by the superpowers and their alleged proxies. New spheres of influence emerged. Both superpowers tried to maintain the status quo or to gain control of new clients. At the same time, European states such as France and Great Britain tried to maintain their influence in the former colonies or to secure their possessions, as did Portugal, which released its colonies late in the mid-1970s.

Despite the close and lasting relations of some of the Member States of the European Community (EC), the precursor organizations of the EU, with sub-Saharan Africa, this region was for a long time not a focus of the EU's external relations. The EC was primarily focused on economic and developmental issues regarding sub-Saharan Africa until the end of the Cold War.

Four significant developments shaped the relations of the EU towards sub-Saharan Africa since 1989/90. First, the end of the Cold War greatly reduced the interest of external actors in Africa. The continent was perceived to be marginal regarding global security issues. That enabled the EU to link its developmental aid to the political performance of the recipient sub-Saharan African States. As elsewhere, the principle of conditionality linked European aid to good governance.

The second development shaping the EU's relations towards Africa was the confrontation with serious problems in sub-Saharan Africa in the mid-1990s: the failure of the UN peacekeeping operation UNOSOM II in Somalia (1993-95) and the genocide in Rwanda in April 1994 were clear signals that economic and developmental support alone was not sufficient to stabilize this region, to prevent crises from emerging or even to stop violence and conflict.³⁴ The European governments realized that Africa could not be left on its own. Humanitarian disasters and the refugees arriving at the EU's frontiers called for external action. This perception had a serious impact; the EU began to develop capacities for that purpose. Recognizing the lack of capabilities for intervention or conducting EU crisis management operations, the EU had to rely on the capabilities and actions of its Member States, the UN or on African sub-regional organizations. The EU's political focus shifted from normative values to conflict prevention. The Balkan war experience bolstered this insight. Concepts were developed for how and in which phase the EU would be able to act concerning crises in Africa. Conflict prevention focused on the root causes of conflicts and how the EU could tackle them.

³⁴ Michael Bauer, "Peace-building durch 'Strukturelle Stabilität?' Möglichkeit und Grenzendes Konfliktpräventionsparadigmas der Europäischen Union," *Arbeitspapiere zu Problemen der Internationalen Politik und der Entwicklungsforschung* 42 (2005): 10, http://www.forschungsstelle-dritte-welt.de/Dokumente/AP/AP_42_Bauer.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007); Olsen, "Challenges," 431.

The third group of events influencing the EU's policy towards sub-Saharan Africa was the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the Iraq war in 2003. The European Council, the highest decision-making body of the EU, consisting of the Heads of State and Government (or Ministers) of the Member States, in December 2003 adopted the first European Security Strategy (ESS) in the aftermath of these events. This strategy was a signal that the EU was much more concerned about its security than before. Key threats for the EU were identified: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, regional conflicts, failing states and organized crime. Some of these threats are prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. Violent regional conflicts, terrorism, failing states, but also other issues like mass migration, it was realized, could pose direct or indirect threats to the EU.

The fourth development shaping the EU's relation towards sub-Saharan Africa was the initiation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999. It became a pivotal element in the second pillar of the EU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with a need of close coordination with the other two pillars, the European Communities, and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The second pillar, established in 1992, enabled the EU to act as a single entity in foreign affairs for the first time. But defense issues were excluded from cooperation until 1999. ESDP evolved significantly in a short time period. The intra-institutional changes affected the relations with sub-Saharan Africa. The EU began to create capacities to act in crises and to gain more leverage for effective action that was now available for crisis management in Africa.

After the founding phase until 2003 when the European Security Strategy was published and the EU launched its first missions, ESDP made further progress. Most of these improvements increased the EU's capacities for civil-military crisis management. The EU became more active as sixteen completed or ongoing ESDP missions since 2003 demonstrate. The EU conducted its first ESDP military crisis management operation in sub-Saharan Africa in 2003: it deployed troops to Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to protect the local civilian population.

Thus, the EU evolved since 1990s from an organization focusing for decades on economic issues to an entity with global aspirations in all political fields. This of course had repercussions on its policies towards all world regions, including sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1989/90, the EU's Africa policy experienced a threefold change: first, the perception of the region changed profoundly – from a mere poverty-stricken region to a security concern; second, the instruments of the EU increased – from mere development aid to peace support missions, both civilian and military; third, the willingness to engage grew – from low-key humanitarian engagement to peace building on the verge to peacemaking. And this is just a snapshot of a process that is still ongoing.

B. THE EU AS A NORMATIVE POWER: IT'S CONCEPTS UNTIL THE MID-1990S

The EU can look back on a long period of interaction with sub-Saharan Africa. The relation during the Cold War was determined by the ideological rivalry of the Western, anti-communist bloc and the Soviet Union. Both sides supported regimes to maintain and increase their influence in Africa independently of the political, moral or legal quality of the African regimes. The end of the East-West confrontation has changed significantly the EU's policy toward SSA, which became more multifaceted and comprehensive. The EU was now able to care more about the political quality of the regimes it dealt with. It henceforth linked “peace, stability, development and respect for human rights, rule of law, democratic principles and good governance [with its] cooperation and development policies towards Africa.”³⁵

Gorm Rye Olsen argues that the end of the Cold War opened a window of opportunity for the EU to increase its independent actions in external relations and exercise its influence on a global scale in order to “become a prominent actor on the international scene.” He states that the traditional EU policy goal toward SSA, the “promotion of economic and social development,” lost much of its importance during the 1990s. He observed a decline in development funds provided by the EU to SSA and

³⁵ Faria, “Crisis Management,” 31

argues that this is an indicator of the decreasing importance of that topic for the EU.³⁶ The author claims that this assessment is outdated and will present that the EU increased significantly its financial developmental support for sub-Saharan Africa in the last years.

C. MID-1990S TO 2003: CONCEPTS FOR CRISIS PREVENTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Olsen's "window of opportunity" was closed in the mid 1990s. The EU was now confronted with serious problems in SSA: the failure of the UN peacekeeping operation UNOSOM II in Somalia (1993-95) and the genocide in Rwanda in April 1994 were appalling wake-up calls that economic and developmental support alone is not sufficient to stabilize SSA or even to hinder crises from emerging.³⁷ These incidents functioned as exogenous factors, which stimulated the transformation of the EU's policy and structure. The normative focus on development, despite its linkage to conditions such as good governance, respect of human rights etc., was insufficient to prevent brutal civil wars or at least to stop ongoing conflicts – the awareness of a need for crisis management capabilities rose. However, due to the fact that the EU had no common security and defense policy until 1999, and hence no common means for intervention, its foreign policy was still focused on political, economic or financial instruments. As a matter of necessity, the EU focused much more on the prevention of the root causes of conflicts than on meeting imminent crises.

The first important EU documents coping with crises in Africa were published in 1995 and 1996.³⁸ Solving conflicts violently is principally rejected by the EU because they contradict the basic ideals of the EU. The European Commission expressed in 1996 that

³⁶ Olsen, "Challenges," 425-426.

³⁷ Bauer, "Peace Building," 10; Olsen, "Challenges," 431.

³⁸ Council of the European Union, *Conclusions of the Council on Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa*. Brussels, December 04, 1995, <http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/theme/prevention/conclusions-1995.htm> (accessed March 15, 2007); Commission for the European Communities, *The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace Building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond*. SEC(96)332, Brussels, March 06, 1996, http://aei.pitt.edu/4280/01/002318_1.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

the European Union is heavily concerned by the issue of conflicts in Africa. This is not only because the international discussion necessitates an adequate response of the Union, not merely because of the moral obligation to reduce human suffering, nor simply the obligation to use its resources in the most meaningful way. For the European Union, the existence of violent conflicts in Africa is increasingly challenging the achievement of its declared policy goals. Fostering peace, stability, democracy and human rights under the conditions of conflicts is a nearly impossible task.³⁹

The Council emphasized, like the Commission, that the EU's commitment to Africa is not guided alone by self interest, its actions are also directed by a moral obligation to improve the living conditions of Africans in general. It stated that:

independent of the historical and particular links between EU Member States and African States, peace, stability and sustainable development, as well as respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance in Africa are of interest and relevance to the Union for reasons of preserving peace and strengthening international security, as well as for humanitarian reasons. The international community, and particularly the Union, cannot remain indifferent to events in Africa. The commitment of the EU to Africa is based on shared interests, values and objectives: a wish to help Africa to achieve peace, stability and sustainable development in order to improve the quality of life of its people.⁴⁰

The two quotations clearly state that the EU was willing to act as a norm diffuser in Africa.

1. EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crises

The European Commission declared in 1996 that:

the means available to the European Union are limited compared to the magnitude of the task of effectively preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in Africa. The Union should aspire to maximise its leverage through an optimal use of its instruments and resources. Therefore, the European Union should develop a comprehensive and pro-active approach ... This approach should be pro-active because the European Union,

³⁹ Commission for the European Communities, *The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa*, 1.

⁴⁰ Council of the European Union, *Conflict prevention and resolution in Africa*, Luxembourg, June 2, 1997, Annex, paragraph 3, <http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/theme/prevention/j2-conclusions-1997.htm> (accessed March 15, 2007).

without prejudging the basic principle that Africans are primarily responsible for handling the issue of violent conflicts, has not only an important interest but also an important potential for actively addressing this issue.⁴¹

The EU's basic concept regarding conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa is comprehensive and covers the whole conflict cycle, including conflict prevention, conflict management, peace-building, and conflict resolution. However, the range of options is effectively limited due to the availability of means.

This concept is visualized in Figure 1. It shows four conflict situations a country could face, the political aims of the EU and the instruments the EU is willing to employ to handle the situation.⁴²




Figure 1. EU's Peace Building Activities in Africa⁴³

⁴¹ Commission for the European Communities, *The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa*, 2.

⁴² Ibid., 4-5.

Michael Bauer labels short and medium term conflict prevention as “process oriented prevention” with the aim to influence the potential or actual conflict parties, to reduce or reverse conflict escalation and to, enable communication and support crisis solution. Operational prevention is synonymous for process oriented prevention. A wide spectrum of instruments could be used to support process oriented conflict prevention: official diplomacy could mediate or arrange peace conferences. Informal diplomacy could organize workshops, conduct private mediation, or support local arbitrators. Positive inducements, like offering most-favored-nation treatment, as well as negative sanctions, like imposing embargos, can be adopted in the political and economic realm. Preventive military measures, like the deployment of troops, are also supporting process oriented prevention.⁴⁴

The Commission’s term “peace-building” is defined by Bauer as “structural oriented prevention” of conflicts with the aim to engage the root causes of crises. Could the root causes be solved, then the potential for crises would be reduced.⁴⁵ Structural prevention is a medium and long term approach with the aim to eliminate conflict laden conditions by guaranteeing security, maintenance of the state monopoly of the legitimate use of force, economic and social stability, legitimacy, rule of law and justice. Structural prevention needs, therefore, a variety of instruments and policies which comprises the promotion of human rights, security-sector reform, economic and financial support, reform of political, judicative and administrative institutions, political participation, democratization and the support of the civil society.⁴⁶

The core problem for the EU concerning possible actions in conflict and peace in the mid-1990s was that it had no means at its disposal to intervene as a “hard power.” The peace building activities possible did not include the deployment of any kind of

⁴³ Figure drawn by the author based on: Commission for the European Communities, *The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa*, 4-5.

⁴⁴ Bauer, “Peace Building,” 14.

⁴⁵ Post-conflict peace-building is a term used by Boutros Boutros Ghali in his Agenda for Peace and comprises measures to consolidate peace if necessary after a conflict has been terminated by a “comprehensive agreement”.

⁴⁶ Bauer, “Peace Building,” 14.

military or police force. Those assets are, though, important, if not decisive, in times of tension and conflict. The EU had to rely on other international organizations like the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the West European Union (WEU), or even its Member States.

2. The Concept of Structural Stability

In 1996, the European Commission summarized the “ultimate policy goal for activities concerning conflicts in Africa” as “structural stability.” Five years later, in 2001, this was again the core concept of a policy paper by the European Commission. Characteristics of “structural stability” are:

sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures, and healthy social and environmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change without [having] to resort to violent conflict.⁴⁷

The concept of structural stability assumes that societies which can create and sustain the mentioned factors are able to solve conflicts without the resort to violent means. The elements of structural stability are illustrated in Figure 2.

⁴⁷ Commission for the European Communities, *The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa*, 2.




Figure 2. Elements of Structural Stability⁴⁸

This concept comprises the elements the EU Commission identified as the necessary conditions to establish stability. Major drawbacks in one of these elements are sufficient to destabilize societies and create tensions that could erupt in violence. The implementation of this “ultimate policy goal” is a real challenge for the EU because it consists of vague categories which are, by themselves, difficult to define and to measure. As a consequence, it is difficult to devise suitable policies and means to realize this aim. Another problem is that most elements first of all fall into the responsibility of local governments – African ownership is obvious. The EU can foster these conditions only indirectly by influencing African governments via incentives or sanctions. The EU will

⁴⁸ Figure drawn by the author based on: Commission for the European Communities, *The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa*, 2.

not run an African economy by itself or organize healthy environmental conditions. This does remain the task for the Africans themselves.⁴⁹

3. Tackling the Root Causes of Violent Conflict

Closely connected to the model of structural stability is the European Commission's approach of structural prevention. The Commission declared in 1996 that:

no amount of humanitarian aid and no effective peace-keeping operation will solve a crisis of peace and security, justice and resources in a sustainable way, there is a need to try to go beyond ad-hoc decisions and a policy of damage limitation.⁵⁰

The European Council focused its attention on the root causes of violent conflict already in 1997:

In other parts of Africa, however, violent conflicts have undermined development [the realm of the European Community] and have resulted in a serious deterioration of the living standards of the population. These violent conflicts, more often than not intrastate rather than interstate, have multiple causes and take many forms. Ethnic, cultural and religious factors often combine with weak social, economic and political structures, rapid socio-economic transition, inequality and environmental degradation. If the root causes of conflicts are to be tackled successfully, then political and socio-economic imbalances, insufficient respect for human rights, as well as lack of effective democratic government, freedom of press and free flow of information must be addressed. Effective mechanisms and institutions for the peaceful reconciliation of divergent interests need to be developed, including legitimate and accountable state structures and vibrant civil societies.⁵¹

Javier Solana, the High Representative of CFSP, personally addressed the root causes of violence conflicts in Africa:

⁴⁹ Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," *International Security*, 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 85-120 He presents a variety of possible models how sovereignty can be shared between weak or failing states and an external actor to (re-)build the states. Power sharing can happen in selected areas but there are also models where external state can rule another state in form of a trusteeship or as a protectorate.

⁵⁰ Commission for the European Communities, *The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa*, 2.

⁵¹ Council of the European Union: *Conflict prevention and resolution in Africa*, Annex, paragraph 2.

Many regions – especially in Africa – are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity, and poverty. Regional conflicts fuel the demand for proliferation. Violent religious extremism is linked to the pressures of modernisation, and to the alienation of young people in societies, which are experiencing social, cultural and political crisis.⁵²

As accepted in the concept of structural stability, conflicts are inevitable in human society. The occurrence of intrastate violence is a symptom of the incapability to solve conflicts in a constructive way. Laurie Nathan states that four structural conditions are the root causes of violence: these conditions are “authoritarian rule; the exclusion of minorities from governance; socio- economic deprivation combined with inequity; and weak states that lack the institutional capacity to manage normal political and social conflict.”⁵³

D. THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO SECURITY

International security has changed drastically since the Cold War ended in 1989, a development which has altered the EU Member States’ perception of their own security. Until that historical event, the security assessment of the EU Member States, regardless their parallel membership in the NATO or their status as neutrals, was determined by the existence of a reasonable threat: the existence of the Warsaw Pact under the tight control of the Soviet Union and its assumed aggressive ideology. Security was primarily defined “in military terms and concerned primarily with the national security of the territorial state.”⁵⁴

First steps concerning the development of a common foreign policy of the EU had been made prior to this fundamental change in the international system. Major developments in that realm have happened since 1989, but, again, additional external

⁵² Solana; Javier. *Address by Javier Solana , EU the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at the National Forum on Europe*. Dublin Castle, January 8, 2004, 4, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/78600.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

⁵³ Laurie Nathan, “The four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Structural Causes of Crisis and Violence in Africa,” *Track Two*, 10 (August 2001): 3, http://www.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/10_2/p04_horsemen.html (accessed May 22, 2007).

⁵⁴ Heinz Gärtner, Adrian Hyde-Price, and Erich Reiter, eds. *Europe’s New Security Challenges* (Bolder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 1.

shocks were necessary to shape the EU Member States' position towards a real *Common Security and Defense Policy* (CFFP), respectively a *Common European Security and Defense Policy* (ESDP).

The hopes of many citizens, politicians and political scientists were that with what Fukuyama ambivalently termed the “end of history,”⁵⁵ a peaceful international society could emerge out of the dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the de-legitimization of the communist doctrine. But this hope was illusionist: the outbreak of the Balkans wars and also the humanitarian disasters in Sierra Leone and Somalia, as well as the genocide in Rwanda⁵⁶ showed the EU that they had neither the adequate political institutions nor the means to solve those problems in its close neighborhood. The culmination of that crisis had been the war in Kosovo in 1999 that could only be solved with the recourse to NATO.

The European experience of helplessness in Kosovo changed the EU Member States minds concerning a more comprehensive security and defense policy. The British-French St. Malo Summit in December 1998 set the course for the EU decision to start ESDP in June 1999. The obvious lack of coherence and capabilities was unacceptable for the EU in the long run. The EU drew the conclusion that it needed effective procedures and instruments for crisis management to be capable to handle future crises.

In subsequent Council Meetings, the MS decided to develop the necessary institutions and capabilities. The military Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) was adopted in Helsinki in December 1999. The EU Member States agreed to create a military force of 50,000 to 60,000 troops, which should be deployed within 60 days after the decision to launch an operation and which should have a sustainability of one year. They also established three new bodies within the EU structure: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS).

⁵⁵ Francis Fukuyama, “Second Thoughts.” *National Interest* 56 (1999): 16-33.

⁵⁶ Adrian Hyde Price, “European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force,” *European Security*, 13, no. 4 (2004): 332.

The unity of the EU came under enormous pressure in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001: the EU Member States were unable to find a common position toward the U.S. engagement in Iraq. To add insult to injury, the two peacemakers of the EU, France and Great Britain, found themselves in opposite camps. Great Britain supported the U.S. operation in Iraq and sent its own contingent into the battle, while France rejected any military operation against the country.

Under these circumstances, the European Security Strategy aimed both inward towards bridging the intra-European gap that had evolved and outward formulating common principles on how to act worldwide, also against the U.S. The central leitmotif of the ESS is that Europe experienced peace and prosperity in the second half of the 20th century. This period of peace is not a result of fortune, rather, it is the result of integration and cooperation within the EU; rule of law and democracy are necessary conditions for peace on the continent. In its self estimation, the economic capability and the number of more than 450 million citizens qualifies the EU to play a global role: “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security.” This statement shows that not only the protection of the Member States against rising threats is in the focus of the ESS. The strategy also includes a self-imposed responsibility for a better world and the clear declaration of the EU’s will “to promote its values” to establish security as a prerequisite for development.⁵⁷

1. EU’s Interests in Crisis Management

The threat of interstate war in the bipolar world and of military invasion of Western Europe from the East has given way to more diffuse threats which have the potential capability of challenging the EU Member States in the future. The challenges are so complex that they cannot be solved by a single actor. Cooperation in the realm of security is the EU’s preferred way to handle the challenges.

The EU is deeply enmeshed in an interdependent world. Europe’s welfare is dependent on a global market. The import of goods, many of its vital resources, as well as

⁵⁷ Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 2.

the export of European manufactured goods is vulnerable to violent conflict. Globalization makes the world smaller. Internal conflicts, diseases, economic decline and poverty can evolve into threats for the EU, whether they are direct or indirect. The EU is willing to face the threats abroad. Africa specifically though is not addressed very prominently in the ESS, it is mentioned only six times, used to illustrate the tragic fate of its people. The ESS states that sub-Saharan Africa

is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, the failure of economic growth has been linked to political problems and violent conflict. In some parts of the world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, a cycle of insecurity has come into being.⁵⁸

During the Cold War, “security was defined in military terms and was concerned primarily with the national security of the territorial state.” This concept, picked up by the realist school of International Relations, is connected with the security dilemma and other problems states may face in an anarchic international system.⁵⁹ However, the classical definition of security has changed. The ESS mentions five “key threats” to European security: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. Terrorist attacks are more likely to pose a threat to the EU Member States than a “classical” military attack from any of its neighbors. The terrorist threat will become more critical if there is the danger that terrorists have access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

a) EU’s Concept of Security

A substitute for the Realist definition of security is the concept of “comprehensive security.” Roots of insecurity could be poverty, unequal distribution of power, economic decline, ethnic, religious or nationalist extremism; or even environmental degradation, critical population growth combined with limited availability of resources, violations of human rights, terrorism, organized crime and proliferation of

⁵⁸ Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 3.

⁵⁹ Heinz Gärtner and Adrian Hyde Price, “Introduction,” in *Europe’s New Security Challenges*, edited by Heinz Gärtner, Adrian Hyde-Price and Erich Reiter (Bolder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 1.

WMD.⁶⁰ This was always the case, but the insight was marginalized during the Cold War due to the overwhelming mental effect of bipolarity. Security for the EU now comprises not only national survival, but also the stable functioning of a government, acceptable living conditions of the citizens and economic welfare and growth.

Biscop and Arnould claim that there is a specific European approach towards security: the Union is acting on the assumption that the provision of “global public goods” (GPG) is the key for international security. The characteristic of public goods is that no one can be excluded from their consumption. Global public goods are identical to those public goods “that the state provides at the national level – or is rightly expected to provide – to its citizens” and consist at least of

- physical security or ‘freedom from fear;’
- political participation, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- an open and inclusive economic order that provides for the wealth of everyone – or ‘freedom from want;’
- social wellbeing in all of its aspects – access to health, to education, to a clean and hazard-free environment, etc.⁶¹

Compared to the earlier mentioned model of structural stability, the concept of global public goods comprises the same characteristics and, despite the fact that the GPG concept is mostly associated with developmental issues, it became relevant for security matters.⁶² Although the ESS is not using the term GPG, it is expressing the concept:

⁶⁰ Jörg Faust and Dirk Messner, “Europe’s New Security Strategy: Challenges for Development,” *Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik Discussion Paper 3*, (2004). They offer a similar concept of “extended security.”

⁶¹ Biscop, “From Reflections to Power,” 89.

⁶² Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002).

Spreading good governance, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.⁶³

Good governance has been defined by the EU as “the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development.”⁶⁴

Biscop and Arnould argue that the division of mankind into “haves” or “have-nots” in respect to the access to global public goods is the “ultimate systemic threat to Europe’s security.” The exclusion of people from public goods can result in “political instability, extremism and violence, economic unpredictability and massive migration flows” which could be uncontrollable at a certain level of inequality.⁶⁵ As a result, the “political upheaval, extremisms of all kinds, economic uncertainty and migration flows will become uncontrollable – as Europe already experienced once, in the 1930s.”⁶⁶ Regarding this proposition, European security is dependent on the political, social, ecological and economic conditions in its closer and also more remote neighborhood. Most distant events do not threaten the EU directly but “negative spillover effects” could have the capability to do so.⁶⁷ Olsen argues in a similar way: he states that the EU has “special ... security interests in weak post colonial states because ... it is exposed to turmoil and general instability.” Because these factors can pose a threat to the EU, it “is in the EU’s ... interest to prevent turmoil, conflicts and general instability in sub-Saharan Africa.”⁶⁸ Stefan Mair came to the same conclusion. There is no guarantee that the

⁶³ Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 9.

⁶⁴ *Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one Part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part. (Cotonou Agreement)* Art 9 (3), http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/cotonou/pdf/agr01_en.pdf#zoom=100 (accessed March 15, 2007).

⁶⁵ Sven Biscop and Valerie Arnould, “Global Public Goods: An Integrative Agenda for EU External Action,” in Eide, *Effective Multilateralism*, 22-31.

⁶⁶ Biscop, “The European Security Strategy,” 17.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 7.

⁶⁸ Olsen, “Challenges,” 428.

effects of state failure, repression, lack of economic prospects, social impoverishment and excessive violence on African states could be limited in the long run to this continent.⁶⁹

As earlier mentioned, the EU's engagement in African conflicts was not focused on the prevention of threats emerging in sub-Saharan Africa; it has to be seen in the context of a general normative approach of the Union to shape the world, within its capabilities, into a better environment for humankind. The EU is willing to cope with this vision and to intervene in conflicts in Africa with the ultimate goal of structural stability.⁷⁰

b) EU's Model to Improve Its Security

The EU repeatedly emphasizes that peace and security are essential for development, but this could also be reversed. On the one hand, security is the prerequisite for development; on the other hand, development can increase the people's access to global public goods and in doing so, reduce the causes of insecurity for the EU.

Figure 3 visualizes this concept. The defect in global governance, the denied access to global public goods and the growing gap between those "who have and those who have not" can cause the key threats mentioned in the ESS. These threats can have direct effects on the EU's security, especially the proliferation of WMD or terrorism, but they can also threaten the EU indirectly through regional conflict, state failure or organized crime. The latter three threats can spill over into the EU because of increasing interdependence in a "globalized" world.

⁶⁹ Mair, "Weniger Altruismus," 37.

⁷⁰ Commission for the European Communities. *The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa*, 2.




Figure 3. Causes for the European Union's insecurity⁷¹

This concept offers international actors two possibilities to increase their security: either the EU concentrates on eliminating the immediate key threats by means of short-term crisis management (operational crisis prevention) which is the predominant, conventional approach; or, with a more long-term vision, it can try to tackle the root causes of insecurity (structural prevention), which does not end once violence has broken out, but actually covers the whole conflict cycle.

It should be noted, though, that this diagram has its limits. The difficulty is that the EU itself is not only affected by the five security problems, but that it itself contributes to the root causes of crisis and insecurity, e.g. through its economic policy

⁷¹ Figure drawn by the author.

and the spill-over effects of globalization to the local African economy. This issue is emphasized by the critical anti-globalization movements and is repeatedly in the focus of the media during G8 summits.

Also, the broad definition of security is not unchallenged. Hyde-Price, for example, warns against a too diffuse definition of security and classifies security in a two step approach: first, its primary focus has to remain about “conflict between discrete political communities” and second, “the causes of war and the conditions for peace.”⁷² The comprehensive security concept is also beyond the definition of security of Wallander and Keohane. Acknowledging that there are many broader concepts they define security strategies more narrow than the ESS does, as:

measures to protect the territorial integrity of states from the adverse use of military force, efforts to guard state autonomy against the political effects of potential use; and policies designated to prevent the emergence of situations that could lead to the use of force against one’s territory or vital interests.⁷³

Comprehensive security is multi-dimensional according to the EU. In order to cope with its full spectrum, the EU has established a concept which comprises of an

overall approach in using civilian and military means to respond coherently to the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization.⁷⁴

The ESS is based on the theory of “democratic peace”, arguing that the “best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states.”⁷⁵ This

⁷² Adrian Hyde Price, “‘Beware of the Jabberwock!’ Security Studies in the Twenty First Century,” in *Europe’s New Security Challenges*, edited by Gärtner, Hyde-Price and Reiter, 36.

⁷³ Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, “Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions,” in *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 24.

⁷⁴ Council of the European Union, *Civilian Headline Goal 2008*. Brussels, December 7, 2004, 2 [http://www.intermin.fi/intermin/hankkeet/skh/home.nsf/files/Civilian%20Headline%20Goal%202008/\\$file/Civilian%20Headline%20Goal%202008.pdf](http://www.intermin.fi/intermin/hankkeet/skh/home.nsf/files/Civilian%20Headline%20Goal%202008/$file/Civilian%20Headline%20Goal%202008.pdf) (accessed May 22, 2007).

⁷⁵ Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 10.

concept alleges that democratic states, though they are not peaceful in principle, do not fight wars against each other. Bruce Russett provides evidence that there “were no wars between democracies” and also that it “is tempting to believe that a norm against the use of force between democracies, and even the threat of use of force, has emerged and strengthened over time.”⁷⁶ Despite the fact that this seems to be a probabilistic argument, Russett and Oneal supplement this theory with the statement that “democracy must rest on a foundation of prosperity and that the economic well-being of ... countries depends on stable, cooperative economic relations among themselves and others.” Their concept argues, based on the “Kantian Triangle,” that the three factors of democracy, economic interdependence and international organizations interact and thus promote peace.⁷⁷ This proposition helps to explain why the EU supports democracy as an instrument to increase its security.

2. EU’s Strategic Security Objectives

As outlined in the ESS, the EU pursues three strategic objectives. The first is addressing the mentioned threats. Second, the EU recognizes that geography matters; thus, the EU is especially concerned about the security situation in its neighborhood. The EU wants to establish a well-governed ring of countries around its borders to keep threats away from its territory. The question is, where does the European neighborhood end? Though the European Neighborhood Policy, that was formulated subsequently, does only include the North African states (besides the Middle Eastern and East European states), Klaus-Dieter Schwarz alleges that sub-Saharan Africa should also belong to it. However, neighborhood or not, the ESS is a strategy with global aspirations and sub-Saharan Africa

⁷⁶ Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold-War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 21-2.

⁷⁷ Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: Norton & Norton, 2001), 25, 35.

is not neglected.⁷⁸ Third, the EU has the strategic aim to strengthen the international order, which is to be “based on effective multilateralism.” The meaning and realization of this concept is analyzed later.

One of the EU’s priorities is to “strengthen the UN, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively.”⁷⁹ Institutionalized cooperation for the EU is the result of the positive development of Western Europe in the last 50 years. The EU wants “international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security”. It is specifically mentioning the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and regional organizations outside Europe like the African Union (AU). Because of its belief that the quality of international society – a concept borrowed from Hedley Bull and the English School – depends on the quality of individual governments, the EU wants to promote good governance. In other words, “international relations should be organized through strong, negotiated and enforceable multilateral regimes.”⁸⁰

3. Policy Implications Derived from the European Security Strategy

The EU is willing to deal with a crisis in all its phases, and tries to create conditions that are favorable to peaceful conflict management and hinder conflicts from turning violent. However, the EU is willing to use military force as a means of last resort to intervene in conflicts, as a resolution of the EU Council gives evidence:

Aware that peace and security are closely interlinked with political, institutional and socio-economic development and respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights, the Council holds that an effective policy of conflict prevention and resolution necessitates a coherent mix of political, economic, developmental, social and

⁷⁸ Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, “Die erste Sicherheitsstrategie der EU. Ein Kommentar zum Solana-Entwurf,” *SWP-Aktuell* 47 (2003): 4, http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=559 (accessed May 22, 2007).

⁷⁹ Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 9.

⁸⁰ Espen Barth Eide, “Introduction: The Role of the EU in Fostering, Effective Multilateralism,” in Eide, *Effective Multilateralism*, 2.

environmental instruments including, where appropriate, military means. Regarding the latter, the EU has with a clear preference for non-military preventive actions.⁸¹

The ESS outlines policy implications for Europe. The Union, it is argued, should be more active, more capable and more coherent. Its policies should be conducted cooperatively with partners. What does this imply?

First, the EU must be more coherent in the use of its available instruments and capabilities. The ESS states that “none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.”⁸² In other words, coherence is necessary because different tasks have to be fulfilled by civilian and military means which are at the ESDP’s disposal. To complicate matters further, some means are under the control of the European Community, i.e. the Commission (first pillar), some under the control of CFSP/ESDP, i.e. the European Council and its Secretariat (second pillar). Civil-Military Operations (CMOs) thus require not only intra-, but also inter-pillar coordination. The different political agendas of the Commission and the Council have to be streamlined and coordinated to increase the effectiveness in crisis prevention and management; this should be supported by coherent regional policies which include the regional actors in conflict resolution.

The second implication of the ESS is that the EU needs to become more capable in order to fulfill its strategic objectives. This includes the transformation of its military “into more flexible, mobile forces” to be better capable to meet the new challenges e.g. concerning strategic transport, and the establishment of more civilian resources for crisis and post crisis situations. The ESS calls on the MS to prepare for a broad spectrum of missions the EU should be capable to fulfill. The ESS took up and refined the Petersberg Tasks which are also mentioned in Article 17.2 of the Treaty of the European Union. They comprise of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Territorial defense of the EU Member States

⁸¹ Council of the European Union, *Conflict prevention and resolution in Africa*, Annex, paragraph 5.

⁸² Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 7.

territory is excluded from these tasks.⁸³ In the words of the ESS, the potential mission spectrum should comprise joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism, and security sector reform (SSR).⁸⁴

Third, the EU must be more active since the EU disposes over a wide spectrum of effective tools for crisis management, which comprises “political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities.” Operations which combine two or more of these elements are of particular importance. These tools should be used synergetically to pursue the strategic objectives. The EU viewed itself over a long time as a “soft power” and neglected military affairs. Now the EU is accepting that the military is sometimes necessary to back up diplomacy.

Fourth, the outlined problems and threats cannot be solved by the EU autonomously because they have complex causes. The ESS draws the conclusion that “multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors” is the only way to counter the challenges for EU’s security.⁸⁵

4. Threat Assessment for Sub-Saharan Africa

The ESS mentioned five “key threats” for European security: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. These key threats vary in their prominence as concerns sub-Saharan Africa.

Subsequently, I outline the relevance of these “key threats” for the EU’s security. I argue first, that they are not all prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, and secondly, that Europe is not threatened directly through regional conflicts and failing states but that the

⁸³ Martin Ortega, *Petersberg Tasks, and Missions for the EU Military Forces*, Condé-Sur-Noireau: EU Institute for Security Studies (February 2005). <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/04-mo.pdf> (accessed May 28, 2007). The Petersberg tasks were defined by the West European Union (WEU) in a meeting on the Petersberg Hotel near Bonn/Germany in 1992.

⁸⁴ Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 12-3.

⁸⁵ Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 13

these conflicts could affect Europe in the long term strongly.⁸⁶ In addition to the “key threats,” the effects of illegal migration also have to be taken into account.

a) *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism*

The proliferation of WMD and terrorism are the most prominent threats mentioned in the ESS, the threat is obvious if terrorists could acquire such weapons. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that any sub-Saharan African state disposes over WMD or is going to acquire such weapons.⁸⁷ The only state that worked on a nuclear program, South Africa, abandoned it prior to the collapse of the apartheid regime.

Terrorism is doubtlessly a direct threat for the EU. EU Member States have had experience with terrorist groups in Europe, such as the ETA in Spain, the IRA in the United Kingdom, or the RAF in West Germany. Terrorists are challenging the state and terrorizing the population. The question is whether internationally operating terrorists are hiding in sub-Saharan Africa or not. Scholars and politicians disagree on this topic of “safe havens”. International terrorism can be traced to Sudan, whose government harbored Osama Bin Laden until May 1996.⁸⁸ Islamic terrorists committed the bombing attacks against the embassies in Kenya; the Unions of Islamic Courts were alleged to protect terrorist suspects in Somalia. The breakdown of order in Somalia is a major concern, especially for the U.S. administration fearing that Somalia could become a safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorists.⁸⁹

Despite these terrorist activities and the appearance of suspects in sub-Saharan Africa, there is no evidence of a “specific African terrorism.”⁹⁰ Mills argues that terrorists in Africa are not global players; the “real terrorist threat on this continent

⁸⁶ Mair, “Konfliktpotentiale,” 111.

⁸⁷ Mair, “Weniger Altruismus,” 37.

⁸⁸ Alex de Waal, *Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 216.

⁸⁹ International Crisis Group, “Can the Somali Crisis be Contained?” *Africa Report* no. 116 (August 2006); International Crisis Group, “Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State.” *Africa Report* no. 45 (Mai 2002).

⁹⁰ Mair, “Weniger Altruismus,” 37.

remains internal.”⁹¹ In a similar way, Mair states that all the problems and shortfalls connected with conflicts, wars, state failure and the root causes of insecurity are not sufficient to create globally operating terrorist networks like al Qaeda that had its safe haven in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that locally operating terrorists pose a threat to EU residents and tourists in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the terrorist attack on the Jewish synagogue in Djerba / Tunisia in April 2002, it is not clear how far the EU is directly threatened through terrorists operating from that region.

b) *Regional Conflicts*

Conflicts are widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa: most African sub-regions are affected by wars, internal strife and / or ethnic conflict. To give only a few examples: In West Africa conflicts arose in Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, and Liberia. In Central Africa the epidemic conflict in the DRC is obvious, especially at its eastern border. The Great Lakes Region is torn by rebel movements and ethnic violence involving Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. The Horn of Africa is another restless region. Cross border wars between Ethiopia and Somalia, the echo of the independence war of Eritrea, the collapse of Somalia and the brutal internal conflicts in Sudan’s south and west (Darfur) are only a few examples of the omnipresence of violence in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa. These conflicts destroy the fabric of societies, create deep cleavages, and displace millions of people in the country, the region or even beyond. Rebels often operate from neighboring countries which are unable to hinder them or even support such groups to destabilize neighbors. Conflicts in Africa usually do not stop at internationally recognized borders; they implicate their neighbors and sometimes the whole region.

Regional conflicts will not affect Europe’s security directly; there is not even a sign that a conflict party will pose a threat to the EU. The military capabilities are negligible.⁹² The most likely threat is that European citizens residing in sub-Saharan Africa could be whipsawed by the local conflicts. Military capabilities for non-

⁹¹ Greg Mills, “Africa’s New Strategic Significance,” *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (2004): 158.

⁹² Meinken, “Militärische Kapazitäten und Fähigkeiten afrikanischer Staaten. ”

combatant evacuation operations are held ready by several EU Member States. Operations of this kind also belong to the mission spectrum of the new EU Battle Groups. However, regional conflicts can create mass migration of refugees and displaced persons. Most of them find refuge in neighboring countries but there is the omnipresent possibility that they try to seek protection and/or a better life in Europe – a challenge for the European societies analyzed later in this thesis. Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa are often carried out with extreme violence and brutality. The atrocities of the Hutu Interhamwe in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s and early 2000s and the Janjaweed militia in Darfur gave evidence of that. Modern media, especially the television, can have an important impact on the European public opinion and can put great pressure on the European politicians to act in humanitarian disasters, as the intervention of NATO in Kosovo in 1999 demonstrated. This military operation was in part stimulated by media reports about the killing of civilians by Serbian militias, such as the Racak massacre that triggered the intervention. On the other hand, the CNN effect seems to decrease in importance with geographic distance. Atrocities in Darfur are well documented but up to now the international community has not decided to intervene against the will of Sudan's government.⁹³

c) Failed States

In a Western view, a modern state could be defined as an entity which comprises three elements: territory, citizens and legal authority. The modern state is constituted by the claim of the central authority for political-institutional control about a defined territory and the inhabiting population. States have to be acknowledged by the international community.⁹⁴

Failing states are those internationally recognized entities which exist in defined borders, inhabited by a population, but without a functioning central authority,

⁹³ Human Rights Watch, Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan, "Human Rights Watch Report 16, no. 6 (May 2004), <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/sudan0504full.pdf> (accessed May 27, 2007).

⁹⁴ Ulrich Schneckenner ed. "States at Risk. Fragile Staaten als Sicherheits- und Entwicklungsproblem," SWP-Studie 43 (November 2004), 9-10, http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=1708 (accessed May 22, 2007).

respectively an authority which cannot exercise its power over the two other elements.⁹⁵ In addition, failed states are characterized by these symptoms: state institutions are unable to manage their central or core functions, unable to provide security for their citizens and unable to control their territory; the guaranty of law and order is not feasible, nor are the provisions of physical infrastructure and basic supplies of public health care and education.⁹⁶ The lack of rule and law compromises the legitimacy of the government, participation of the population in decisions and the quality of the judiciary.⁹⁷

To differentiate the capacity deficit in the realm of state authority, Gero Erdmann developed the “Apocalyptic Trias” model which comprises three elements: state failure, state decline and state disintegration.⁹⁸ Erdmann argues that nearly all African states are threatened by state failure. This includes, for example, the collapse of the public health or education system, deterioration of existing infrastructure, increase of criminality and corruption. State decline is defined as a situation in which the state has lost its authority over parts of its territory. State functions are substituted and privatized. The third category, state disintegration, is defined as the collapse of the entire state authority. This could be limited territorially, and be partial state disintegration, or total disintegration of state authority, like what happened in Somalia in the 1990s. State failure is one of the biggest concerns in the ESS: “State failure undermines global governance and adds to regional instability.” The ESS warns that “state failure and organized crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa.”⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Tull, “Stabilisierungsstrategien,” 7.

⁹⁶ Gero Erdmann, “Apokalyptische Trias: Staatsversagen, Staatsverfall und Staatszerfall: Strukturelle Probleme der Demokratie in Afrika,” in *Demokratie und Staatlichkeit, Systemwechsel zwischen Staatlichkeit und Kollaps*, ed. Petra Bendel, Aurel Croissant and Friedbert Rüb (Oplanden: Leske und Dudrich, 2003), 281, <http://homepage.univie.ac.at/gregor.giersch/Lehre/Downloads/ERDMANN%20Apokalyptische%20Trias.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007)

⁹⁷ Schneckener, “State at Risk,” 12-4.

⁹⁸ Erdmann, “Apokalyptische Trias,” 270-272. The German terms used by Erdmann are Staatsversagen, Staatsverfall und Staatszerfall.

⁹⁹ Jim Class, “EU-UN Co-operation on Crisis Management,” in *ESDP newsletter* no 3 by Council of the European Union, 15. <http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=561&fArticleId=3392866> (accessed May 22, 2007); Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 11-2.

Failing states are prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. The Failed States Index, established by Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, mentioned in July 2005 twelve sub-Saharan African countries within the list of the 20 most instable states.¹⁰⁰ Figure 4 presents the results of the Failed State Index for Africa.¹⁰¹




Figure 4. The Failed State Index (Extract for Africa)¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ These countries are: Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Liberia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Guinea, Burundi and Central African Republic.

¹⁰¹ The colors represent the results of the assessment: Red colored countries are critical, orange in danger, beige at the borderline. Black colored countries are not categorized as failed states.

¹⁰² *Failed State Index* by Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3098 (accessed May 22, 2007).

Failing and failed states are a concern for the EU because this weakness could be exploited by criminals. The ESS warns that as “states fail, organized crime take over.” Failed states can lead to “humanitarian tragedies,” that could cause serious concerns in Europe’s public opinion. The worst case for the EU’s security would be, as the ESS alleges, the concurrence of failed states, terrorism and WMD.¹⁰³

The connection between failed states and terrorism is repeatedly mentioned in scholarly articles, as well as in the U.S. National Security Strategy 2002.¹⁰⁴ The case of Afghanistan is evidence that international terrorists could use a failed state as a residue area.¹⁰⁵ Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, “state collapse and state failure were seen chiefly as humanitarian tragedies.”¹⁰⁶ After that incident they have become a security concern. Nevertheless, the link between failed states and terrorism is not without controversy. Simmons and Tucker argue contrary “to a common held view, [that] significant numbers of international terrorists do not come from failed states. Nor do failed states house many organizations that support terrorism.”¹⁰⁷ Their argument is supported by Mills, who alleges that “there is no exact correlation between state weakness or failure and terrorist activity.”¹⁰⁸

The EU is trying to stabilize and rebuild failing / failed states not only because of humanitarian and security concerns, but also because states are the building blocks of the international order, and well-functioning ones are in themselves goals for the EU. As concerns failing states, Africa indeed is the main focus of the ESS.

¹⁰³ Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 6, 11.

¹⁰⁴ Mair, “Konfliktpotentiale,” 111; Mills, “Africa’s New strategic Significance.”

¹⁰⁵ Schneckener, “States at Risk,” 5.

¹⁰⁶ Michael Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 156.

¹⁰⁷ Anna Simons and David Tucker, “The Misleading Problem of Failed States: A ‘socio-geography’ of terrorism in the post 9-11 era,” *Third World Quarterly*, 28, no. 2 (2007): 387.

¹⁰⁸ Mill, “Africa’s new Strategic Significance,” 161.

d) Organized Crime and Warlords

Most African conflicts are of low intensity and fought with small arms. Warlords try to secure and control resources and markets to enrich themselves, to pay off clients as their power basis or to procure supply for their militias. In order to guarantee access to resources and markets, warlords sometimes operate across borders, causing violence that can affect whole regions. Due to the fact that continuing the conflict guarantees the extraction of vital resources, these warlords have no interest in conflict termination. The “war economy” is incompatible with good governance and the rule of law. These interests are important in the conflicts in West Africa.

The trade of African gemstones, the infamous “Blood Diamonds,” and timber by warlords can fuel regional conflicts and are such as in the case of Sierra Leone necessary condition for the rebels to procure weapons and ammunition. African warlords, leaders of militias and rebel commanders are integral elements of organized crime, partially with global links.¹⁰⁹ Organized crime is seen primarily as a threat for the internal order of a state. Criminals try to realize gains and to seek influence and power in politics and / or economy through illegal means, including violence. Gains from illegal trade are used to manipulate and bribe decision makers in the public sphere.

Organized crime in sub-Saharan Africa is first of all a problem for the states in which the criminal groups are operating. However, organized crime affects directly European interests in several respects. First, it takes advantage of the demand of the industrialized world for high value luxury goods, commodities and raw material to finance their illegal business or interests. Second, it helps to sustain local and or regional conflicts – a fundamental contradiction to the EU’s interests. Third, organized crime has to launder the illegal acquired money in Europe or elsewhere which could have an impact on the internal security of the EU Member States. The most threatening scenario for the EU, though, would be the participation of globally operating terrorist organizations in the

¹⁰⁹ Mair, “Konfliktpotentiale,” 111.

illegal trade of goods. Their aim is to get money to finance terrorist attacks. There is some evidence that al Qaeda is involved in the illegal trade of diamonds in sub-Saharan Africa for that purpose.¹¹⁰

e) Migration

Despite the fact that migration is not mentioned in the ESS, the problems connected with this issue are very important for European domestic politics, even though migration is not a security threat. The deterioration of living conditions by civil war, ethnic conflict, and bad governance raises the incentives or even force Africans to leave their home; many of them try to find a better future for themselves and their relatives in Europe. Migration toward the EU has become a political problem.

Illegal immigration is a very sensitive topic for European societies, connected with prejudices but also with the fear of EU citizens being alienated in their own country through massive immigration. Hundreds of thousands have already been naturalized in Italy, Spain and elsewhere. The expenses for asylum seekers in terms of housing, social security and legal expenses are enormous. Vice versa, emigration is a mixed blessing for sub-Saharan African states. On the one hand, expatriates who are able to earn money abroad can subsidize their families at home. On the other hand, if educated, skilled people emigrate. This “brain drain” is a major cause for economic decline. To put it simply, African medical doctors, living abroad, do not help to improve the conditions of the African health care system.

Migration is a very prominent topic in Europe: continuous news reports about African migrants in overcrowded, non-seaworthy boats picked up in the Mediterranean Sea or migrants who try to cross the border fences surrounding the Spanish enclaves in North Africa leave a distorted view of reality for the European

¹¹⁰ Global Witness, *For a Few Dollars More: How al Qaeda moved into the Diamond Trade*, (April 2004), <http://allafrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/view/00010304.pdf>, (accessed May 27, 2007).

public. Approximately 2,180,000 people born in sub-Saharan Africa were living in the EU at the end of 2004, a number which is less than the news media may suppose.¹¹¹

f) Conclusion

The last subchapters presented evidence that the key threats mentioned in the ESS exist in sub-Saharan Africa, but they pose neither a threat for the survival of the European Union Member States nor for the economic wellbeing of their citizens. But conditions in some states of sub-Saharan Africa could affect Europe indirectly. Deteriorating conditions in failing states could be exploited by terrorist groups, offering e.g. a fertile ground for recruitment. Failing states, regional conflicts and organized crime are interdependent. Sub-Saharan Africa's population is much more threatened than European citizens. Conflicts lead to migration but only a few of the migrants manage to overcome the well protected European borders. Migration and displacement are first of all an intra-African problem. Organized crime can have an impact on Europe's internal security, but no vital interests would be violated. This special type of crime is much more the task of criminal investigation departments of the EU Members States and their trade policies than for their expeditionary military.

This assessment is a snap-shot of the current situation. But also over the long run the emergence of a military threat in sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely. The scholarly discussion concerning terrorism shows that such threats are at least in the realm of possibility.

E. EU'S CONCEPT OF CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Only one month after the adoption of the ESS, the European Council declared that progress in "long term conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives" is the "necessary precondition ... for the African States to build and sustain capacity to deal

¹¹¹ European Commission, *EU Donor Atlas 2006 Volume I: Mapping Official Development Assistance*, February 2006, 43, http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/docs/eu_donor_atlas_2006.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

effectively with terrorism” and that the EU will try to prevent conflicts by addressing the “more structural root causes” of violent conflict.¹¹²

This statement is specified by Javier Solana’s comment in the UN Security Council (UNSC) that the “European Union has identified poverty as the main root cause of conflict in Africa.” But, he acknowledged that however hard the EU tries, it will be difficult to tackle poverty and other root causes successfully:

Sometimes prevention will fail, so we must also be prepared to manage crises. We must be ready to do so in an integrated and coherent manner: capable of deploying development aid, and the full range of political, economic, financial and, where necessary, military means. The EU is making important efforts to equip itself with all the capabilities required to effectively manage crises.¹¹³

Despite the EU’s view of “African ownership” and the importance of conflict prevention, the EU is willing to prepare itself “to become involved, whenever necessary, in crisis management in Africa with its own capabilities.”¹¹⁴ This is necessary if the EU is truly willing to act in all phases of conflict. Each phase has a special character, and therefore special capabilities are needed.

Figure 5 presents the EU’s potential political fields in four stages of conflict based on its own publication:

¹¹² Council of the European Union, *Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004 concerning Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa*, Art. 1(3) and 2, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_021/l_02120040128en00250029.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹¹³ Solana, *Speech on Africa*.

¹¹⁴ European Council, *Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004*, Art. 1(1), (2).



Figure 5. EU's Policy in Four Stages of Conflict¹¹⁵

The foundation of the EU's reputation as a credible player in all phases of conflict is connected with its political will and the capabilities the EU is able to deploy. Missions where military means were necessary to stop ongoing crises, classical interventions, were beyond the EU's possibilities in the early 1990s. On the one hand, the political will of the EU to become a relevant actor in crisis management increased significantly since the formal adoption of ESDP as a part of CFSP at the Cologne summit in June 1999. On the other hand, the EU had to recognize that its capability to implement its will was more than rudimentary and, as it will be presented later, much had to be done to improve this weakness.

¹¹⁵ Figure drawn by the author based on: European Council, *Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004*, Art. 2.

F. EU STRATEGY FOR AFRICA (EUSFA)

Most relevant for our topic the “EU Strategy for Africa,” adopted by the European Council on December 16, 2005.¹¹⁶ The strategy can be interpreted as a summary of two preceding papers.¹¹⁷ These papers reflect the competences of the two pillars of the EU. While the Solana document focuses on the “peace and security aspects of the global strategy for Africa”, the Commission paper focuses on developmental aid.¹¹⁸

Similar to the ESS, the EUSFA is a declaration of the EU’s intents, and outlines the challenges for the EU rising out of Africa, and the means the EU is willing to develop or to adopt to implement its basic goals. The strategy’s central message is how the EU is willing to support Africa in its development. Because of this, the strategy is manifold, and it would go beyond the scope of this research to analyze it in every detail.¹¹⁹ In this chapter, I will focus on security issues of the EUSFA and the two preceding documents.

1. EU’s Strategic Goals Regarding Africa

The EUSFA provides a detailed analysis of African challenges in geopolitical, economic, social and environmental spheres, outlines the principles which guide the relationship between the EU and Africa, and presents the EU’s concepts in response to the challenges. The strategy shows how the EU is going to act in order to promote its aims: the creation of peace and security, the promotion of human rights and democracy, economical and social development as well as regional integration and trade. The order of this aims in the European Council’s paper implies a sequence of priorities. Fundamental

¹¹⁶ Council of the European Union, “The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership.” *Press Release*, December 19, 2005, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/87673.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹¹⁷ One paper, the *Contribution by the High Representative Javier Solana to the EU Strategy for Africa*, was presented by the Javier Solana on October 27, 2005. The second paper, the Communication of the European Commission to several EU bodies including the Council and the European Parliament, titled the “*EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa’s Development*” from October 12, 2005.

¹¹⁸ Javier Solana, *Contribution by the High Representative Javier Solana to the EU Strategy for Africa*. Brussels, November 21, 2005, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/87088.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹¹⁹ Kingah, “The European Union’s New Africa Strategy.” He provides a comprehensive analysis over the EUSFA is provided by S.S. Kingah in his essay.

is the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG), backing “sustainable development, security and good governance in Africa.”¹²⁰

The UN MDG, adopted in 2000, comprises eight goals, which are providing countries around the world a framework for sustainable development. These goals are the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, the achievement of universal primary education, promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women, reduction of child mortality, the improvement of maternal health, combat against HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, the guarantee of environmental sustainability and the development of a global partnership for development. The realization of these goals is scheduled for 2015, the same timeframe is set for the EUSFA.

The EUSFA serves, in general, the ESS’s goal to make ESDP more congruent and presents the guiding principles of the EU’s foreign policy towards Africa for the next ten years. The strategy refers to the whole African continent and proclaims a partnership between Africa and the EU. The EU is willing to conduct a three part approach to deal with the African problems. This approach comprises first the will to strengthen the “EU support in priority areas,”¹²¹ second, an increase of “EU financing in Africa” and third, a “more effective EU approach.”¹²²

The EUSFA’s core principles are partnership between Africa and the EU “based on international law and human rights, equality and mutual accountability. Its underlying philosophy is African ownership and responsibility, including working through African institutions.”¹²³

Human rights, the EU’s vision of governance, as well as development assistance, are addressed in this strategy. The EU’s focus on institutions is obvious: “Successful

¹²⁰ United Nations, *UN Millennium Development Goals*; Council of the European Union, *The EU and Africa*, 2.

¹²¹ These areas are the prerequisites for attaining the MDG and the creation of an economic environment for achieving the MDGs.

¹²² Commission for the European Communities, *EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa’s Development*, Brussels, October 12, 2005. http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/communications/docs/eu_strategy_for_africa_12_10_2005_en.pdf#zoom=100 (accessed March 15, 2007).

¹²³ Council of the European Union, *The EU and Africa*, 2.

development requires adherence to human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and effective, well governed states, and strong and efficient institutions.”¹²⁴ Without using the term structural stability, the EUSFA is in line with that concept. Security and good governance are seen as prerequisites for development. The EU sees regional integration and the establishment of common market zones as facilitators of economic growth and development. Nevertheless, the EU is aware that the production has to be diversified if an exchange of commodities and manufactured goods should be possible. Countries with the same variety of commercial goods have few to exchange. Economic development also needs much capital investment. The decision to invest in a foreign state depends, among other things, on local stability, transparency and accountability of the state and security for investment.¹²⁵

Solidarity and subsidiarity are also basic principles of the EUSFA. Solidarity appeals to the responsibility of all African countries for the improvement of Africa’s own situation. Solidarity and African ownership includes, for the EU, working “with the AU, sub-regional organizations and African countries to predict, prevent and mediate conflict.”¹²⁶ Subsidiarity means that the EU is cooperating with Africa on three levels: with the individual countries, the regions, and the continent. Subsidiarity is not only a tool to channel developmental aid to different levels; it is also delegating responsibility to the lowest possible organizational level. First of all, the state is responsible for the well-being of its own citizens. If the problems cannot be solved on the country level, then the region has to take responsibility. Cross-regional problems and concepts can and have to be covered by Africa as one entity.

Despite the detailed outline of the strategy it is first of all mere declaratory policy. Much of its content is still pretty general and the future has to prove how far the EU is willing to implement these statements of intent.

¹²⁴ Council of the EU. *The EU and Africa*, 3.

¹²⁵ Commission of the European Communities. *EU Strategy for Africa*, 13.

¹²⁶ Council of the European Union, *The EU and Africa*, 2.

2. Security Aspects of the Strategy

Conditions in many African countries and regions are, in general, obstacles for the EU's and the UN's aim to support the implementation of the MDG until 2015. To remove these obstacles, the EU claims to conduct a policy that will set the stage for "attaining the MDGs and good governance." This policy has two sectors; first are measures to "foster peace and security" and second are measures to "support legitimate and effective governance." Within each sector the EU identifies specific actions to help implement the political aims.¹²⁷ Because of the importance of both elements, I provide a more detailed overview about the two preconditions.

a) Foster Peace and Security

In order to promote peace and security, the EU is announcing its will to address the root-causes of violent conflict and will promote dialogue, participation and reconciliation. The EU appeals for cooperation to tackle common security threats. Non-proliferation of WMD, and combating terrorism are issues which are not to be solved by unilateral EU actions.

The EU announces that it will continue the provision of "support to African led, -owned and implemented peace support operations" through the African Peace Facility (APF), which will be sustainably funded. Support will also be granted for the development of African military capacities, such as the African Standby Force. Both will be introduced later in this thesis. The EU's approach towards conflict is, though, more than financial support and advice. CFSP and ESDP missions should directly support the efforts of other organizations to promote peace and stability in Africa. This commitment includes "military and civilian crisis management missions, including potential deployment of EU Battlegroups."¹²⁸

Post conflict situations should be stabilized through "regional and national strategies for disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and reinsertion (DDRR)."

¹²⁷ Commission of the European Communities. *EU Strategy for Africa*, 21-3.

¹²⁸ Council of the European Union, *The EU and Africa*, 2.

Former combatants, including child soldiers, have to be offered alternatives to conflict in a peaceful environment to “break the conflict cycle.” To interrupt conflict cycles, it is also important to stop the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as well as land mines in conflict areas.

In line with its earlier declarations, the EU is stressing the importance of post-conflict stabilization of societies. Serving this issue, the EU declared that it will “develop a strategy and capacity to foster security sector reform (SSR) in Africa.”¹²⁹ As it is presented later, significant progress has been made up to now.

b) Support for Effective and Legitimate Governance

In order to set the second prerequisite for the realization of the MDG, the EU is willing to support effective and legitimate governance. The EUSFA argues, like many other EU declarations, that there “is a strong linkage between the promotion of development and the promotion of democracy.” The EU is aware that:

democracy cannot be created or imposed by domestic elites or external actors ... The appropriate role of external actors is therefore instead to support and encourage domestic efforts to build, strengthen and sustain democratic norms, procedures and institutions.¹³⁰

To foster good governance, the EU declared to design special activities in Africa. The EU supports the reform of state structures to “build effective and credible central institutions,” and to “develop local capacity.” These two fields include the promotion of strong central institutions, the enhancement of “respect for human rights, freedoms of citizens, good governance and effectiveness of state,” as well as the “support for the police and the judiciary system,” the “strengthening of public financial management,” and the improvement of the role and capabilities of the parliaments in

¹²⁹ Commission of the European Communities. *EU Strategy for Africa*, 21-23.

¹³⁰ Commission of the European Communities. *EU Strategy for Africa*, 24.

Africa. Furthermore, the EU is supporting decentralization, which includes to “empower people,” and guaranteeing “a fair share of income to remain within regions instead of being absorbed by the center.”¹³¹

Other major EU activities to support effective and legitimate governance are the reinforcement of respect for human rights and democracy, the promotion of gender equality, and to fight “corruption and organized crime and promote good governance in the financial, tax and judicial area.”¹³²

G. EU’S SUPPORTIVE CONCEPTS

1. EU’s Concept for Security Sector Reform

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a very important issue for the EU in sub-Saharan Africa. Two ESDP missions in the DRC are connected with this concept; they are examined in the case study. In this chapter the author provides an overview about the development of the EU approach, the concept itself, and information about some related problems.

SSR is a relatively new “concept in state transformation, development and post conflict peace building.”¹³³ The goal of SSR

is to reach a situation where the security system is organized in a way which ensures an effective Security Sector, the protection of individuals as well as of sustainable state institutions, through ensured democratic oversight, transparency and accountability in accordance with internationally recognised values and standards.¹³⁴

The EU used the term SSR in many documents: in 2003, Javier Solana requested (in the ESS) the improvement of the EU’s capabilities in different areas and mentioned

¹³¹ Commission of the European Communities. *EU Strategy for Africa*, 24-25.

¹³² Ibid.,

¹³³ Herbert Wulf, *Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries*, July 2004, 2, http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/dialogue2_wulf.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹³⁴ Council of the European Union, *EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform*. Brussels, October 13, 2005, 10.

explicitly supporting third world countries in security sector reform.¹³⁵ The EU decided to set up expert teams which are capable of providing planning support for African operations, or to plan and conduct disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and SSR actions in an EU framework.¹³⁶ The EUSFA foresaw the development of a strategy and capacity for SSR in 2005.¹³⁷ To conform to these demands, the Commission and the Council developed new concepts which were endorsed in July and October 2005.¹³⁸ The UK Presidency of the EU conducted, together with the European Commission and civil organizations in November 2005, an expert seminar with the topic “Developing a Common Security Sector Strategy for the EU.”¹³⁹ The European Commission adopted a “Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform” in May 2006.¹⁴⁰ Here, the classical dilemma of the EU becomes evident. Both pillars developed their own concepts and they are not merged into one overarching strategy.

In general, the SSR describes a reform process which has to be applied “in countries whose development is hampered by structural weakness in their security and justice sectors and often exacerbated by a lack of democratic oversight.”¹⁴¹ The basic guidelines and principles for the SSR were developed by the Organisation for Economic

¹³⁵ Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 15.

¹³⁶ Council of the European Union, *Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa*, November 16, 2004, 5, <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st10/st10538-re04.en04.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹³⁷ Commission of the European Communities. *EU Strategy for Africa*, 23.

¹³⁸ Council of the European Union, *Initial Elements for an EU Security Sector Reform (SSR) Concept*. The PSC endorsed that document in July 2005. The second paper was adopted by the European Council the “EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)” in October 2005. This paper was drafted by the Civil-Military Cell’s and is an example for its activities. See Catriona Gourlay, “Civil-Civil Coordination in EU Crisis Management,” in Nowak, *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way*, 116.

¹³⁹ Saferworld. *Developing a Common Security Sector Reform Strategy for the EU*, November 28, 2005, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/SSRReportSaferworld.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁴⁰ Commission of the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform*. Brussels, May 24, 2006. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0253en01.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁴¹ Damien Helley, “Developing an EU Strategy for Security Sector Reform,” *ISIS European Security Review* 28 (February 2006), 2, <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/ARTICLE%203%20-%20SSR.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

Cooperation and Development (OECD) and its Development Assistance Committee and accepted by the EU.¹⁴² The European Commission, as well as the European Council, refers to this basic document in their own statements. The OECD declares that the

overall objective of security system reform is to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy. This secure environment rests upon two essential pillars: i) the ability of the state, through its development policy and programmes, to generate conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which people are exposed; and ii) the ability of the state to use the range of policy instruments at its disposal to prevent or address security threats that affect society's well-being.¹⁴³

Based on this OECD concept, the Commission defines the security system as “all state institutions and other entities with a role in ensuring the security of the state and its people.” The Commission, as well as the Council, refers explicitly to the OECD paper, as it defines which actors in the security sector should be affected by SSR.¹⁴⁴ These actors are

- “*Core security actors including law enforcement institutions,*” such as armed forces, police, presidential guards, paramilitary forces, etc.
- “*Security management and oversight bodies,*” which comprises the executive with all its branches; such as the government, the ministries of defense and interior, financial management bodies, such as border and customs sector, etc. Also included are the parliament, civil society and NGOs.
- “*Justice and law enforcement institutions,*” such as justice ministries, prisons, law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, etc.

¹⁴² OECD. “Security System Reform and Governance.” *DAC Guidelines and Reference Series*, 2005. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007). The Council made in the EU Concept for ESDP support the reservation that it accept the basic principles of the OECD concept but it emphasized that it does not reflect the EU's special capabilities.

¹⁴³ OECD. “Security System Reform and Governance,” 16.

¹⁴⁴ *Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform*, 5-6; Council of the European Union, *EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform*, 7-8. See: OECD. “Security System Reform and Governance,” 20-1.

- “*Non-statutory security forces*,” such as guerillas, private security companies, and liberation armies.

SSR should include all these actors in such a manner that the whole security system is “consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance.”¹⁴⁵

Possible scenarios for ESDP support of SSR are identified according to different stages of post-conflict situations. In an early stage, DDR of former combatants is one of the top priorities. Security in that stage “would likely to be ensured by an external military or police presence and political authority might be exercised by an external actor for a limited period of time.” In a transition and stabilization phase, the task would be to prevent the return of violence; in a stable environment, ESDP support for SSR would focus on the development of democratic institutions.¹⁴⁶ Possible tasks for ESDP support are manifold, they could range from “defining defence policy,” “training the armed forces,” “organizing the police sector,” or even the co-location of “experts to national ministry of justice to monitor, mentor and advise local authorities.”¹⁴⁷

SSR is obviously a long term project and can be subsumed under the Commission’s term “peace building” It is essential in post-conflict societies to create the preconditions for a lasting peace, but it is also needed in fragile states which are close to an outbreak of conflict. In accordance to the earlier introduced concept of “structural oriented prevention,” SSR should engage the root causes of crises in sub-Saharan Africa. The implementation of SSR creates favorable conditions for achieving the UN MDG.¹⁴⁸

The implementation of SSR is not an easy task.¹⁴⁹ SSR is, in most cases, but especially in West and Central Africa, donor driven. The promise of financial support is

¹⁴⁵ *Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform*, 6.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 11-2.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 13-6. Detailed possible tasks for SSR are mentioned there.

¹⁴⁸ Helly, “Developing an EU Strategy for Security Sector Reform,” 1.

¹⁴⁹ OECD, *Implementation Framework for Security Sector Reform (IF-SSR) Draft I* December 2005. http://www.africansecurity.org/docs/assn_paper1.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

linked to reforms in the security sector according to Western donor standards and guidelines. Without the local will to comply with these guidelines, the chance of successful implementation of SSR is problematic. As the EU Council acknowledges, African ownership is a necessary prerequisite for success and defined as “the appropriation by the local authorities of the commonly agreed objectives and principles.”¹⁵⁰

Another factor influencing SSR is the general political condition of the state. The realization of SSR during war, open conflict, times of tension, or in failed states, is impossible, or at least not very promising.¹⁵¹ The EU Council states that “SSR is a core task in countries emerging from conflicts and is a central element of the broader institution-building and reform efforts in countries in a more stable environment.”¹⁵² The first two ESDP missions in sub-Saharan Africa, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DR Congo, are conducted in such an environment and analyzed later in this thesis.

An example for EU’s action in support of SSR can be also found in Europe: The EU launched the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 2003 to reform the local police according West European standards. Similar aims are pursued by the EU’s mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) where the EU conducted the operation EUPOL PROXIMA from 2003 to 2005 and launched the follow-on mission EUPAT after termination of EUPOL PROXIMA.

2. EU’s Concept for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DDR is a central element in the stabilization of post-conflict societies: many former regular and irregular combatants have to be demobilized, disarmed, and together with their families, reintegrated after the settlement of a conflict through a peace agreement. The European Council declares that DDR “can constitute a significant pillar

¹⁵⁰ Council of the European Union, *Initial Elements for an EU Security Sector Reform (SSR) Concept*. Brussels, July 15, 2005, 3, <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st11/st11241.en05.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁵¹ Wulf, “Security Sector Reform,” 6.

of SSR and is regarded as central to conflict resolution and internal stability. In many cases, SSR will call for DDR type activities. However, SSR goes well beyond DDR.”¹⁵³

The three phases of DDR are defined in the following way by the EU:¹⁵⁴ disarmament “is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often civilians.” Demobilization “is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups.” This process can be separated into two phases; first, troops should be assembled in temporary processing facilities and disarmed and then in a second step, former combatants and their relatives / dependents should be provided with the basic needs for living, prior to their reintegration into the society and economy. This step is defined as “reinsertion” by the UN. Reintegration “is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.”¹⁵⁵

The implementation of DDR is complex. The offer of DDR can be an instrument to facilitate conflict resolution during peace negotiations. Former liberation armies, rebels and other fighters usually had a reason to start the armed uprising, these root causes have to be addressed before DDR can take place. To have an impact, the DDR programs have to be credible. Simply stated, DDR can interrupt conflict cycles by offering a prosperous future to the former combatants and their relatives / dependents. As a question of rational choice, former combatants should prefer a promising, peaceful life to violence. But this central prerequisite is not easy to provide. Sub-Saharan African post-conflict societies are challenged by many problems: former combatants are usually not provided with jobs to start a new life; irregular combatants, especially child soldiers, are often alienated by atrocities they conducted in their original community and have no place to return; warlords have a vested interest in going on to fight and press their militias to do so. There

¹⁵² Council of the European Union, *Initial Elements for an EU Security Sector Reform (SSR) Concept*. Brussels, July 15, 2005, 3, <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st11/st11241.en05.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁵³ Council of the European Union, *EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform*, 7.

¹⁵⁴ *EU Concept for Support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)*. December 2006, 7, http://www.eplo.org/documents/EU_Joint_concept_DDR.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁵⁵ *EU Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)*, 7.

is a great danger that the conflict will start once again if the attempts of appropriate reintegration fail. Reintegration is especially dependent on complex social and structural preconditions. The local economy must be able to provide former combatants and their families the chances to make their living; social reintegration is a question of reconciliation, which is especially important for former “child soldiers” who were forced to commit atrocities against close neighbors / friends in order to cut social ties.

The acceptance of DDR is also connected with a serious threat: if rebels and other anti-government movements surrender their weapons, it has to be guaranteed that they do not suffer retaliation by the government later on. Resurgence of fighting by local militias, causing a collapse of peace accords, is thus a widespread phenomenon.

The European Commission and the European Council acknowledged the importance of DDR and approved a joint EU concept of support for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in December 2006.¹⁵⁶ In this concept, the EU outlines its understanding of DDR, possible activities and general principles for EU support to DDR. Key actors in the field are the UN and the World Bank, the EU plays only a secondary role. Nevertheless, cooperation and coordination between these actors is necessary.

The EU can support DDR in different areas, such as the “strategic planning, and setting up the national coordination mechanisms as well as giving support to the demobilization and reintegration phase.”¹⁵⁷ In general, EU’s support is possible in all phases of DDR. This includes short term disarmament and demobilization programs and long term reintegration, a task for developmental support by the European Community.

The EU is capable and willing to support local authorities, and “through a military, civilian and or military/civilian operation,” the EU can play a “role as both a donor and a political actor.”¹⁵⁸ ESDP measures can promote DDR in various ways: disarmament can be supported by the provision of advice; EU troops could guarantee a

¹⁵⁶ *EU Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)*, 7.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁵⁸ *EU Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)*, 18.

secure environment. ESDP could support demobilization through monitoring and adviser teams, conducting “reception, screening, registration and discharge” of former combatants, the establishment and operation of cantonment facilities, etc. In the third phase, reintegration (and reinsertion) the EU can give “support to ex-combatants, their dependents and receiving communities including shelter, food, vocational training, education, tools, micro-credits, employment reintegrated opportunities, and addressing psychological and physical needs.”¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁹ *EU Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)*., 20.

III. INTERINSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION

One of the EU's declared aims is the promotion of "effective multilateralism," defined as "the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule based international order."¹⁶⁰ Biscop and Arnould equate the term "effective multilateralism" with "global governance, a system that is able to ensure that every human being, at the global level, has access to the core public goods."¹⁶¹ Biscop argues that this effective multilateralism is synonymous with "a network of multilateral mechanisms and institutions that together manage to provide everyone access to the essential GPG or, in other words, effective global governance."¹⁶² Multilateralism is necessary to handle the global challenges of the early 21st century, which are beyond the capacities of a single nation state, as well as regional organizations such as the EU.

For the EU, the foundation of effective multilateralism is the UN, which has "the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."¹⁶³ This declaration is reiterated in several EU documents, such as in the Council declaration concerning "EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations" and in the ESS. The Joint Declaration of September 2003 is the guiding document. The EU here affirms that the "fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter."¹⁶⁴ The UN involvement in African affairs is obvious, as the number of Security Council resolutions gives evidence: since the end of the Cold War, the number of adopted

¹⁶⁰ Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 9.

¹⁶¹ Biscop and Arnould, "Global Public Goods," 22.

¹⁶² Biscop, "From Reflections to Power," 92.

¹⁶³ *Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Africa issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998*, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&a=KArticle&aid=1013618395082> (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁶⁴ Council of the European Union, *EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations – Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration: Adopted by the Council 17-18 June 2004*. Brussels, June 2004, 2, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-UN%20co-operation%20in%20Military%20Crisis%20Management%20Operations.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007); Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 9.

resolutions has more than doubled compared to all resolutions between 1946 and 1990; interventions in local crises and wars become more important, “in particular in Africa.”¹⁶⁵

Based on their declarations, the EU has promised to strengthen the UN, equip it “to fulfill its responsibilities and act effectively.”¹⁶⁶ This includes the training of UN peacekeepers from other nations by EU Member States, financial support, and especially the provision of personnel.¹⁶⁷

But not only is the UN important for the EU, which “will continue to support efforts in favour of the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa, in close cooperation with the UN, the African Union and other sub-regional organizations.”¹⁶⁸ The EU’s concept is in line with the “Agenda for Peace” of the former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Due to the overwhelming demand for UN peace operation in the early 1990s, he requested the increased involvement of regional organizations in order to relieve the UN.¹⁶⁹

Functional and capable African regional and sub-regional organizations are essential for the EU’s basic principles of African ownership and partnership regarding peace and security in Africa. Today in Africa are several regional and sub-regional organizations existing which are engaged in security matters. Mark Malan describes the

¹⁶⁵ Claas, “EU-UN Co-operation,” 15.

¹⁶⁶ Kennedy Graham, “Towards effective Multilateralism: The EU and the UN; Partners in Crisis Management,” *ECP Working Paper* no. 13 (November 2004), 7, http://www.theepc.be/TEWN/pdf/806649081_EPC%20Working%20Paper%2013%20Toward%20Effective%20Multilateralism.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁶⁷ Sarah Beaver, “The EU, a New Partner for the UN in Peacekeeping,” *The RUSI Journal* 149, no. 4 (2004): 15.

¹⁶⁸ European Union, *The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making Multilateralism Matter*. New York: January 2004, 28, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/un/docs/brochure0104.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁶⁹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, New York, N.Y., June 17 1992, Chapter VII, <http://www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html> (accessed May 22, 2007).

multilayered responsibility for peace in Africa as a “peace pyramid.”¹⁷⁰ All the involved organizations are collective security organizations, designed to deal with threats among their members.¹⁷¹

The organizations differ in their institutional design and, most importantly, in their regional responsibility. The organization with global responsibility is the UN, the overarching regional organization for Africa, comprising all African states, the AU. Subordinated to the AU are the sub-regional organizations: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for West Africa, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) for Southern Africa (interestingly including the DRC), in East Africa the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), in Central Africa the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and in North Africa the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The function of African regional and sub-regional organizations is addressed by many authors and well analyzed.¹⁷²

It would go beyond the focus of this thesis to analyze all African organizations regarding their institutional design, decision making procedures, capabilities and weaknesses; also, this analysis was limited to peace and security matters. This chapter

¹⁷⁰ Mark Malan, “The OAU and African Subregional Organizations: A Closer Look at the ‘Peace Pyramid’,” *Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper* 36 (January 2006). <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/PAPERS/36/Paper36.html> (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁷¹ Wallander and Keohane. “Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions,” 26.

¹⁷² Basic papers analyzing the different regional and sub-regional organizations are available: Kerstin Petretto, “Die Rolle der Regionalorganisation im System kollektiver Friedenssicherung der Vereinten Nationen, dargestellt an der Region Afrika – Möglichkeiten und Grenzen regionaler Konfliktbearbeitung,” *Arbeitspapiere zu Problemen der Internationalen Politik und der Entwicklungsländerforschung* 44 (2005). http://www.forschungsstelle-dritte-welt.de/Dokumente/AP/AP_44_Petretto.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007); Mark Malan, “The OAU and African Subregional Organizations: A Closer Look at the ‘Peace Pyramid’,” *Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper* 36 (January 2006), <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/PAPERS/36/Paper36.html> (accessed May 22, 2007); Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid ed., *West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*, (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004); Stefan Mair, “Regionale Integration und Kooperation in Afrika südlich der Sahara. Synopse der Fallstudien EAC, ECOWAS und SADC,” *SWP-Studie* 17, Berlin, 2001, http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=220 (accessed May 22, 2007); Stefan Mair, “Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Regionale Integration und Kooperation in Afrika südlich der Sahara. Teil II,” *SWP-Studie* 15 Berlin, 2001, http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=218 (accessed May 22, 2007); Christian Peters-Barries, “Southern African Development Community (SADC): Regionale Integration und Kooperation in Afrika südlich der Sahara, Teil III,” *SWP-Studie* 16 Berlin, 2001 http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=219 (accessed May 22, 2007).

provides only an overview about the UN, the AU, the main partner for the EU in Africa, and SADC, which is engaged in the conflict in the DRC.

A. EU–UN COOPERATION CONCERNING SECURITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Increasing the authority and capabilities of the UN as the foundation of effective multilateralism is a central aim of the EU as the “Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management” from September 2003 evidenced. Both organizations emphasized the “existing co-operation between the UN and the European Union in the area of civilian and military crisis management, in particular in the Balkans and in Africa.” It can be assumed that the experience of the first accomplished EU autonomous operation ARTEMIS in Bunia, DRC, was the driving factor that led to the signing of the EU – UN document.¹⁷³ The challenge is that both organizations “share the same values and visions but have different roles, build on different structures, use different concepts and apply different procedures.”¹⁷⁴

EU-UN cooperation took place in military affairs. Military Crisis Management (MCM) cooperation takes place in meetings on the working level as well as through meetings of the EU High Representative and the UN Secretary General; the provision of military capabilities by the EU Member States or, this seems to be the most important issue, by “an EU operation in answer to a request from the UN.”¹⁷⁵ The latter was the case in both operations in the DRC, Operation ARTEMIS and Operation EUFOR RD Congo, which are analyzed in the case study.

The EU-UN Joint Declaration makes clear that the UN is the central reference point for the EU’s actions concerning conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. EU operations have to be “in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and in close cooperation with

¹⁷³ *Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation*. Similar: European Council, *Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004*, Art. 2 (2).

¹⁷⁴ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. “Military Aspects of UN – EU Co-operation in Crisis Management operations in the light of EUFOR RD Congo.” Summary of Findings, ESDP Seminar, Berlin, March 19-21, 2007, 2.

¹⁷⁵ Council of the European Union, *EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management*, 2.

UN operations in that region.”¹⁷⁶ This restraint is also valid for the AU and the African sub-regional organizations which need an UN mandate to intervene in the internal affairs of regional neighbors. The EU Member States could provide support for the UN for MCM on a national basis. They could provide “enabling capabilities,” like communication or electronic intelligence assets, which are general shortfalls in UN operations.

Initially, the EU as a whole was willing to use its military rapid response capabilities, including the EUBGs, to “strengthen the EU’s ability to respond to possible UN requests.”¹⁷⁷ The EU will be capable to conduct “bridging” or “stand-by” operations.¹⁷⁸ The first type of missions could be launched to intervene with EU military means in an immediate crisis and to gain time for the UN to conduct a force generation process and to establish its own presence in the conflict area. The EU forces should then be relieved by UN forces.¹⁷⁹ The EU mission would end when the UN troops arrive and are capable to take over the mission.¹⁸⁰ An example of this kind of mission is the EU Operation ARTEMIS. The second mission type envisaged EU military capacities as an “over the horizon reserve” to reinforce UN troops or as an “extraction force.”¹⁸¹ The EU mission EUFOR RD Congo is an example. In a wrap-up seminar of EUFOR RD Congo, further possible forms of co-operation were developed. Two new models for EU operations in support of an UN CMO were elaborated: first, a supporting model, “where an autonomous EU operation would support the UN operation by covering a specific mission or area” and, second, a model of “focused support,” where the EU would provide scarce capabilities without launching an autonomous EU operation.” The seminar made

¹⁷⁶ European Council, *Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004*, Art. 6 (1).

¹⁷⁷ *Headline Goal 2010*, 5, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁷⁸ Council of the European Union, *EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management*, 4-5.

¹⁷⁹ The EUMS conducted a small-scale research on that issue in order to make an assessment which challenges the “hand over” of the crisis from EU to UN forces could create.

¹⁸⁰ Council of the European Union, *EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management*, 4.

¹⁸¹ Eide, “Introduction,” 18-9.

clear that the EU is willing to cooperate very closely with the UN, but a unity in command, the subordination of EU forces under UN command, is beyond that cooperation.¹⁸²

B. EU AND AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS

The EU attributes much importance to multilateralism and integration. The EU's central function is that the "European countries are [now] committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and cooperating through common institutions."¹⁸³ The European Commission declared in 2001 that the "EU is in itself a peace project, and a supremely successful one."¹⁸⁴ Inter-institutional cooperation is meant to "export" this promising concept to Africa also; the European Commission states "that the EU model can serve as an example for other regions in encouraging states to reduce potential tensions, to increase economic interdependence and to create greater mutual trust between countries."¹⁸⁵ The AU emerged out of the OAU in July 2002.¹⁸⁶ The OAU oriented its institutional reform using the model of the EU and transformed itself into the African Union (AU).¹⁸⁷ The highest AU body is the Assembly comprising the head of states and governments, similar to the Council of the European Union. The AU Executive Council mirrors the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), a body consisting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The AU has also a Commission, but this body is mainly just a Secretariat. The AU parliament was established in March 2004.

¹⁸² Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. "Military Aspects of UN – EU Co-operation in Crisis Management operations," 6.

¹⁸³ Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 1.

¹⁸⁴ Commission for the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*, COM(2001)211 final, Brussels, April 4, 2001, 5, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/com2001_211_en.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 8.

¹⁸⁶ Eide, "Introduction: The Role of the EU," 2.

¹⁸⁷ Siegmar Schmidt, "Prinzipien, Ziele und Institutionen der Afrikanischen Union," 2.

1. The African Union

African regional, as well sub-regional, organizations traditionally play an important role in the EU's overall policy of conflict prevention towards Africa. In December 2003 the Council declared that it

welcomes the developing partnership between the EU, the UN, the African Union and sub-regional African organisations in the field of conflict prevention, conflict management and development.¹⁸⁸

Again in January 2004 the EU declared “that the AU and African sub-regional organisations constitute the central actors in prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa.”¹⁸⁹

The EU needs functioning African institutions that are capable of crisis management, conflict prevention and peace building. These institutions are necessary if “African ownership” of conflicts and their solution should be more than words. Javier Solana declared in the UNSC in January 2002 that the EU attaches:

great importance to our dialogue and cooperation with sub-regional organisations, notably SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD. They are further evidence that Africans today are assuming their part of the responsibility for securing peace and stability on their continent. Yet “African ownership” can only function effectively, when other countries and the UN help to enhance African institutional capacities and closely cooperate with them.¹⁹⁰

a) *African Union's Role in Peace and Security*

The OAU, founded in 1963, was the first Pan-African organization and a result of the decolonization of Africa. The OAU was emphatic about African state's sovereignty, rejected interference in internal affairs, and declared the sanctity of

¹⁸⁸ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*. Brussels, December 12, 2003, 20, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/78364.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁸⁹ European Council, *Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004*, Art. 4 and 6(4).

¹⁹⁰ Javier Solana, *Speech on Africa at the Security Council*. New York, January 29, 2002. http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_1116_en.htm (accessed May 22, 2007).

international borders.¹⁹¹ This basic orientation was abandoned by the AU. This organization is willing to play a role in the establishment of security in Africa. Its charter abolished the principle of non-interference by stating acceptance of “the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” The AU condemns and rejects “unconstitutional changes of governments.”¹⁹² The AU’s entitlement to interfere in internal affairs if fundamental human rights are violated is far reaching.

The AU is according to its constitutive act the ideal type for institutionalized multilateral cooperation in security affairs for the EU. The AU’s objectives are the promotion “of peace, security, and stability on the continent” and of “democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance.”¹⁹³

An important body within the AU’s structure is its “Peace and Security Council” (AU PSC). Its first objective is the promotion of “peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property ... as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development.”¹⁹⁴ The AU PSC can “authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support operations” and can “recommend to the assembly ... the intervention ... in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”¹⁹⁵

The AU is acting as an institution in African conflicts as the peace operations AMIS I and II in ... and the new AU operation in Somalia evidences. Despite the fact that the missions are not yet very successful, that the AU is confronted with several problems and dependent, in many areas, on financial or other support of external

¹⁹¹ Schmidt, “Prinzipien.”

¹⁹² *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, Art. 4 h) and p), http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive_Act_en.htm (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁹³ *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, Art. 3 f), g).

¹⁹⁴ African Union, *Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*, Durban, July 9, 2002, Art. 3 a), http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/psc/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, Art. 3 c) and e).

actors, these missions are a signal that the AU is willing to act. As a very young organization, it will still learn from its experience and improve in the future.

b) African Standby Force

Like the EU, the AU needs capabilities to fulfill its political agenda and to correspond to the EU's credo of "African ownership." One important asset under development is the African Union Standby Force (ASF). A detailed survey about the ASF was done by Cillier and Malan in 2005; in 2006 Malan issued a progress report and analyzed the current shortfalls of the ASF in its command and control capabilities.¹⁹⁶

This force should consist of 5 brigades; each African sub-regional organization will provide one brigade. A sixth brigade will be available at the AU's headquarter at Addis Abeba.¹⁹⁷ Each brigade should consist of approximately 3,000 to 4,000 troops and should be authorized as a multinational force to intervene in crises all over Africa as the rapid reaction capability of the AU. Its mission readiness is expected not earlier than 2010.¹⁹⁸ Currently, Africa's sub-regional organizations SADC, ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are most advanced in establishing the ASF; the AU itself bears the operational and strategic responsibility.¹⁹⁹

The ASF should also include police and civilian experts capable of covering the whole spectrum of potential CMO. The concept and the formation are influenced greatly by the EU. There are some similarities to the EUBG, which is not surprising due to the fact that both formations are designated for the same purpose. Partnership, as announced by the EUSFA, is another reason for the resemblance. The EU financially and technically supports the AU and the sub-regional organizations in this

¹⁹⁶ Jakkie Cillier and Mark Malan, "Progress with the African Standby Force," *Institute for Security Studies Paper* 98 (May 2005), http://www.issafrica.org/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/PAPER98.PDF?link_id=3&slink_id=469&link_type=12&slink_type=23&tmpl_id=3 (accessed May 22, 2007); Malan, "The European Union and the African Union as Strategic Partners."

¹⁹⁷ Neethling, "Shaping the African Standby Force," 68.

¹⁹⁸ International Crisis Group, "The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not yet a Winning Combination." *Africa Report* no. 99 (October 2005), 1.

¹⁹⁹ Franke, "A Pan-African Army," 13.

endeavor. Workshops were held concerning doctrines under the chairmanship of SADC, and concerning Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) through ECOWAS. The EU's support also includes financial aspects and civilian police issues.²⁰⁰

The ASF should be capable of conducting a challenging mission spectrum comprising the observation and monitoring of missions, the conduct of peacekeeping missions, intervention “in affairs of a member state during grave circumstances or at its request to restore peace and security,” preventive deployment, the “conduct of peace-building operations, including post-conflict disarmament and reconstruction and the provision of humanitarian assistance.”²⁰¹

In relation to the EUBG Concept, the ASF is, regarding numbers, much stronger. A EUBG is, in its core, a light Infantry battalion plus combat service support and combat support elements; one ASF brigade consists of four Infantry battalions and a variety of support elements. Based on the available data and the early stage of the implementation of the ASF, the author cannot make a statement concerning the mission effectiveness of the ASF. It can be assumed that the traditional shortfalls in the category of strategic enablers such as strategic air-lift capacity, communication and logistics will challenge the project.

2. Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)

SADC, one of the five African sub-regional organizations, is the EU's partner in Southern Africa. This sub-chapter focuses on SADC's role as a collective security institution. SADC was selected as an example for the African sub-regional organizations because it played an important role in the conflict in the DRC.

SADC was founded in 1992 as a successor of the “Southern African Development Coordination Conference” (SADCC), whose original purpose was to counterbalance the power and influence of the apartheid regime in South Africa. South Africa was integrated

²⁰⁰ European Commission and General Secretariat of the Council, *Joint Progress Report by the European Commission and General Secretariat of the Council to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on the Implementation of the EU Strategy of Africa*. October 12, 2006, 3, http://www.europe-cares.org/africa/docs/061012_FINAL_VERSION.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

²⁰¹ Neethling, “Shaping the African Standby Force,” 68-9.

into the organization after the abolition of apartheid in 1994. Today SADC is comprised of fourteen member states, including the “hot spots” DRC and Zimbabwe.²⁰² SADC has scheduled an impressive and challenging plan for political integration: the organization aims to establish a customs union by 2010, create a common market by 2015 and a monetary union by 2016.

In the field of security policy, SADC adopted a “Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation” (SIPO) in August 2004. This plan “is an instrument for dealing with the Southern African region’s political, defence and security challenges.”²⁰³ SIPO’s core objective is “to create a peaceful and stable political and security environment through which the region will endeavour to realize its socioeconomic objectives.”²⁰⁴ The major source of military interstate tensions in Southern Africa was eliminated with the apartheid regime in 1992. SADC defines itself not only as an instrument to facilitate political and economic integration, but also as a tool to enhance security as a prerequisite for sustaining development. Article 4 of the SADC treaty declares that “human rights, democracy and the rule of law” are its overarching principles.²⁰⁵

Despite significant improvement, the security situation in the whole region was “non stable” in 2005.²⁰⁶ The two major issues of concern in the SADC region are the ongoing conflict in the DRC and the autocratic rule of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.²⁰⁷ SADC member states intervened in the DRC, as it will be shown in the case study.

²⁰² This states are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania. See: Soest, Regionale Integration, 2.

²⁰³ SADC, *Strategic indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation*. August 5, 2004, 5, http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/sipo/sipo_en.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

²⁰⁴ Mike Cohen, “SADC to Discuss Economic Integration and Reduce Trade Barriers.” *Business Report*, August 15, 2006.

²⁰⁵ SADC, *Declaration and Treaty of SADC*. Windhoek, August 17, 1992, Art 4, http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/legal/treaties/declaration_and_treaty_of_sadc.php (accessed May 22, 2007).

²⁰⁶ Petretto, “Rolle der Regionalorganisationen,” 55.

²⁰⁷ Gretchen Bauer and Scott D. Taylor, *Politics in Southern Africa. State and Society in Transition* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 171.

Another intervention was conducted by South Africa, which deployed troops to Lesotho in 1998/99, without a formal decision of SADC.²⁰⁸

The traditional areas of tensions in Southern Africa, the apartheid regime in South Africa and the civil war in Angola have terminated. Southern Africa tried for years to destabilize its neighbors, Angola's rebels operated from bases abroad, and Angola's government fought against rebels in their retreat in the DRC. International borders are no borders for conflict.²⁰⁹ The conflict in the DRC is currently the major conflict in SADC's region. To deal with such a troubled state in a regional organization is a challenge per se, but it shows how important capabilities for intervention and peace support are. As a tool for such measures, SADC committed itself in December 2004 to build a SADC standby brigade, which should be available for the African Standby Force (ASF).²¹⁰ The effectiveness of such a rapid reaction force depends on the acceptance of the troop contributing countries to agree to a potential mission.

²⁰⁸ Petretto, "Rolle der Regionalorganisationen," 66-9

²⁰⁹ Helmoed-Roemer Heitmann, "Afrika – Staatsgrenzen sind keine Konfliktgrenzen." *Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik* (2001): 19-20.

²¹⁰ Neethling, "Shaping the African Standby Force," 70.

IV. THE INFLUENCE OF FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN ON ESDP REGARDING SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Some EU Member States have a long colonial history in Africa. France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium, Italy and, for a shorter time period, Germany participated in the “scramble” of Africa. These colonial ties have bound Europe with Africa to this day; the policy of EU Member States is guided by perceived national interest, including a sense of responsibility for the effects of the colonial history.²¹¹

The European powers with the greatest former colonial possessions in Africa, France and Great Britain especially, have never ended their engagement in Africa after their former colonies gained independence. The author argues that both countries have pushed repeatedly for a comprehensive approach towards Africa through the EU’s policy, and especially the ESDP. Great Britain and France have been traditional rivals in creating and maintaining their spheres of influence, but overcame that in the late 1990s when they aligned their policies towards sub-Saharan Africa. The former colonies of Great Britain and France are presented in Figure 6.

²¹¹ Joschka Fischer, Speech by Federal Foreign Minister to the German Bundestag on 18 January 2001, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/reden/2001/010118-PolicyonAfricaPDF.pdf> (accessed March 15, 2007). He expressed that “Europe has a responsibility for Africa and not only due to its colonial history.”



Figure 6. Africa Partitioned 1914²¹²

²¹² Philip Curtain and others, *African History: From the Earliest Times to Independence*, (Harlow: Longman, 1995), 411.

Both European states were confronted with increasing demands of their colonies for independence after the end of the Second World War but only French Algeria and Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea, the three former colonial possessions of Portugal, waged war to achieve that aim.²¹³ Great Britain and France granted most of their former colonies independence in 1960. Algeria is an exception because of its French settler community and its status as a part of France. The loss of this country after a brutal and long-lasting war in the 1960s had serious impact on the French self-esteem as a grand nation. However, while Great Britain relinquished its colonial empire relatively smoothly, this step was for France more problematic because it was more closely connected to its status as a global power and because France had more difficulties accepting the reality of a declining power after World War Two.

Starting from the assumption that France and Great Britain, two of the three leading members of the EU, try to influence the EU's policy in accordance with their own national interests, it is necessary to give an overview about the basic policies of both EU Member States towards sub-Saharan Africa.

France's Africa policy was always military policy. It served national, economic, and security interests. France's engagement in Africa was a central pillar to support its role as a global actor.²¹⁴ Tobias Koepf alleges that France was able to maintain its sphere of influence in its African backyard in sub-Saharan Africa through the deployment of French troops after its former colonies became independent.²¹⁵ Despite the fact that today France is less willing to intervene as it has done in the past, two trends are obvious since the end of the Cold War. First, France tries to multilateralize its interventionist policy, which means that it tries to get UN mandates to legitimize its actions and to act through common EU action as much as possible (?). Second, France tries to "africanize"

²¹³ Daniel Moran, *Wars of National Liberation* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2006), 130.

²¹⁴ Mair, "Einsatzgebiet Kongo," 1-2.

²¹⁵ Tobias Koepf, "Die französische Sicherheits- und Militärpolitik in Subsahara-Afrika nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges. Das Ende einer Ära oder Business as Usual?" *Arbeitspapiere zu Problemen der Internationalen Politik und der Entwicklungsländerforschung* 43 (2005), http://www.forschungsstelle-dritte-welt.de/Dokumente/AP/AP_43_Koepf.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

its sub-regional security policy by strengthening African capacities and capabilities. France is securing its own interests indirectly, and, in doing so, it can reduce its financial and political burden.

Joseph-Thomas Göller states that France's socialist government of Lionel Jospin, elected in 1997, established a new Africa policy which resulted in a reduction of French civil and military experts in that region, a reduction in French military engagement and in the region's strategic importance in general. Factors causing that political adjustment were the French experience of Rwanda and Zaire, where France supported "the wrong side," which hurt France's reputation greatly.²¹⁶ Dennis Tull presents evidence that France's policy towards sub-Saharan Africa was changed by the new conservative French government of president Chirac, elected in 2002, but that this policy led to a military fiasco of the Operation LICORNE in the Ivory Coast in 2004. France's reluctance to support the Ivorian government against the rebels fanned the anti-French sentiments.²¹⁷ It is argued that this operation is an indicator of the readjustment of France's Africa policy under President Chirac, and that France will abstain more from military intervention in the future and will interfere more indirectly in the internal affairs of African states.²¹⁸

Tull expects that France will reduce its engagement and unilateral interventions further, despite the fact that the region maintains its strategic political importance for the country. Like Koepf, Tull argues that France attempts to "multilateralize" its Africa policy in two areas: first, more cooperation and responsibility for African states and, second, more cooperation with Europe.²¹⁹

Great Britain's policy after the Cold War regarding sub-Saharan Africa was much less active than of France. Africa, in the British view, was more a source of problems

²¹⁶ Joseph-Thomas Göller, "Frankreichs neue Afrika-Politik," *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 1 (1998): 52-60.

²¹⁷ Hans Georg Toeche-Mittler, "Cote d'Ivoire – Das Schlachtfeld der Politiker: Eruption antifranzösischer Gefühle." *Neue Züricher Zeitung Internationale Ausgabe* 226 (2004): 5.

²¹⁸ Lutz Holländer and Ronja Kempin, "Europas Platz an der Sonne: Afrika und die europäische Sicherheitspolitik," *Blätter für deutsche und Internationale Politik* 50, no. 5 (2005): 593-599.

²¹⁹ Dennis M. Tull, "Zeitenwende in der französischen Afrikapolitik," *SWP Aktuell* 44 (Oktober 2005): 41-2. http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=2458 (accessed May 22, 2007).

than an offer of opportunities. It concentrates its policy in line with the EU's programs on the "promotion of peace, prosperity and democracy on the continent,"²²⁰ connected with the conditionality of developmental aid, the promotion of good governance and human rights. But in general, Africa has been a "marginal concern for British foreign policy", since its global focus is more beyond Africa and its Commonwealth is worldwide. The focus of British policy is on its former colonies in Africa, the most important partner being South Africa. After September 11, 2001, the prevention of threats played an important role and intensified British interest in the region.²²¹ The government of Tony Blair was willing to be more active, and employed a variety of policies in response to crises in Africa, based on diplomacy, sanctions and, if needed, military intervention.²²² The ideal type for the latter was the intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000. Major motives for the British intervention were the protection of British citizens, the avoidance of a humanitarian crisis, the protection of the democratically elected government, and the support of the UN mission in Sierra Leone.²²³ After the immediate crisis was solved, Britain remained in Sierra Leone and supported SSR and DDR.²²⁴ This more demanding approach is in conflict with another aim of Britain's policy: Britain has the interest to "improve military efficiency while achieving cost saving."²²⁵

The different approaches of France and Great Britain toward sub-Saharan Africa have been aligned in the last years. France and Great Britain broached the issue of peacekeeping in Africa at several occasions. A first step was the French-British project taken after the bilateral summit in Chartres in November 1994. Both agreed to increase

²²⁰ Paul Williams, "Britain and Africa after the Cold War: Beyond Damage Limitation," in Taylor and Williams eds., *Africa in International Politics*, 41-59.

²²¹ Williams, "Britain and Africa after the Cold War," 42.

²²² Ibid., 49.

²²³ Paul Williams, "Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone." *Contemporary Security Policy* 22 no. 3 (December 2001): 155.

²²⁴ Adrian Horn, Funmi Olonisakin and Gordon Peake, "United-Kingdom -led Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone," *Civil Wars* 8, no. 2 (June 2006): 109-123.

²²⁵ Richard Connaughton, "Organizing British Joint Rapid Reaction Forces," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 2000): 87, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1726.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

the support of peacekeeping mechanisms in Africa.²²⁶ The French – British summit in St. Malo in 1998 is well known for its impact on the launching of ESDP one year later at the Cologne European Council. Both states declared that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”²²⁷ But both states also set the course for “close cooperation on the ground in Africa itself” and for harmonization of their Africa policies. Further, they committed themselves to “promote the EU Common Position on Human Rights, Democratic Principles, the Rule of Law and Good Governance in Africa.”²²⁸

If the main European actors in Africa launch such an initiative, it has an impact on the common EU policy toward Africa. France and Britain since then have assumed an agenda setting role on ESDP towards Africa. They advocated at their summit in Le Touquet in February 2003 the creation of an international finance facility for Africa (later implemented as the African Peace Facility) and emphasized the importance of the establishment of Africa’s own peace keeping capacities.²²⁹ At another summit in London in November 2003, both countries their willingness to combine their “efforts to promote peace and stability in Africa”; and they called on the EU to “examine how it can contribute to conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa, including through EU autonomous operations, in close co-operation with the United Nations.” Another announcement pertained to the establishment of the EU Battlegroups. Britain and France argued that “the EU should be capable and willing to deploy in an autonomous operation within 15 days to respond to a crisis.”²³⁰ The Battlegroup concept, explained later in

²²⁶ Lenzi, Guido, “WEU’s Role in sub-Saharan Africa,” in Kühne, Lenzi and Vasconcelos *WEU’s Role in Crisis Management*, 7, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillet/chai22e.html#chap4> (accessed May 22, 2007).

²²⁷ *British-French Summit St. Malo, Joint Declaration* December 3-4, 1998, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillet/chai47e.html#3> (accessed May 22, 2007).

²²⁸ *Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Africa*

²²⁹ Gegout, “Causes and Consequences,” 432.

²³⁰ *Franco British Summit. London, 24 November 2003: Strengthening European Cooperation in Security and Defence. Declaration*, 1-2, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/UKfrance/DefenceDeclaration,0.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

more detail, foresees a tactical, battalion size force for rapid reaction in military crisis management operations, a capability which was not available at that time for the EU.

Another bilateral summit took place in Lancaster House / London in November 2004. On this occasion both states declared that their bilateral cooperation has the aim “to sustain and enhance the EU’s contribution to the building of a better future for Africa.” They emphasized that “peace and security are fundamental for sustainable development,” and recognized “the importance of building African capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflict.” Furthermore, they declared that “the Battlegroups would allow the EU to respond quickly to a crisis in Africa while giving time for the AU or the UN to prepare a longer-term intervention.”²³¹

What these summits have in common is that France and Great Britain were the pacemakers regarding European military capacities and the development of a more prominent role of the EU in Africa. Both made no secret of their plans to use the Battlegroups in African conflicts. This chapter thus supports the argument that “Britain and France have undoubtedly been able to dominate the development of the ESDP and its role in Africa.”²³²

²³¹ *Franco British Relations. Joint Declaration on Africa*, Lancaster House, November 18, 2004. http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2004/chirac_london_africa111804.asp (accessed May 22, 2007).

²³² Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace, “Operation Artemis,” 521.

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V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU'S POLICY TOWARDS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

In this chapter the author will outline how the EU's political declarations concerning conflict prevention and crisis management in Africa have been implemented: it will be shown, first, which institutional capacities are available to increase the coherence of EU policy; second, which military crisis management capabilities can be employed; and third, which civilian crisis management capabilities are at the disposal of the EU. In a following subchapter, the ESDP activities will be analyzed.

A. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES

The EU declares itself that it is necessary “to make use in a coherent and coordinated manner all of the instruments available to the EU, inter alia as regards reconstruction, development and ESDP.”²³³ More coherence, as it is requested by the ESS, “requires complementarity in the use of EU instruments (civilian and military) and a better co-ordination between EU institutions.”²³⁴ This is obvious if the concepts of “comprehensive security” or the model of “global public goods” are taken into account. Both concepts argue that only the combined employment of civil and military instruments can increase the EU's security. The character of ESDP missions for crisis management demands the deployment of military and civilian means. The challenge is that these instruments are not only different by their nature; they are sometimes under different jurisdiction.

Figure 7 visualizes the demand of coordination between the EC (first pillar) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (second pillar) and also within the second pillar.

²³³ Council of the European Union, *Presidency Conclusions*, Brussels, December 12, 2003, 20.

²³⁴ Nowak “Introduction,” 11.




Figure 7. Requirements for Coordination for CCMO²³⁵

Civil-Military Crisis Management Operations (CM CMO) require inter- and intra-pillar coordination. Their different political agendas have to be streamlined and coordinated to increase effectiveness in crisis prevention and management.

The decision making procedures for crisis management operations within the EU are complex.²³⁶ The most important decision making body is the European Council consisting of the heads of state and government of the EU Member States, and its subsidiary organ, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). Topics related to peace and security, including military actions for crisis management, are prepared by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), a body consisting of EU Member States ambassadors. Military advice to the PSC is provided by the EU Military

²³⁵ Figure drawn by the author.

²³⁶ Catriona Gourlay, "European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management." *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 404-421; International Crisis Group, "EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited," *Europe Report* no. 160 (January 2005); Sebastian Mayer, "Sicherheitspolitische Interventionen der Europäischen Union: Rahmenbedingungen, Kompetenzen und Interaktionsmuster," *TranState Working Papers* no. 13 (2005). <http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de/homepages/mayer/arbeitspapierBeschreibung.php?ID=14&SPRACHE=de&USER=mayer> (accessed May 22, 2007).

Committee (EUMC) which consists of the joint chiefs of staff of the EU Member States. All these bodies guarantee the primacy of national interests in the decision making process due to the fact that the second pillar is outside the supranational structure of the EU, that the EU has no European-level forces available and can only launch military CMO relying on the Member States armed forces. The highest military body of the EU is the EU Military Staff (EUMS) which is subordinated to the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, Javier Solana, who is also the Chairman of the PSC.

An important step towards the coordination of civil and military instruments is the establishment of the Civil-Military Planning Cell. A proposal to establish this cell was welcomed by the EU Council in December 2003 and agreed to by the Council in June 2004.²³⁷ The Cell should be able to

- link work across the EU on anticipating crises, including opportunities for conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization;
- assist in planning and coordinating civilian operations;
- develop expertise in managing the civilian/military interface;
- do strategic advance planning for joint civil-military operations;
- reinforce the national HQ designated to conduct an EU autonomous operation.²³⁸

One part of the Cell is the Strategic Planning Branch and is the key nucleus of the Operations Center (OpCen). This is in turn part of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), which itself is a division of the Council Secretariat. Its main effort is to coordinate ESDP civil-military missions, despite the fact that it is an element of the second pillar and therefore within the military part. Its task is reflected in its manning: the Cell is headed by a military director with a civilian deputy. The Strategic Planning Branch consists of

²³⁷ EU Presidency: *European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations*. [December 2003], <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78414%20-%20EU-NATO%20Consultation,%20Planning%20and%20Operations.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007); Council of the European Union, *Brussels European Council 17 and 18 June 2004: Presidency Conclusions*. Brussels, July 19, 2004, 20, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/81742.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

²³⁸ EU Presidency: *European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations*, 2.

seventeen military and civilian planners. Among the latter are two liaison officials detached by the Commission.²³⁹ Thus, both intra- and inter-pillar coordination should be feasible.

The OpCen has the capacity to plan and conduct missions within the spectrum of the Treaty of the EU on a small scale, in the case that none of the national OHQ could be used. Nevertheless, the Council emphasizes “that this will not be a standing HQ.”²⁴⁰ In the case of activation, the OpCen is separated from the EUMS under the command of a designated Operations Commander and reinforced by additional augmentation personnel.²⁴¹

B. MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES

The Kosovo crisis in 1999 has shown that the Europeans were willing but not able to act decisively, partially because of the lack of military capabilities. Although the deployment of military force is not the EU’s first choice, military “will often play a crucial role at the beginning of a crisis, during its development and / or in the post conflict phase.”²⁴² Military capabilities can be important, as Hyde-Price argues, for “Europe can only act as a force of good in the world if it is prepared to use coercive power to back up its diplomacy.”²⁴³

The EU launched a process to improve its military, as well as its civil capabilities in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis and prior to the adoption of the ESS. Several shortfalls in its military capabilities were identified in 2001. The European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was established to close those gaps.²⁴⁴

²³⁹ Radek Kohl, “Civil-Military Co-ordination in EU Crisis Management,” in Nowak, *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way*, 131.

²⁴⁰ Council of the European Union. Brussels European Council 17 and 18 June 2004, 20.

²⁴¹ EU Presidency: European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations, 2.

²⁴² Headline Goal 2010, 1.

²⁴³ Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 12; Hyde-Price. *European Security*, 341.

²⁴⁴ Burkard Schmitt, *European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)*, n.p., n.d. <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/06-bsecap.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

With the endorsement of the (military) Headline Goal (HG) 2010 by the Brussels European Council on 17-18 June 2004, another improvement project was launched. The HG 2010 states, referring to the ESS, that the EU Member States are willing to provide the Union the capabilities which are necessary to increase security and stability in Europe's neighborhood, as well in the world. The aim is to enable the EU

to respond with rapid and decisive action ... to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union. This includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, tasks for combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking [as well as] joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and a role in security sector reform.²⁴⁵

The HG 2010 is the attempt to improve the interoperability, deployability and sustainability of the MS armed forces. The HG 2010 has defined some "milestones" that must be met. These include the establishment of the mentioned Civil Military Cell, coordination of strategic joint lift, and the formation of EU Battlegroups (EUBG).²⁴⁶

The EUBG concept was launched by France, Germany and Great Britain in February 2004 by issuing a "food for thoughts paper" concerning the development of capabilities in support of EU rapid response.²⁴⁷ The EUBG's mission spectrum is identical with the Headline Goal 2010 and consists in its core of the Petersberg Tasks.²⁴⁸ The EU BGs are modeled according to the experience of the EU mission ARTEMIS, where approximately 2,000 troops had been deployed to the northwestern province of the DRC, Ituri.

A EUBG is a approximately 1,500 troops strong, militarily "effective, credible, rapidly deployable, [a] coherent force package capable of stand alone operations or being used for an initial phase of larger operations," to accomplish the missions mentioned in

²⁴⁵ *Headline Goal 2010*, 1.

²⁴⁶ Council of the European Union, *EU Battlegroups Concept*.

²⁴⁷ *Capabilities Development in Support of EU Rapid Response 'The Battlegroups Concept'*, French, German and United Kingdom Food for Thought Paper November 2004, http://www.geopowers.com/Allianzen/EU/akt_eu/RRF_BGConcept.pdf.

²⁴⁸ *Headline Goal 2010*, 1.

the HG 2010.²⁴⁹ They are fully operational since January 2007. The potential area of operations (AOO) is determined by a radius of 6,000 km around Brussels. Much of sub-Saharan Africa is located inside of EUBG's AOO as the red line in Figure 8 indicates:



Figure 8. EUBG's Potential Area of Operations²⁵⁰

This limitation is not sacrosanct as the deployment of the European force to the DRC gives evidence; it is primarily an assumption for military strategic and operational planning. A French-British Joint Declaration states explicitly that the “Battlegroups would allow the EU to respond quickly to a crisis in Africa while giving time for the AU or the UN to prepare a longer-term intervention.”²⁵¹

Further capabilities also include the availability of headquarters on the military strategic level in the case of a military crisis response operation without recourse to NATO assets. France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg announced at their summit in Brussels in April 2003 that they intended to establish a permanent EU Operational Headquarters (OHQ) in Tervuren (Belgium). This summit became known as the “Chocolate Summit,” but the concept of a permanent EU OHQ has been blocked up to

²⁴⁹ *Military Capability Commitment Conference. Declaration on European Military Capabilities*, 3, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/82761.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

²⁵⁰ Figure drawn by Bundeswehr Operations Command (Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr) on request of the author.

²⁵¹ *Franco British Summit. Joint Declaration on Africa*.

now. The rift between MS who wanted to strengthen the EU-US relationship and those who wanted to bolster the EU's autonomous capacity was obvious. The establishment of an independent, permanent HQ was seen as a further duplication of NATO and was therefore strongly opposed by Great Britain. The EU internal crisis was solved by the Brussels' European Council decision in June 2004 that a permanent headquarters was not envisioned, and that autonomous EU operations should be planned and led by headquarters provided by willing and capable member states.²⁵²

The Council's request to make national HQs available for the EU was implemented by five MS. Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Greece have made preparations to activate an EU OHQ by providing the infrastructure and personnel for a key nucleus. After activation, the EU OHQ is structurally separated from the national HQ, although it remains dependent on logistics and expertise provided by the host nation. EU member states augment additional trained personnel to enable the OHQ to fulfill its tasks to plan and run an autonomous EU CMO without recourse on NATO assets.

Two other options for a strategic EU OHQ are available: first, the "Berlin Plus" formula which enables the EU to launch an operation while relying on NATO assets and capabilities; this implies establishing a strategic EU HQ at NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), commanded by DSACEUR. Second, the OpCen within the Civil-Military Cell of the EUMS will also be capable of functioning after augmentation as an EU OHQ.

The three different HQ options are shown in Figure 9.

²⁵² European Council. Presidency Conclusions Brussels, 17 – 18 June 2006, 20. This decision has to be seen in the context of the Belgium, France, German and Luxembourg "Chocolate Summit" in 2003 and its controversy proposal to establish a permanent EU OHQ in the Brussels' suburb Tervuren.




Figure 9. Possible EU OHQ at the Military Strategic Level²⁵³

The first ever activation of an EU OHQ to plan and run an autonomous EU CMO without recourse to NATO assets was conducted for EUFOR RD Congo in 2006. This option was not earlier available. The EU CMO ARTEMIS in the DRC in 2003 was planned and led by the French national HQ, the EU operation CONCORDIA in FYROM from March to December 2003 made use of the Berlin Plus arrangements and was led by the OHQ established within SHAPE.

C. CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES

Civilian Crisis Management (CCM) can be defined as “the intervention by non-military personnel in a crisis that may be violent or non-violent, with the intention of

²⁵³ Figure drawn by the author.

preventing a further escalation of the crisis and facilitating its resolution;” therefore, CCM needs civilian means.²⁵⁴

The civilian dimension of the EU’s approach to crisis management is much more complex than the military. Civilian means, which could be used and / or deployed, are not under the unified control of one EU pillar. As mentioned, CCM can be conducted by the European Community (EC) (first pillar) and within the CFSC (second pillar).

1. First Pillar CCM-Capabilities and Measures

To present the EC’s engagement in CCM in all its facets would go beyond the scope of this paper. But it is important to have an overview of the Commission’s activities in peace building and crisis management, because the policies of both pillars have the same orientation and the instruments should be complementary.

The EC has many and very different instruments for CCM-interventions available; many different Commission bodies are involved in its deployment.²⁵⁵ They are comprised of political dialogue, agreements and institutional arrangements with third countries and regional groups (such as association agreements and other forms of partnership), trade and economic measures, development aid and emergency relief, support for rehabilitation and reconstruction and macro-economic support.²⁵⁶

a) *The Cotonou Agreement*

Traditionally the EC conducted a policy focused on economic and developmental issues. The first institutionalized cooperation between the EC and some African countries was based on the Yaoundé Agreements (1963-69 and 1969-75). This arrangement was substituted by the Lomé agreement which incorporated besides the

²⁵⁴ Lindborg, “European Approaches,” 4.

²⁵⁵ Mayer, “Sicherheitspolitische Interventionen,” 16-22.

²⁵⁶ European Commission Conflict Prevention Unit, *Civilian Instruments*, 5. This document provides a detailed summary about the different instruments the EC can deploy for CCM.

African states also Caribbean and Pacific countries. The Lomé Agreement was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement signed in Benin in June 2000 by all sub-Saharan African states.²⁵⁷

As mentioned earlier, sustainable economic development is an element of the structural stability concept of the European Commission. In this field the Commission makes “substantial contributions to macroeconomic stabilization” and supports economic reforms through subsidizing budgets or debt cancellation.²⁵⁸ The EU recognizes that economic factors are important for the emergence of conflicts in Africa as well as for their prevention and resolution. Economic instability and weakness belongs to the root causes of African conflicts. Due to this proposition, the EU attempts to “promote the further integration of Africa into the world economy,” “support economic and political cooperation” and to “assure that regional trade integration measures ... support conflict prevention and resolution.”²⁵⁹

Despite the fact that the Cotonou agreement is mainly an economic pact between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, it has also functions in security matters. Different issues – economic and political – are linked together in this agreement. The agreement includes stipulations for conflict prevention, good governance and democratization. The Agreement declares in Art 8 (3) that the signatories “should contribute to peace, security and stability and promote a stable and democratic political environment.” Countries which do not comply with the rules set by this arrangement can be suspended. Consultations should take place if the essential elements of the agreement, human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, are violated. If the consultations resulted in a formal decision, that the basic principles are violated, “appropriate measures may be taken.” Article 96 outlines that these have to be “taken in accordance with the

²⁵⁷ Faria, “Crisis Management,” 31.

²⁵⁸ Commission for the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*, 12.

²⁵⁹ European Council, *Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004*, Art. 8 (1).

international law and proportional to the violation.” Olsen argues that these regulations are tightening the premises for sub-Saharan African states to receive developmental help from the EU.²⁶⁰

The case of Zimbabwe is evidence that this instrument is not used in a decisive way to hinder the Mobutu regime which perpetuates the violation of democracy, rule of law and human rights. A paper on the Zimbabwe Human Right’s NGO Forum²⁶¹ presents evidence concerning that issue in November 2006 and calls for the continuation of assets freeze and visa restrictions.

The renegotiation of the Cotonou agreement is used by the EU to convince the African partners to support the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague.²⁶² Up to now, the ICC is not conducting its own trials against sub-Saharan Africa’s despots. It supports the work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone that uses the ICC’s facilities in The Hague to sue the former Liberian president Charles Taylor.²⁶³

The EU linked migration with the Cotonou agreement: from a strategic perspective, ACP countries, as well the EU, see in the reduction of poverty, the improvement of living and working conditions, and the creation of employment a chance to normalize migratory flows. But until these favorable conditions are established, the Cotonou agreement includes an article to facilitate the repatriation of illegal immigrants. It declares that

each of the ACP States shall accept the return of and readmission of any of its nationals who are illegally present on the territory of the Member States of the European Union, at that Member States request and without formalities.²⁶⁴

²⁶⁰ Olsen, “Challenges,” 431.

²⁶¹ Zimbabwe Human Right’s NGO Forum, *Zimbabwe’s Failure*, 17.

²⁶² Eide, “Preface,” v.

²⁶³ Council of the European Union, *10th ECOWAS-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting*, 4.

²⁶⁴ *Partnership Agreement (Cotonou Agreement)* Art 13, 5.c) and i).

b) Developmental Aid

During the Cold War developmental aid was an important tool to gain influence in the recipient countries. It was already included in the Rome Treaties of 1957 and thus “became the first element in an embryonic common European foreign and security policy.”²⁶⁵

Javier Solana declared at the UNSC in January 2002 that the EU is “the world’s leading source of development and humanitarian assistance in Africa, providing more than two thirds of total official development flows to sub-Saharan Africa.”²⁶⁶ The EU’s share of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) distributed to sub-Saharan Africa amounted to 55 percent in 2004. In a regional perspective, 51 percent of all EU ODA were dedicated to that region in that year.²⁶⁷

Olsen argues that developmental aid lost its significance, despite the traditional importance of it for the EC after the end of the Cold War. This might be a result of a shift of priorities in the EU’s policy towards Africa. The EU is increasingly preoccupied with security issues in Africa. As a consequence of this priority shift “development aid was increasingly reduced to being only one among a number of instruments in the pursuit of the EU’s policy priorities in sub-Saharan Africa.”²⁶⁸ This observation is outdated: the European Council decided in 2005 to double the amount of financial aid until 2010 and distribute 50 percent of it to Africa partly to support the implementation of the UN MDG.²⁶⁹ The 10th European Development Fund (EDF), the main inter-governmentally funded financing instrument of the ACP-EU cooperation since 1958, will cover the time period 2008 – 2013.²⁷⁰ The EU is willing to offer €22 billion in developmental aid. Approximately €20 billion are designated for sub-Saharan Africa,

²⁶⁵ Bayart, “Towards a new Start,” 453.

²⁶⁶ Solana, *Speech on Africa*.

²⁶⁷ European Commission, *EU Donor Atlas 2006*, 14, 20.

²⁶⁸ Olsen, “Challenges,” 433.

²⁶⁹ Commission for the European Communities, *EU Strategy for Africa*, 6.

²⁷⁰ European Center of Development Policy Management. *The 10th European Development Fund*, 1.

without South Africa.²⁷¹ The EDF is very important for conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. An example for the latter is the European Commission's mine clearance program in Angola, funded through the European Development Fund. The EDF also plays an important role in financing the DDR process.²⁷²

c) *Sanctions*

On the one hand, the EU is capable of employing incentives for African states which respect the political conditions connected to the EU – Africa agreements, on the other hand, the EU is able to enact sanctions like trade embargos, flight or travel bans. These measures are labeled by the EU as restrictive measures.²⁷³

An example of the latter measures is the relationship of the EU to Zimbabwe. The democratic transition from a white, racist settler regime to a democratic society started in 1980, but its failure has become evident since 2001. Political decisions were made by Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's president since 1987, to stay in power but at the expense of the law, individual rights, and positive economic development. White farmers were labeled as the punching bag to cover for maladministration, their farms occupied, the right of the opposition was neglected, the economy collapsed, and the national currency was devaluated by hyperinflation.²⁷⁴ Those who are affected by the EU's ban are "individuals who engage in activities which seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Zimbabwe."²⁷⁵

In 2002, the EU introduced measures such as the ban on entry into the territory of the EU member states and a freeze of national assets. An embargo has been imposed on the supply of arms and equipment intended for military operations.²⁷⁶

²⁷¹ European Commission and General Secretariat of the Council. *Joint Progress Report*, 2.

²⁷² *EU Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)*. 27.

²⁷³ Council of the European Union, *Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)*. See also: Rudolf, Peter. "Sanktionen in der internationalen Politik." He provides an overview about the effect of sanctions

²⁷⁴ Bauer and Taylor, "Zimbabwe."

²⁷⁵ Council of the European Union, "General Affairs and External Relations," 9.

²⁷⁶ Council of the European Union, "Zimbabwe – Restrictive Measures."

d) *The European Community's "Rapid Reaction Mechanism"*

The Commission is able to fund via the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) projects which support long term development goals like DDR, mediation, arbitration and reconciliation.²⁷⁷ It provides funds for humanitarian assistance, like emergency relief or demining activities. The European Community provides more than €100 million for several areas that are connected with DDR in sub-Saharan Africa.²⁷⁸

The EC can use the RRM in “situations of crisis or emerging crisis, situations posing a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, situations threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to destabilize the country.”²⁷⁹ Similar to the African Peace Facility, presented in the next chapter, it is a tool to support African peacekeeping operations.

e) *The European Community's "African Peace Facility"*

The “African Peace Facility” (APF), established in April 2004, is a new and comprehensive instrument for the EU.²⁸⁰ This facility has been designed to enable regional and sub-regional African organizations like the AU, ECOWAS or SADC to establish their own military peace capabilities, such as the AU African Standby Force (ASF), and to conduct African owned peace support operations.

The European Council adopted a common position “concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa” in January 2004. The Council declared that the EU is willing to “contribute to the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts in Africa by strengthening African capacities and means of action in this

²⁷⁷ European Commission Conflict Prevention Unit, *Civilian Instruments*, 22.

²⁷⁸ Catriona Gourlay, “Community Instruments for Civilian Crisis Management,” in Nowak, *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way*, 57-8.

²⁷⁹ European Community, *Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism*, Art 3(1), http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_057/l_05720010227en00050009.pdf (accessed March 15, 2007).

²⁸⁰ European Commission, *Securing Peace and Stability for Africa: The EU funded African Peace Facility*. Brussels: July 2004. http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/docs/flyer_peace_en.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

field.”²⁸¹ The APF is to be seen in the light of this declaration, and it is the implementation of the EU’s concepts of partnership and African ownership. To simplify it: the EU is providing the money, the AU the will and the troops to conduct peace support operations. The APF is part of the EU’s approach to create capacities for conflict prevention and crisis management.

The first budget covered the timeframe 2004 to 2007 and comprised reallocated development funds in the amount of €250 million.²⁸² As it became apparent that the available budget would be exhausted earlier than expected, the EU announced in April 2006 to provide a new €350 million budget for the timeframe 2006-10.²⁸³ 80 percent of the funds are envisioned for operational costs. The initial budget was provided by the European Development Fund (EDF).²⁸⁴ Meanwhile, the APF got an additional €50 million; the 2008-10 budgets of €300 million will be financed through the 10th EDF.²⁸⁵

The AU has to request the activation of the APF for a special purpose, such as an AU mission. This request has to be endorsed by the European Council. This guarantees the EU’s influence regarding how Africans can conduct “their” operations. The central question, whether or not a peace operation is conducted in Africa, is a decision of the African side. The EU’s principles of partnership and African ownership are not functioning if the EU has the opinion that a mission is necessary and its African partners are not willing or even are in opposition to such an endeavor. In such a situation, the EU has to be capable to conduct crisis management operations without the participation of African troops and has to rely on its own capabilities. The EU’s will to influence African decisions is obvious; the SG/ HR Javier Solana declared that the EU “should find ways of using the APF that gives us [the EU] more influence.”²⁸⁶ Influence can also be exerted through the limitation of the possible uses of the APF’s budget. Due

²⁸¹ European Council, *Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004*, Art. 1(3) and 2.

²⁸² European Commission, *Securing Peace and Stability*, 4.

²⁸³ Reuters. *EU gives 350 Million Euros for Africa Peace Operations*. November 4, 2006. <http://defensenews.com/story.php?F=1680073&C=europe> (accessed May 22, 2007).

²⁸⁴ Walde and Schukraft, “Die Peace Facility,” 105.

²⁸⁵ European Commission and General Secretariat of the Council. *Joint Progress Report*, 3.

²⁸⁶ Solana, *Contribution by the EU High Representative*, 3.

to the origin of that money from the EDF, its spending is limited to “civil” purposes like medical support, communications, transportation and logistics. The procurement of weapons, ammunition and military equipment is excluded.²⁸⁷

Examples of the uses of the APF are the funding of the AU Mission in Sudan / Darfur (AMIS) and the ECOWAS mission in the Central African Republic.²⁸⁸ The financial support provided by the APF for AMIS alone amounted to €242 million between June 2004 and October 2006.²⁸⁹ This is also a case which demonstrates how European investment in indigenous African conflict management can relieve the EU of the burden of starting an own operation and employing its troops.

An evaluation of the effectiveness of the APF was done and the final report presented in January 2006. The evaluation team provided a detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the APF. Two conclusions are important: first, “the APF should continue in much the same form as present with a strong emphasis on ... African ownership”; and second, that the APF’s long term strategy should focus on

capacity building needs in the African continental peace and security architecture. (...) The APF has been a very positive initiative which has allowed the EU to support African work on peace and security in a practical, flexible and highly relevant manner that has respected the principle of African ownership.²⁹⁰

This positive assessment is not shared by everybody. Wadde and Schukraft argue that the available budget is not sufficient to fund long term African peace operations, and the AU’s capability to raise its own funds is limited.²⁹¹ The International Crisis Group criticizes the restrictions concerning the use of the APF’s money and the exclusion of weapon and equipment procurement. In the case of the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS), the AU had to get support in this respect from other donors, including EU

²⁸⁷ Walde and Schukraft, “Die Peace Facility,” 102.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ European Union, “EU Support to the African Union Mission in Darfur – AMIS” *Factsheet*, October 2006, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/061017factsheet5AMISII.doc.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

²⁹⁰ Neimacro Consortium. *Mid Term Evaluation of the African Peace Facility*, 4-5.

Member States.²⁹² Nevertheless, the APF serves a very important purpose. Academics allege that “the single biggest impediment to peacekeeping in Africa is funding.”²⁹³ The APF addresses this problem and is a significant institution for African capacity building.

2. Second Pillar CCM – Capabilities

Three years prior to the adoption of the ESS, in June 2000, the European Council in Feira focused on four areas of CCM which have to be developed with priority: capabilities for police missions, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection. The European Council in Göteborg in June 2001 set additional goals with the “EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts.”²⁹⁴

The EU is now able to provide more than 5,000 police officers “to international missions across the range of crisis prevention and crisis management operations and in response to the specific needs at the different stages of these operations.”²⁹⁵ Rapidly deployable Integrated Police Units (IPU) can be made available to substitute for ineffective or disintegrated local police forces in a crisis.²⁹⁶ On the initiative of France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, a European Gendarmerie Force has been established as a supplement to the IPUs. These formations have military status and should be used “for more demanding scenarios and for rapid deployment in order to guarantee public security and public order.”²⁹⁷

²⁹¹ Walde and Schukraft, “Die Peace Facility,” 107-108.

²⁹² International Crisis Group. “The EU/AU Partnership,” 8.

²⁹³ Cillier and Malan, “Progress with the African Standby Force,” 16.

²⁹⁴ *EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts*. <http://www.eu2001.se/static/eng/pdf/violent.PDF> (accessed May 22, 2007).

²⁹⁵ Council of the European Union, *Santa Maria Da Feira European Council 19 and 20 June 2000. Conclusions of the Presidency*, Annex 1, Appendix 3, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei2_en.htm#an1 (accessed May 22, 2007).

²⁹⁶ Gourlay, “EU Civilian Crisis Management,” 2.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

Concerning the “rule of law,” the EU is now able to provide more than 200 experts (judges, lawyers and prosecutors) in that field. Such experts are necessary to support capacity building in failing states. Rule of law missions can be launched in order to

educate, train, monitor and to give advice with the aim of bridging the local legal systems up to international standards, and ... carrying out executive functions, notably where local structures are failing or inexistent in order to consolidate the rule of law in a crisis situation and thereby restoring public order and security.²⁹⁸

In the field of civil administration, the EU is now able to call on its Member States to deploy experts in a crisis, “to provide or help provide basic services that the national or local administration is not able to offer.”²⁹⁹

Civil protection, as a field of crisis management, uses the existing capabilities and structures within the Member States. These national assets should be employed in emergencies for tasks such as search and rescue, the building of refugee camps or communication systems. Small rapid reaction teams are available on short notice; up to 2,000 personnel can be deployed later, if needed.³⁰⁰

The Committee for Civil Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), also established by the Feira Council in 2000, is the central body for the coordination of civil crisis management operations.³⁰¹

The four core areas of the 2000 Feira Council were supplemented in June 2004. Referring to the ESS, the council adopted an “Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP,” and declared that the available expertise should be expanded in order to cover

²⁹⁸ Catriona Gourlay, “EU Civilian Crisis Management: Preparing for flexible and Rapid Response,” *ISIS European Security Review* 25 (March 2005), 2, <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/ESR25-CCM%20final.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

²⁹⁹ Gourlay, “EU Civilian Crisis Management,” 2.

³⁰⁰ Gourlay, “European Union Procedures and Resources,” 414.

³⁰¹ Sebastian Mayer, “Sicherheitspolitische Interventionen der Europäischen Union: Rahmenbedingungen, Kompetenzen und Interaktionsmuster,” *TranState Working Papers* no. 13 (2005): 10-11, <http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de/homepages/mayer/arbeitspapierBeschreibung.php?ID=14&SPRACHE=de&USER=mayer> (accessed May 22, 2007).

“the field of human rights, political affairs, security sector reform (SSR), mediation, border control, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and media policy.”³⁰² At the same council meeting, it was decided to set a Civilian Headline Goal for 2008. This was adopted in December 2004. The four core areas of CCM were supplemented by the formal declaration that capabilities for monitoring missions, as well as generic support for the EU Special Representatives, are necessary. It is envisaged that the EU will be capable of deploying “integrated civilian crisis management packages” similar to military capabilities.³⁰³ The Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2004 resulted in an offer of more personnel by the MS than was requested by the EU.³⁰⁴

These general capabilities are amended by “multifunctional civilian crisis management sources in an integrated format, including rapidly deployable Civilian Crisis Response Teams (CRTs)” which should be, despite other tasks, able to “carry out assessment and fact finding missions in a crisis or impending crisis situation.”³⁰⁵

The ESS’ plea for increased capabilities in different areas to accomplish a wider spectrum of missions is reflected in the EU’s approach concerning SSR. The British Presidency of the EU conducted, in cooperation with the Commission, a seminar concerning this topic; the Council adopted an initial EU SRR concept. The latter accentuates that the “EU should expect further requests for assistance from third States concerned/or from the EU, Regional or Sub Regional Organizations, in particular in

³⁰² *Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP: Adopted by the European Council (17-18 June 2004)*, 3, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Action%20Plan%20for%20Civilian%20Aspects%20of%20ESDP.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁰³ Council of the European Union: *Civilian Headline Goal 2008*.

³⁰⁴ Council of the European Union, *Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference 2006: Ministerial Declaration*. Brussels, November 13, 2006, 1, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/civilian_crisis_management_20.11.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007). The personnel commitment of the MS comprises of 5761 police officers, 631 personnel for rule of law, 562 personnel for civilian administration and 4988 personnel for civil protection. More than 1,000 police officers could be deployed within 30 days.

³⁰⁵ Council of the European Union. *Civilian Headline Goal 2008*, 1 and 4.

relation to Africa.”³⁰⁶ SSR is not a task only for ESDP; issues within this spectrum have to be tackled by the Commission as well. This calls for a “two pillar concept,” which is not yet available.

D. ACTIVITIES

For this study, the author divided the EU’s activities in two sub-chapters: first the author provides a short overview over completed or ongoing ESDP missions and then focuses in the second part on the EU’s activities in the DRC.

1. EU’s ESDP Operations 2003 - 2007

Sixteen ESDP civilian, police and military operations have been launched by the EU since 2003. Figure 10 shows the broad spectrum of ESDP missions which are ongoing or have been completed since 2003. Four of them, presented in green, are military missions. The rest are civil missions dealing with police, rule of law and other types. In some of them, police officers have been deployed to support local governments in order to improve their police capabilities and to adjust local police forces to European standards in codes of conduct or respect for the law. Although the EU is willing to substitute local police completely, such missions have not been conducted up to now. Other types of civil ESDP missions have been conducted to support judicial institutions, such as in Georgia (EUJUST Themis) and Iraq (EUJUST-LEX), or a mission to support border control (EUBAM Rafah).

Five ESDP missions have been conducted in sub-Saharan Africa or are continuing. AMIS II (African Union Mission in Sudan), a follow-up operation of AMIS, is a still ongoing operation conducted by the African Union (AU) in Sudan’s eastern region of Darfur. There is a brutal civil war ongoing between the Government of Sudan and its Arabian militias, the Janjaweed, on the one hand and Darfur’s rebels on the

³⁰⁶ UK Presidency of the EU in conjunction with the European Commission, Saferworld and International Alert, *Developing a Common Security Sector Reform Strategy for the EU*. Post-seminar Paper, November 28, 2005, <http://www.eplo.org/documents/SSRReportSaferworld.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007). Council of the European Union, *Initial Elements for an EU Security Sector Reform (SSR) Concept*.

other.³⁰⁷ On October 20, 2004, the AU Peace and Security Council adopted a resolution that increased the personnel strength of police and military personnel to more than 3,000. Their mission was mainly to monitor and verify the stipulations of a peace agreement and to protect civilians in the vicinity of their positions from immediate threat.³⁰⁸ The EU provided strategic air lift for more than 2,000 AU personnel and deployed police officers, military experts and military observers to AMIS II. Also included is the provision of assets, planning and technical assistance, the training of AU troops and police personnel.³⁰⁹ A deeper analysis of the Darfur conflict would go far beyond the scope of this research; the conflict is still ongoing. The other four ESDP missions have been conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These missions are the Operation ARTEMIS in 2003, EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 and the still ongoing missions EUPOL Kinshasa, respectively EUSEC RD Congo. These four missions will be discussed in the next subchapter.

³⁰⁷ Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, *Darfur: A Short History of a Long War* (London: Zed Books, 2005); Gérard Prunier, *Darfur. The Ambiguous Genocide* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

³⁰⁸ International Crisis Group, "The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur," 3.

³⁰⁹ European Union, "EU Support to the African Union Mission in Darfur – AMIS."




Figure 10. ESDP Operations 2003 - 2007³¹⁰

2. EU's Engagement in Democratic Republic of Congo 1996-2007

This subchapter will first provide an overview about the history of the conflict to put the EU's actions into perspective.³¹¹ It will then present the UN mission MONUC, the main actor for conflict resolution in this country, followed by the EU's approach towards the region. Subsequently, a description and analysis of the EU's two military and two civilian CMO is provided. The conclusion provides an assessment of why the EU is

³¹⁰ Picture drawn after: <http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/ESDPoperations.jpg> utilizing United Nations *World Map No. 4170*. The abbreviations are: EUPM and EUPOL – European Union Police Mission; FYROM – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; EUPAT: European Union Police Advisory Team; AMM - Ache Monitoring Mission; EUBAM – European Union Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories; EUPOL COPPS – European Union Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories; AMIS – African Union Mission in Sudan.

³¹¹ Young and Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*; Edgerton, *The troubled Heart of Africa*; Nest, Grignon and Kisangani, *The Democratic Republic of Congo*; Clark ed., *The African Stakes of the Congo War*; Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz*. This literature provides detailed studies about the history of the DRC.

engaged in the DRC and in how far the EU's actions are in fact an implementation of its concepts and declarations. Figure 11 presents a map of the DRC.




Figure 11. Map of the DRC ³¹²

a) *Historical Background of the Conflict*

The origins of the conflict in the DRC are manifold; they are rooted in the colonial past of the country and its unprepared fast-track independence, in internal defects of the state such as the neopatrimonial rule of Joseph Mobutu (President of DRC/Zaire 1965-1997), and in tensions caused by ethnic rivalries in the DRC's east. But external factors also played a major role in the process which led the DRC to the brinks of total collapse: the spill-over of the ethnic conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, and two Congo wars from 1996-1997 and 1998-2001 in which other African states were involved.

³¹² United Nations. *Democratic Republic of the Congo: Map No. 4007 Rev. 8 January 2004.*

The territory of today's DRC became the "Congo Free State" in 1885 and was recognized by the European powers at the Berlin Conference (1884-85) as the private property of the Belgian King Leopold.³¹³ His administration was "based on exploitation and extraction", indeed extreme violence.³¹⁴ The Free State was transferred to Belgium and became its official colony as Belgian Congo in 1908. Belgium, like other European colonial powers, established a system of indirect rule but was never able to exercise power in the whole country. After a phase of violent uprisings in 1959, the Belgian government released its colony to independence in June 1960, but unfortunately without any preparation. No educated indigenous elite was available to substitute for the Belgian expatriates who left the country immediately after independence due to the bad security situation.³¹⁵ Congo was plagued by separatist movements and rebel groups operating in its territory after independence. Joseph Mobutu was the first to profit from this, making a coupe d'état and declaring himself president on November 25, 1965. He changed the country's name to Zaire and installed a clientelistic and neopatrimonial rule at the expense of the whole public infrastructure, including the educational and public health systems.³¹⁶ The economy declined, no significant development took place.³¹⁷ Mobutu's weak military was repeatedly backed by Belgian and French interventions, a policy which cost France much of its reputation.³¹⁸

Mobutu's system of neopatrimonial rule was crippled after his financiers terminated their support following the end of the Cold War. Sufficient national revenues could not be generated. The death blow for his regime was a rebellion which was

³¹³ Edgerton, "The Troubled Heart," 78. The conveyance of the Congo territory as a private property of the Belgian King was the result of the balancing policy of the European powers. If one of the traditional European colonial powers could have controlled that huge territory, this would have had a serious impact on the distribution of power between them.

³¹⁴ Jermaine O. McCalpin, "Historicity of a Crisis: The Origins of the Congo War," in Clark ed., *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, 35.

³¹⁵ Edgerton, "The Troubled Heart," 180-2. For example, neither Patrice Lumumba, the first prime minister of Congo nor Joseph Mobutu, the later long term President and autocrat of Congo/ Zaire had finished secondary school.

³¹⁶ Ibid., 215.

³¹⁷ Michael Nest, "Background to the Conflict," in Nest, Grignon and Kisangani, *The Democratic Republic of Congo*, 19.

³¹⁸ Göller, "Frankreichs neue Afrika Politik."

launched in Zaire's eastern provinces by the Banyamulenge people, related to the Rwandan Tutsi, in 1996. This conflict was later named the "First Congo War." A rebel organization led by their "spokesman" Laurent Kabila, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, was able to seize Zaire's capital Kinshasa in June 1997. Mobutu, after being in power for 32 years, fled one month earlier to Morocco, where he died in exile.

This rebellion was according to Kevin Dunn "planned and directed" by Rwanda and Uganda, which had important security interests in the DRC.³¹⁹ The Rwandan genocide took place April 7 to mid July 1994. The perpetrators of this genocide, but also many innocent Rwandan Hutus, took refuge in eastern Zaire as the Tutsi rebels stopped the genocide in Rwanda. The militant Rwandan Hutus reorganized in Zaire and used the refugee camps as recruiting bases and staging areas for attacks on Rwanda. Furthermore, they fueled the tensions between Zairian Tutsis (the Banyamulenge) and Zairian Hutus. Mobutu's government was not able to stop the exiled Rwandan Hutus from committing further attacks against Rwanda. The latter took the matter into their hands and forged an alliance against Mobutu. Their strategic aim was to solve the problem of the remnants of the "génocidaires," the perpetrators of the massacres, and to establish a government in Zaire that would reflect their interests. Uganda had its own interests in this struggle. Mobutu accepted that anti-Ugandan rebels were gathering in eastern Zaire and launched their operations from that area.³²⁰ Rwanda and Uganda, initially primarily interested in solving their common security problems, aligned and organized the anti-Mobutu rebel alliance.

Angola was also involved in both Congo wars, primarily for security reasons. The aim was to destroy its own opponents, the rebels of the "Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola" (UNITA), which operated from the DRC against Angola. Prior to the first Congo war, UNITA was tolerated by Mobutu; high ranking

³¹⁹ Kevin C. Dunn, "A Survival Guide to Kinshasa: Lessons of the Father, Passed Down to the Son," in Clark ed., *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, 56.

³²⁰ Nest, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," 23.

DRC officials sold UNITA weapons and supply. The aim to eliminate the long term enemy caused the alignment of Angola with Mobutu's enemies Rwanda and Uganda.³²¹

After seizing power, Laurent Kabila renamed Zaire in 1997 the Democratic Republic of Congo, but his reputation in the country was that of a puppet of Rwanda and Uganda. To improve his position and to gain local support, he terminated his relation to the former allies and ordered the withdrawal of the Rwandan and Ugandan troops out of the DRC on July 28, 1998. Parallel to this, Kabila launched an anti-Tutsi policy to exploit existing sentiments for his own purpose.³²² This policy resulted in the second Congo War. Rwanda and Uganda, dissatisfied with the changed situation, supported a new rebel group, the "Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo" (MLC), controlled by Jean-Pierre Bemba. Aligned with the regular troops of Rwanda and Uganda, the new rebels advanced towards Kinshasa. But this time they were stopped by the intervention of three other African states on Kabila's side. The DRC had joined the SADC in 1997 and requested assistance from this subregional organization in August 1998, one month after the eviction of Rwanda and Uganda.³²³ Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola now supported the DRC against the new rebellion, which was interpreted as a foreign-led invasion. The involvement of these three states "changed the nature of the war into the first conventional war among states on the African continent."³²⁴ Despite this solidarity, each state had its own interests in the second Congo war.

Angola, former ally of Rwanda and Uganda, switched fronts because UNITA established contacts with these two countries, a rapprochement which brought

³²¹ Thomas Turner, "Angola's Role in the Congo War," in Clark ed., *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, 81.

³²² Dunn, "A Survival Guide," 66.

³²³ Martin R. Rupiya, "A Political and Military Review of Zimbabwe's Involvement in the Second Congo War," in Clark ed., *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, 96.

³²⁴ Rupiya, "A Political and Military Review of Zimbabwe's Involvement," 99.

them in opposition to Angola. Angola deployed approximately 3,000 troops to the DRC. UNITA was finally defeated when its leader was killed in 2002.³²⁵

Zimbabwe, also officially following the request for support by the DRC, had its own stakes in that war. Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe was the driving force behind SADC's decision to intervene.³²⁶ Although South Africa's President Nelson Mandela called initially for a peaceful solution, he declared on September 2, 1998 that SADC had unanimously decided to support the intervention of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola in the DRC.³²⁷ Despite these official declarations, Zimbabwe's motivation seemed to be primarily economic. Zimbabwe has no direct border to the DRC, no rebel movement operated from the DRC's territory. Zimbabwe deployed 10,000 to 13,000 troops to the DRC. This deployment enabled Zimbabwe's military and political elite to control and exploit rich parts of the DRC and to enrich themselves.³²⁸ Many academics identify economic benefits as the main motive for Zimbabwe's intervention, but there are also arguments which focus on the official explanation of Zimbabwe as an execution of the official SADC decision.³²⁹

Namibia's interests in the war are less clear than those of the other involved states. Security aspects played a similar role as with Angola. UNITA tried to use Namibia as a retreat area, but Namibia endorsed Angolan attacks on UNITA, which was also on Namibian territory. That decision brought Namibia the hostility of the Angolan rebel movement. Personal relationships may also have played an important role: the

³²⁵ Mungbalemwe Koyame and John F. Clark, "The Economic Impact of the Congo War," in Clark ed. *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, 214; Gretchen Bauer and Scott D. Turner, "Angola: Peace and the Predatory State," Chap. 6 in *Politics in Southern Africa* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 150.

³²⁶ *BBC-News*, "Congo Troops Launch Counter-Offensive," August 18, 1998. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/153685.stm> (accessed May 22, 2007).

³²⁷ Petretto, "Die Rolle der Regionalorganisationen," 62.

³²⁸ Koyame and Clark, "The Economic Impact," 214.

³²⁹ Rupia, "Zimbabwe's Involvement," 96.

Namibian President Sam Nujoma was a close friend of Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe. It seems that both tried to balance South Africa's hegemony through their concerted operation in DRC.³³⁰

An analysis from 2006 about the role of economic interests in the overall origins of the two Congo wars argues that "economic interests ... emerged as a consequence of the conflict, and not vice versa."³³¹ The motives of the belligerent factions

were a complex and evolving combination of regime security, concern at preventing ethnic-based harassment and killings, grievances related to access to land and citizenship rights, domestic political leader's interest in obtaining a 'seat at the table' of a new post Mobutu regime, and the desire by neighboring governments to maintain their political dominance within the region.³³²

The support of the SADC members for the DRC resulted in a stalemate on the battlefields and opened the way for alternative, peaceful solutions to the conflict. The first step was the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (or Lusaka Peace Accord), signed on July 10, 1999 by Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe and later by the MLC and another rebel movement.³³³ This agreement laid the foundations for the solution of the immediate crisis but was not very effective, since the war was not ended. One of the major spoilers was the DRC's president himself. The peace process gained momentum when Laurent Kabila was assassinated on January 16, 2001 and succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila. The Pretoria agreement between the DRC and Rwanda was signed on July 30, 2002, a result of South African mediation. It arranged the complete withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the DRC's territory in return for the disarmament and dismantling of Rwanda's enemies by the DRC's government. A similar agreement

³³⁰ Nest, "The Political Economy of War," 59.

³³¹ Ibid., 54.

³³² Michael Nest, "The Political Economy of the Congo War," in Nest, Grignon and Kisangani, *The Democratic Republic of Congo*, 31.

³³³ International Crisis Group, "The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace." ICG Democratic of Congo Report no. 5, (August 1999), This report provides a detailed analysis of the Lusaka Agreement.

was brokered by the Angolan government, the Luanda Agreement, between the DRC and Uganda. The latter was signed on September 6, 2002.³³⁴ An agreement that aimed to solve the endless internal conflict was the “Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in DRC,” signed in Pretoria on December 16, 2002.³³⁵ The belligerent factions, rebel movements, pro-government militias, political parties and representatives of the civil society in the DRC signed a pact to divide the ministries among them and to establish an interim power-sharing government. After a transition phase, national elections were to be held. A new transitional government was established on June 30, 2003 but the elections were postponed until June 2006. These elections were the reason for the deployment of EUFOR RD CONGO.

b) The UN Observer Mission to the DRC (MONUC)

MONUC was established as a result of the signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreement.³³⁶ Part of MONUC’s mandate of 2000 was to “monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire.” MONUC can act under chapter VII of the UN Charter and is able to “take the necessary actions” to defend itself and “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”³³⁷ After the UNSC Resolution 1341 was adopted in 2001, MONUC was deployed to the DRC to observe and verify the disengagement the belligerent parties had agreed upon. The initial size comprised 5,537 personnel, including 500 observers.³³⁸ Due to the fact that MONUC

³³⁴ Francois Grignon, “Economic Agendas in the Congolese Peace Process,” in Nest, Grignon and Kisangani, *The Democratic Republic of Congo*, 64-5.

³³⁵ International Crisis Group, “The Kivus: The forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict.” *Africa Report* 56 (January 2003). The agreement itself: *Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Inter-Congolese Dialogue - Political negotiations on the peace process and on transition in the DRC*. <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/MHII-65G8B8?OpenDocument> (accessed May 22, 2007).

³³⁶ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1279*, November 30, 1999. http://www.difesa.it/NR/rdonlyres/8AFA9759-D5E4-4446-812E-B362C31460E3/0/UNSCR_1279.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

³³⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1291*, February 24, 2000, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/313/35/PDF/N0031335.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed May 22, 2007).

³³⁸ International Crisis Group, “From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in Congo.” *Africa Report* 27, (March 2001), 4-7.

was not able to fulfill its initial mission, its size was expanded and the mission adapted.³³⁹ In October 2004, the UNSC increased the number of military personnel to more than 17,000 troops.³⁴⁰

MONUC's mission is separated into four phases: first, the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement; second, the observation of the implementation and the compliance of the factions; third, the support of the DDR process; and fourth, support of the smooth conduct of the elections which would end the phase of transition. MONUC provided nationwide support for the Independent Electoral Commission and trained instructors of the national police.³⁴¹

In 2006 the main bulk of MONUC's forces were deployed in the eastern DRC, approximately 14,600 troops. The Eastern Division's HQ is located in Kisangani. A smaller force, comprising approximately 1,900 troops, is located as the Western Brigade in the DRC's capital Kinshasa.³⁴²

c) *EU's Approach towards the Great Lakes Region*

Concerning the implementation of its strategies, the EU is promoting a regional approach to conflict resolution. As it was presented, the two Congo Wars involved many African states. Conflict resolution has to take the interests of the involved states into account. Solana argued that the conflict in the DRC can only be solved in a wider context, comprising the whole Great Lakes Region.³⁴³ The EU has been involved in conflict resolution in the DRC since 1996. The EU Council appointed a Special Representative (SR), Aldo Ajello, for the Great Lakes Region in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in March 1996. The SR's mission is to assist the countries of that

³³⁹ Petretto, "Die Rolle der Regionalorganisationen," 64.

³⁴⁰ Democratic Republic of the Congo - MONUC – Mandate. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/mandate.html> (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁴¹ Alexander Ramsbotham, ed., "United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)," *International Peacekeeping*, 13, no. 2 (June 2006): 271-2.

³⁴² European Union Operations Headquarters, *Operation EUFOR RD Congo*, Potsdam: European Union Operations Headquarters, 2007, 8-9.

³⁴³ Solana, *Contribution by the EU High Representative*, 2.

region “in resolving the crisis affecting their region” and to support the efforts of several actors, including the UN and the AU, “aiming at finding a lasting and comprehensive peaceful solution to political, economic and humanitarian problems facing the region.”³⁴⁴ The SR played an important role in the EU’s plan for peace building in the region.³⁴⁵ The EU supported the several external and internal peace related agreements.³⁴⁶ The EU assists, for example, in the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Process through financial and technical assistance in non-military affairs.³⁴⁷ The EU called for “the full implementation of MONUC’s mandate” which is “vital in order to reach a degree of stability in Ituri and the Kivus.”³⁴⁸ Only one month later, the EU decided to launch operation ARTEMIS.

The European Commission has been involved in the DRC for a long time through the activity of the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and as an important provider of humanitarian help in Ituri, but also through financial support on a larger scale. The EU’s financial support for the DRC is significant and channeled through different projects and funds. The DRC was in 2004 the top recipient country of the EU’s development aid in sub-Saharan Africa measured in absolute transfers; the DRC received more than US\$ 1.13 billion, labeled as Official Development Assistance (ODA) by the EU in 2004.³⁴⁹ In September 2003, the EU signed a cooperation program with the DRC worth €205 million until 2008. This money is designated for the improvement of

³⁴⁴ Council of the European Union, *Council Joint Action 1996/250/CFSP of 25 March 1996*, <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996E0250:EN:HTML> (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁴⁵ Martha Martinelli, “Helping Transition: The EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa) in the Framework of EU Policies in the Great Lakes,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 11 (2006): 383.

³⁴⁶ Council of the European Union, Council Common Position of 11 March 2002 concerning European Support for the Implementation of the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement.

³⁴⁷ Council of the European Union, *Review of Common Position on Human Rights, Democratic Principles, the Rule of Law and Good Governance in Africa (13442/99)*. Brussels, November 25, 1999, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/99/st13/13442en9.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁴⁸ Council of the European Union, *Council Common Position concerning European Union support for the Implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the Peace Process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*, Brussels, May 7, 2003, 7, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st08/st08856en03.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁴⁹ European Commission, *EU Donor Atlas 2006*, 14, 21.

infrastructure and of social and political conditions. Further support for the DRC is provided through the EDF and following the Cotonou Agreement. Overall, since 2002 the European Commission has funded €750 million for programs in poverty reduction, institution building and macroeconomic support.³⁵⁰

d) *Operation Artemis in 2003*

Operation ARTEMIS was the first autonomous military crisis response operation the EU conducted and the archetype of EU support for the UN. Despite the signed Pretoria Peace Accord of December 2002 and the new transitional government established in June 2003, the situation in the Ituri and Kivus Provinces in the DRC's east worsened. The root causes of the conflict in Ituri are extremely complex.³⁵¹ The root causes are many, starting with traditional economic rivalries between the Hema, traditional stock farmers, and Lendu agriculturalists. Ancient social structures, which were socially engineered by the Belgian colonial administrations, the alignment of Uganda with the Hema and of Rwanda with the Lendu, the neighbors' attraction to Ituri's minerals, and in general, the incapacity of the DRC to exercise its authority, justice and policing functions in this region were all factors. Local rebel groups disintegrated and formed new factions, which fought against each other for the control of territory. Civilians belonging to the opposed groups were victims of murder, rape, and violence. The situation worsened and assumed genocidal proportions; since 1999 more than 60,000 people had died and atrocities had been conducted.³⁵² MONUC should have provided security in that area, but it was too weak to fulfill its mission. The withdrawal of the last Ugandan troops in May 2003, a result of the Luanda agreement, left behind a power

³⁵⁰ Faria, "Crisis Management," 45-6; EU Council Secretariat "Background. DRC Elections 2006: EU support to the DRC during the election process." *Press Release*, Brussels, June 2006, 2, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/90508.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁵¹ A comprehensive analysis regarding the origins of the DRC conflict is provided by the International Crisis Group, by Johan Pottier from an anthropologist view, and by Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers from a social perspective; see International Crisis Group, "Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri," *Africa Report* 64 (June 2003); Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, "The Politics of Rebellion and Intervention on Ituri: The Emergence of a new Political Complex?" *African Affairs* 103, no. 412 (July 2004): 385-410.

³⁵² Faria, "Crisis Management," 40.

vacuum. Neither the DRC's authorities nor MONUC was able to replace the Ugandans.³⁵³ The UN itself was targeted in Bunia, unarmed civilian UN personnel and staff members of humanitarian organizations were killed.

The decision to deploy a European force to Bunia was a result of parallel and interdependent developments in the UN, the EU and France. At the beginning of May 2003, the UN expected a humanitarian disaster and "massive killing of civilians" if nothing happened in Bunia. The Secretary General requested military support for MONUC by the UN members as it became evident that the available MONUC forces were not able to execute their mandate in Bunia, and short term reinforcement was not available. The UN member states were supposed to provide forces to gain time for the UN to generate its own capabilities to reinforce MONUC, a typical "bridging operation."

France declared its willingness to lead a multinational force on May 28, 2003 had conducted, parallel to this, its own preparations to mount a national mission (Operation MAMBA) in Ituri. MONUC's reinforcement by non-UN troops was finally authorized two days later as an "Interim Emergency Multinational Force" in Bunia in close coordination with MONUC.³⁵⁴ As required by France, the deployment took place under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, was only temporary and was to be terminated on September 1, 2003. The mission purpose was

to contribute to the stabilization of security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in town.³⁵⁵

Following this UNSC Resolution, the EU Council adopted a Joint Action on June 5, 2003 and decided to conduct an EU military operation in the DRC with the

³⁵³ Uganda was occupying parts of the north east of DRC, including Ituri. In 2002 it signed the Luanda accord to withdraw its troops out of DRC.

³⁵⁴ UN Security Council, *Resolution 1484*, May 30, 2003. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/377/68/PDF/N0337768.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁵⁵ UN Security Council, *Resolution 1484*, May 30, 2003. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/377/68/PDF/N0337768.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed May 22, 2007). 2.

code-name ARTEMIS. France was designated as the framework nation, a concept adopted in July 2002. A French General was appointed as EU Operation Commander, the French Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations (CPCO) in Paris was selected as the strategic command.³⁵⁶ Despite the fact that this mission was an official EU mission in the framework of ESDP, there is evidence that France was the driving force behind the EU engagement and determined the operational design of the whole mission.³⁵⁷ The ESDP mission was formally launched on June 12, 2003, only one week after the Council's Joint Action.³⁵⁸ This impressive tempo was only possible because of the prior French preparations. Interestingly, one day after the Joint Action and nearly a week before the formal decision to launch the operation, the first French troops arrived at the Bunia airport, and on June 10 the French contingent had been increased to 250 troops.³⁵⁹ The whole contingent consisted of more than 2,000 troops, mainly provided by France but also by eight other EU Member States and non-EU Member States.³⁶⁰ 1,100 troops were deployed to Bunia; 750 more were stationed in Entebbe/Uganda together with the Forces Headquarters. Approximately 75 percent of the troops in Bunia were French.³⁶¹ The European contingent was initially contested by the warring factions, small scale engagements happened but the presentation of overwhelming force and the clear will to act forced the militias to withdraw out of a 10 km protective zone around Bunia. The city was secured; the expected humanitarian disaster was avoided. The mission was successfully accomplished; the EU forces were relieved in place by a UN force and returned, as scheduled, back to Europe in September 2003.

The specific reasons why the EU conducted Operation ARTEMIS are at least two-layered. A separate examination of the French and the EU motives is needed.

³⁵⁶ Council of the European Union, *Council Joint Action 2003/423/ CSFP of 5 June 2003*.

³⁵⁷ Ulriksen, Catriona and Mace, Operation Artemis, 512.

³⁵⁸ Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP.

³⁵⁹ Ulriksen, Catriona and Mace, Operation Artemis, 518.

³⁶⁰ Beside France, Belgium, Brazil, Great Britain, Canada, Germany, Greece, South Africa and Sweden provided troops. Austria, Hungary Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain augmented the HQs.

³⁶¹ Faria, "Crisis Management," 42.

Catherine Gegout states that ARTEMIS can be explained through “Realpolitik reasons.”³⁶² She argues that there were several reasons for France to “volunteer” for the mission requested by the UN Secretary General. The two central motives are that France wanted to intervene to prevent a new humanitarian disaster and by doing this, to repair its reputation damaged through its role in the Rwandan genocide. More important, so Gegout writes, are France’s strategic motives, to present the willingness and capacity of the EU to conduct autonomous operations without the recourse on NATO assets in the aftermath of the EU internal strife regarding Iraq. She argues that the French attempt to increase the EU’s autonomous military capacities is in line with the balance of power theory of International Relations. France tried to counterbalance the hegemon U.S.A. through the EU. In this light, the reference to the worsening humanitarian situation in Ituri served to conceal the real motives. But there are other French motives outlined earlier: France’s engagement in Africa is important to its self-conception as a “Grande Nation” and the embedding of its operation in a multilateral framework allows France to maintain its position while sharing the burden with others.³⁶³

Despite this convincing proposition, I argue that this is not a sufficient explanation for the conduct of the first EU ESDP mission in Africa. Of course, France was an important actor in this mission; Miskel and Norton even claim that “other EU countries including Germany, Sweden and the UK responded to French pressure, turning the operation into an EU affair and also contributing troops.”³⁶⁴ However, a France-centered argument misses an important point, as concerns the EU-level. Koepf argues against an overestimation of France’s national interests in the ARTEMIS operation. He states that France wanted to use its rapid reaction capabilities and its knowledge of the region in order to demonstrate that the EU is capable to mount out of area operations without recourse on NATO assets. A byproduct was the demonstration of France’s claim of leadership in ESDP matters and a chance to increase its influence.³⁶⁵

³⁶² Gegout, “Causes and Consequences,” 435-39.

³⁶³ Mair, “Einsatzgebiet Kongo,” 2; Koepf, “Die Französische Sicherheits- und Militärpolitik in Subsahara Afrika,” 83.

³⁶⁴ Miskel and Norton, “The Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo” 8.

³⁶⁵ Koepf, “Die Französische Sicherheits- und Militärpolitik in Subsahara Afrika,” 84.

But still, the EU as a whole decided to mount this operation. ARTEMIS is in line with the concepts mentioned earlier in this thesis: it is the implementation of the EU's commitment to effective multilateralism, as well as its will to strengthen the UN and EU's commitment towards Africa after the genocide in Rwanda. In general, this mission showed the willingness to act autonomously after the internal Iraq-induced dispute; it also acted as a test of the new EU's ESDP capabilities. The ESS states that the interventions in Congo and elsewhere were conducted to "help failed states back on their feet."³⁶⁶ Gegout's claim regarding the French motive to use the EU to balance the hegemonic USA is also valid for the EU as an organization. The rift between the EU Member States caused by their diverging position regarding the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq was obvious. Ten years after the creation of CFSP and four years after the establishment of ESDP, the EU was at odds with itself. The united action of the EU can also be interpreted to present the restored unity of the EU and its capability to act. If this operation had been spoiled by the EU Member states disputes, the EU's interest to become an important and capable international actor would have been thwarted. This mission was important to give a signal that the EU is capable and willing to act collectively, even and still after the Iraq crisis. One important factor which contributed to the EU's decision to conduct this CMO was the EU's wish to test the new crisis management procedures and the effectiveness of ESDP.

e) EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC – DR Congo since 2003

EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DR Congo are the first civilian CMO the EU has conducted in Africa. Although they are separate missions and individually mandated by the EU Council, they are connected and serve the same purpose.

The "Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC" and a "Memorandum on Security and the Army" from 2002 include the plan to establish an Integrated Police Unit (IPU) comprised of 1,008 police officers, with the purpose to ensure the protection of state institutions, the government, and to reinforce the internal security apparatus. An UNSC Resolution encouraged donors to support the

³⁶⁶ Solana, *European Security Strategy*, 11.

establishment.³⁶⁷ The transitional government of the DRC officially requested EU support in setting up the IPU on October 20, 2003. The EU decided on December 15, 2003 to comply with the request and to rehabilitate and refurbish a training center, to provide basic equipment, to train the IPU and, after the training is accomplished, to monitor and mentor the IPU for an initial phase. The EU assessed the consolidation of internal security in the DRC as “an essential factor for the peace process and the development of the country” and decided to support the establishment of the IPU through financial assistance by the EDF (support by the European Community) and the provision of law enforcement equipment, arms and ammunition (CFSP / ESDP support).³⁶⁸

In December 2004 the Council decided to establish EUPOL Kinshasa as a follow-up project to the financial and material support. Its mission is “to monitor, mentor, and advise the setting up and the initial running of the IPU.”³⁶⁹ After a pre-deployment of an advance party, the first civil ESDP mission in Africa was launched on April 12, 2005. The EU staff consists of 30 members who conduct training activities, participate in a board conceptualizing the reform and reorganization of the National Congolese Police, and support the “Congolese forces maintaining order during the election period.” EUPOL Kinshasa has no executive authority; the EU staff is only entitled to support the DRC’s authorities.³⁷⁰ EUPOL Kinshasa staff is, besides other things, advising the IPU, developing drafts of regulations; its technical advisors “assist during patrols operations, and they go out in the field with the IPU to provide feedback on shortcomings and difficulties as well as advice on how to overcome them.”³⁷¹ In December 2006, the mandate was extended to June 30, 2007 and instructed to advise the Congolese police on

³⁶⁷ United Nations Security Council *Resolution 1493*, July 28, 2003, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/443/15/PDF/N0344315.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁶⁸ Council of the European Union, *Council Joint Action 2004/494/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on European Union support to the establishment of the Integrated Police Unit in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)*.

³⁶⁹ Council of the European Union, *Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004 on the European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) regarding the Integrated Police Unit (EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’)*, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_367/l_36720041214en00300034.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁷⁰ EUPOL-KINSHASA: The first European Police Mission in Africa , 4. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DocumentPresentationEUPOLOctobre2006EN.pdf> (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁷¹ Martinelli, “Helping Transition,” 391.

how to facilitate the SSR process in the DRC together with EUSEC DR Congo, the second civil ESDP mission in the DRC – and in Africa. While the EUPOL is focused on the DRC's police, EUSEC is focused on the DRC's army and the DDR process.

EUSEC DR Congo was launched on June 8, 2005, again after a request by the DRC's government. This mission should “provide advice and assistance” for SSR in the DRC and “contribute to a successful integration of the army in the DRC.” Furthermore, the mission should promote “policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards and the principles of good governance, transparency and respect for the rule of law.”³⁷² The EU has placed several representatives in key positions in the DRC's administration, such as in the Ministry of Defense, the combined general staff, and the army general staff. EUSEC is also positioned in the National Committee for DDR to facilitate the DDR process.³⁷³ EUSEC DR Congo should “provide practical support for the integration of the Congolese army and good governance in the field of security,” and should identify and support projects serving the purpose of the mission. One result is that members of EUSEC DR Congo supervise the payroll system of the armed forces, which was a major field of irregularities and an obstacle in the reform of the army. Interrupting the cash flow between superiors and subordinates and establishing a regular payroll system could have the capacity to reduce neopatrimonial relations and the dependence of subordinates on their military patrons. These financial issues are very important; un- or underpaid soldiers are a huge threat for the peace process.³⁷⁴

The overall aims of SSR in the DRC are the establishment of security agencies that are capable of accomplishing their task, the provision of security for DRC against internal and external threats, and the transformation of the whole security apparatus into an institution that respects the rule of law and human rights. This is a huge

³⁷² Council of the European Union, *Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005 on the European Union Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*. http://www.eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_112/l_11220050503en00200023.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007)..

³⁷³ Martinelli, “Helping Transition,” 392.

³⁷⁴ International Crisis Group, “Escaping the Conflict Trap: Promoting Good Governance in the Congo.” *Africa Report* no. 114 (July 2006), 12-3.

challenge, not only because of the poor professional skills and the composition of the new Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) out of former opposing groups, but also in a historic view. For decades the security forces “did not exist to provide security for the public in any normal sense but were primarily predatory organs used by politicians and officers to pursue individual political aims and economic goals while perpetuating massive human right abuses.”³⁷⁵ To overcome such a “tradition” is more than difficult. The International Crisis Group argues that SSR is the most important issue for the DRC’s “prospects for peace and development.”³⁷⁶

The EUSFA presents the DRC as an example of the EU’s promotion of DDR programs “where a wide range of activities, ranging from the collection and destruction of arms to the development of a national army...are at present deployed.”³⁷⁷ A huge number of different armed groups existed in the DRC, such as the disintegrated former Congolese Army, rebel movements, local militias and so forth. Their demobilization and integration in the new FARDC and in the Congolese society is a large hurdle for a successful SSR in that country. Reports regarding disarmament and integration in the DRC give evidence of the importance of that issue for the stabilization of the whole country as the overall motive for the EU’s action in the DRC.³⁷⁸

The financial commitment of the EU to SSR in DRC is significant: from 2002 to 2006 more than €137 million were provided for its support.³⁷⁹ MONUC bears the main responsibility for SSR in the DRC. The EU Member States provided eight experts for EUSEC DR Congo. The personnel strength of this mission doesn’t seem to reflect the importance the EU is attaching to SSR in general and to that mission in particular. Also, given that the EU is not in the lead with this issue, it has to be questioned if this small

³⁷⁵ International Crisis Group, “Security Sector Reform in the Congo” *Africa Report* no. 104 (February 2006), 2.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

³⁷⁷ Commission of the European Communities. *EU Strategy for Africa*, 22.

³⁷⁸ International Crisis Group, “Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A new Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration.” *Africa Report* no. 63, (May 2003). International Crisis Group, “Disarmament in the Congo.” These reports were published in 2001 and 2003 and could not cover EU programs which did not exist at that time.

³⁷⁹ Gourlay, *Community Instruments*, 57-8.

group is sufficient to fulfill the expectations. Both missions, EUPOL Kinshasa as well as EUSEC DR Congo, can be interpreted as a step towards the EUSFA, where the EU committed itself to enhance its “support for post conflict reconstruction in Africa” in order to “secure lasting peace and development.” The EU “will support in particular...the strengthening of fragile states; and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, and Security Sector Reform programmes.”³⁸⁰

The overall explanation of why the EU is engaged in the DRC is provided in the conclusion. There it is emphasized that the EU’s engagement in this field is in line with its earlier declarations and concepts. The EU stresses the importance of SSR and DDR in its relevant concepts as an important process in post conflict peace building. Because the EU wants to stabilize the DRC, both issues got prominent support by the EU.

f) EUFOR RD Congo 2006

The capstone of the “Global and All Inclusive Agreement on Transition in DRC” and the end of the transitional phase was supposed to be “the organisation of free and transparent elections at all levels allowing a constitutional and democratic government to be put in place.”³⁸¹ These elections were postponed until June 30, 2006. The most relevant rivals were the incumbent, the DRC’s President Joseph Kabila, and his contender, Vice-President and former leader of the anti-Kabila MLC rebel movement, Jean-Pierre Bemba. The greatest concerns had been that the loser would not accept the electoral outcome and use violent means to challenge it. The most dangerous area was identified as the capital Kinshasa, because of the assessment that turmoil there could spill-over easily into the remote regions of the DRC. That made the reinforcement of MONUC in the capital necessary. Another factor was the interest of the international community to provide the new government a broad legitimacy. Therefore, a significant voter turnout was needed. Security was seen as a necessary condition to enable a

³⁸⁰ Council of the European Union, “The EU and Africa,” 3.

³⁸¹ Global and all inclusive Agreement on Transition, Art 2 (4).

maximum number of voters to participate in the elections. MONUC's forces were concentrated in the eastern regions; their redeployment was not possible because of the situation in the east.

The UNSC resolution 1671 of April 25, 2006 set the framework for a second deployment of EU forces to the DRC. This mission was again functionally, timely and regionally limited. The European force should “support MONUC to stabilize a situation,” contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment,” “contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa,” “execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger,” and ensure its own security and freedom of movements.³⁸² Two days later, the EU Council adopted a Joint Action and formulated that the EU “shall conduct a military operation in the DRC in support of MONUC during the election process, named Operation EUFOR RD Congo, in accordance with the mandate” supplied by the mentioned UNSC resolution.³⁸³ For the first time, an OHQ was activated for an autonomous EU operation and established in Potsdam / Germany, a German Operation – and a French Force Commander designated. Twenty-three EU Member States participated in this mission, with Turkey as the only non-EU state. The largest contingents were provided by France, Germany, Poland and Spain.³⁸⁴

The most challenging step in the preparation of the operation was the EU Member States' reluctance to contribute capabilities to this mission. The fear was widespread that mission-creep could embroil the EU in a long-term peacemaking operation in a region that was replete of children warriors, warlords and other factors beyond control. The German EU Battlegroup, which was on standby, was not selected for

³⁸² United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1671*, April 25, 2006, 3, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Res1671_En.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁸³ *Council Joint Action 2006/319/CSFP of 27 April 2006 on the European Union Military Operation in Support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process*, Art. 1 (1).. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_116/l_11620060429en00980101.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁸⁴ European Defence Almanac 2007. *Military Operations: EUFOR RD Congo*. http://www.european-defence.co.uk/milops_02.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007); European Union Operations Headquarters. *Operation EUFOR RD Congo*, The latter publication provides detailed information regarding the operation, its preparation and conduct.

that mission due to the fact that the Battlegroups would not reach full operational capability until January 2007. However, the needed forces could be generated and deployed into sub-Saharan Africa.³⁸⁵

The Forces Headquarters (FHQ) deployed with 1,200 troops to the N'Dolo Airport at Kinshasa, and an additional 1,150 troops were based at Libreville/ Gabon as an “over the horizon force” for rapid reinforcement, if the situation in the DRC became critical. A strategic reserve was available in France but not called in.

The first round of the presidential and legislative elections proceeded without major incidents on July 20, 2006. The most critical situation for the EU contingent occurred on August 21, 2006 when the residence of Jean-Pierre Bemba in Kinshasa was attacked by the Presidential Guard of Joseph Kabila after the announcement of the provisional results. At the moment of the attack, Bemba was visited by fourteen ambassadors and the representative of the UN General Secretary.³⁸⁶ EUFOR flew in German reinforcements and deployed Spanish and Swedish troops in close cooperation with MONUC's Quick Reaction Force. Both could negotiate a ceasefire and the withdrawal of the belligerent factions.³⁸⁷

The run-off elections were conducted on October 29, 2006 and resulted in a victory of the incumbent Kabila. His challenger Bemba accepted his defeat after initial rejection.³⁸⁸ This did not prevent violence between Bemba's militia, which resisted their scheduled disarmament, and the FARDC, loyal to the president.³⁸⁹ The intermediate result is that Bemba left the DRC “to seek medical treatment in Portugal” on April 11,

³⁸⁵ Schmidt, “Freiwillige Vor!” 68.

³⁸⁶ Dunja Speiser, “DR Congo: Stage Victory. International Community Being Challenged by Presidential Election.” *SWP Comments* 23 (September 2006), 2, http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3318 (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁸⁷ European Union Operations Headquarters. *Operation EUFOR RD Congo*, 44-5.

³⁸⁸ *BBC News*, “Bemba accepts DR Congo poll loss,” November 28, 2006. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6193384.stm> (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁸⁹ *BBC News*, “Army regains Control of Kinshasa,” March 23, 2007. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6487889.stm> (accessed May 22, 2007).

2007.³⁹⁰ The main body of EUFOR RD Congo troops was redeployed to Europe until January 10, 2007, the OHQ deactivated in mid-February 2007.³⁹¹ Despite the backlash regarding the situation of Bemba, the main purpose of this mission could be achieved, since it facilitated free and democratic elections.

Beside the deployment of troops, the EU was also engaged in the preparation and conduct of this election. The EU spent, together with its Member States, €250 million for the election process and sent over 250 officials for an Election observer mission.³⁹²

The explanation, as to why the EU again conducted a military crisis management operation in the DRC, is multilayered. First of all, it is again in line with “effective multilateralism,” one of the EU’s guiding principles. Responding negatively to the UN request would have undermined the EU’s credibility regarding its efforts to strengthen the UN’s role in peace and security matters and it would have contradicted its declarations and commitments regarding the EU’s role in Africa. Strengthening of peace and international security, as well as its own security, the development and strengthening of democracy and the rule of law are goals of Europe’s CFSP. EUFOR RD Congo is the implementation of the “Stand By Model” outlined in the EU-UN Co-operation in the military CMO of November 2003. This model consists of an ‘over the horizon reserve’ [here EUFOR RD Congo troops in Libreville] or an ‘extraction force’ [part of the mission of EUFOR RD Congo] provided by the EU in support of a UN operation. As the EU Council states, such missions “would be of particular relevance in an African context.”³⁹³

The overall assessment of the EU was that the stabilization of the DRC is essential for the peace process of the whole region. As outlined, the EU assigns much importance to democratically legitimized governments as a step towards strengthening democracy, the rule of law and international and regional security. The establishment of a

³⁹⁰ *BBC News*, “Opposition Leader leaves DR Congo,” April 11, 2007. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6542165.stm> (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁹¹ European Union Operations Headquarters. *Operation EUFOR RD Congo*, 75.

³⁹² EU Council Secretariat “Background. DRC Elections 2006,” 2.

³⁹³ Council of the European Union, *EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations*, 5.

democratically elected government is one step in the implementation of the EU's concept of structural stability. Democracy and viable political structures are necessary conditions in order to solve societal conflicts without violence. If the outcome of the election could be challenged by the defeated candidate because of a lack of legitimacy, the EU's whole previous engagement, its financial support, its civil and military CMOs and its political legitimacy in the region could be foiled.

Despite the fundamental and general interest of the EU in stabilizing this country, there are also some statements that highlight particular French interests in the conduct of the EU operation. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, requested EU forces for the protection of the planned elections. Peter Schmidt argues that it is not a concurrence that the French high ranking diplomat, who served for a long time in the French Department of Foreign Affairs, launched this request. He claims that France had a special interest in the DRC and therefore in the conduct of this mission.³⁹⁴ Hans-Georg Erhard alleges that Germany was put in a difficult situation by France, due to France's very prominent participation in the mission.³⁹⁵ The author cannot judge how far Jean-Marie Guéhenno was pursuing France's national interests or the interests of the UN. The UN needed support for MONUC; the EU declared several times that it is willing to do so. Maybe Guéhenno took the EU only at their word. The EU is not a unitary actor, national interests persist, and it may be that France is the EU Member State with the strongest national interest in the DRC respectively in the region.

But as this thesis gave evidence, the EU as an organization has its own interest in stabilizing the DRC and resolving the conflict. National interests of EU Member States are secondary in this assessment. France, Great Britain and Germany are the three major European powers, so it is interesting what motives the other two states could have. Gourlay argues that Great Britain "has neither historical nor economic links to the DRC."³⁹⁶ Nevertheless, she argues that Great Britain wanted to implement its

³⁹⁴ Schmidt, "Freiwillige Vor!" 70.

³⁹⁵ Erhart, "Nichts wie weg?" 2.

³⁹⁶ Gegout, "The EU's Intervention in DRC," 438.

French- British Africa policy developed in the last decade in order to demonstrate that it is still interested in the improvement of ESDP. Germany also seems not to have any national interests in the DRC, but, as Erhard argues, it has the national interest to maintain the EU's capability to act and to concentrate its power in order to cope with the challenges of the 21st century. Despite this, Germany aspires to a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. A neglect of the UN request would have undermined Germany's position. The engagement of the EU in the DRC was thus in the broader interest of all EU Member States.³⁹⁷ The prominent role of France in the hitherto EU ESDP operations in the DRC can also be explained through the fact that France has the most experience in crisis management operations in Africa and maintains national garrisons in that sub-region, which allows the EU to resort to the French knowledge and assets. Future ESDP operations in other African sub-regions will show how prominently France will act beyond its traditional sphere of interest.

g) Conclusion

The previous analysis gave evidence that the EU is committed to the DRC and explains the EU's motivation. As this thesis presents, the DRC is not a direct threat to the EU or its Member States; the engagement of the EU is serving an indirect purpose. The DRC is without a doubt the heart of the African continent, because of its size, the central position and its natural wealth.³⁹⁸ If the whole region were inflicted with violence and anarchy, this could spill over through war, organized crime and the displacement of people to Europe – not to mention the humanitarian tragedy that would be caused by such a development. Javier Solana declared that if the DRC's stabilization fails, the aims of the EU's development policy would be harmed and the implementation of the MDG would be threatened.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁷ Erhard, "Was soll die EU im Kongo?" 84.

³⁹⁸ Javier Solana, "Europas Engagement für Frieden in Afrika: Warum die EU für Kongo-Kinshasa Truppen bereitstellt." *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, July 5, 2006.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/DE/articles/90528.pdf (accessed May 22, 2007).

³⁹⁹ Solana, *Contribution by the EU High Representative*, 2.

Bishop's model of the "global public goods" is helpful at this point. The DRC can only be stabilized if the situation of its citizens can be improved. Traditionally, the EU support is provided via developmental instruments, but at its core it is a task of the DRC's citizens; they have to own the process. Necessary conditions for an improvement of the living conditions are capable and functioning institutions in that country which are accepted by the citizens. A democratically elected government is a first step in that direction, but SSR and DDR are also important measures to make state institutions capable and to reduce potential sources of tension and insecurity.

Two key threats mentioned in the ESS are apparent in the DRC: regional conflict and state failure. Both are interconnected in the DRC. As long as the state is weak and unable to exercise its control in the eastern provinces, and as long as rebel movements have the opportunity to use the DRC's territory as a retreat area from which they can mount attacks on Uganda and Rwanda, stable peace is not realizable. In addition, the physical control and exploitation of the DRC's natural wealth, like minerals and diamonds, enable them to finance their campaigns. As long as these rebels exist they pose a threat for the DRC's neighbors and could again be used by Rwanda and Uganda as an argument for future offensives. Terrorism is the most important direct threat mentioned in the ESS. Stevenson claims that the DRC could become more attractive to "a non-state actor like al-Qaeda;" he argues that this "possibility makes major power involvement in peacekeeping and nation building more important."⁴⁰⁰ Keeping in mind the mentioned critique of Simmons and Tucker in combining failed states and terrorism, this threat seems to be marginal, but it cannot be neglected.⁴⁰¹ The EU's action in the DRC can also be explained by its attempt to neutralize push factors for illegal African migration to Europe, as the German Minister for Defense Franz Joseph Jung argued.⁴⁰²

The EU's military engagement in the DRC has to be interpreted with the background of EU's normative values, which are diffused through CFSP and ESDP. Despite these explanations, in order to answer why the EU as an organization decided to

⁴⁰⁰ Stevenson, "Africa's Growing Strategic Resonance," 158.

⁴⁰¹ Simmons and Tucker, "The Misleading Problem of Failed States."

⁴⁰² Atlantische Initiative. *Der Einsatz für Stabilität im Kongo*, 1.

launch this mission, it must be explained why the Member States were reluctant to participate, although the CMO is in the interest of all Member States. The author argues that this is also the result of rational choice and cost benefit analysis. The deployment of troops in ESDP missions is connected with a financial and, more importantly, with a political burden. The “Athena-Mechanism” covers common costs such as the establishment of the OHQ; the troops have to be financed by the Member States according to the principle that “costs lie where they fall.” More problematic than the financial burden is the risk that is connected with such a mission for the deployed service members. If troops are killed in action, the governments would be under pressure to justify this mission. If mission environments erode into war fighting scenarios, simply pulling troops out would be difficult to legitimize; expanding their mandate and operational focus is, though, risky. Due to the complex environment of crisis and conflict in Africa and the EU’s policy regarding that region, it is not easy to explain to the EU citizens why they have to bear the burden. The case by case force generation also includes a free rider problem. EU Member States which do not participate in an operation are impacted by their outcome.

The EUSFA mentions the political foundations of EU’s engagement in the DRC:

To provide direct support to the African Union, sub-regional or UN efforts to support peace and stability through Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy activities, and military and civilian crisis management mission.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰³ Council of the European Union, *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership*, 3.

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VI. CONCLUSION

This thesis presented the basic concepts, strategies and aims of the EU's (and to a certain extent, its predecessor organization's) policy regarding peace and security towards sub-Saharan Africa. It showed that this policy evolved from a purely civilian to a joint civil-military approach. One of the oldest institutional links is the EU's developmental assistance for Africa. The European Development Fund (EDF), established in 1958, is a very important instrument for a broad variety of projects. The EU's continuous commitment to lasting development was renewed by the EU's dedication to the UN Millennium Development goals. The second continuing element in the EU's relation to sub-Saharan Africa is in economic matters, marked by the Cotonou-Agreement. Both financial and economic measures are designed to support a lasting development of African states and in doing so they set the preconditions for better living conditions for the Africans.

The end of the Cold War changed the attitude of the EU regarding the quality of the supported regimes. The EU's support became linked to good governance and democracy. This conditional developmental support was focused on conflict prevention. The EU's policy became more focused on the root causes of conflict in the mid-1990s. Conflict prevention became the primary aim of the EU regarding sub-Saharan Africa. But not only had the EU's political focus on Africa changed in the 1990s. This decade noted a fundamental change of the EU's institutional design. With the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), the EU received the competence for the Common Security and Defense Policy (CFSP). Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) became a part of CFSP in 1999. Finally, a fundamental change occurred in 2003 when the EU conducted its first ESDP mission and deployed forces to the DRC – the EU became an actor in CMO in sub-Saharan Africa.

This thesis asks for the *rationale*, why sub-Saharan Africa matters for the EU. The author argues that the answer is threefold: first, the EU's policy is determined by its commitment to its basic norms such as democracy, humanitarian rights and peaceful solution of conflicts. The EU believes that these values are relevant on a global scale;

they are necessary conditions for peaceful coexistence in an interdependent world. That is one reason why the EU supports the UN and other international organizations which have the same agenda. The diffusion of its norms is a primary driving factor in the EU's policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. Effective multilateralism is allowing the implementation of this political aim.

The second group of factors which explains why sub-Saharan Africa matters is exogenous, such as the experience of humanitarian disasters in central Africa or the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The genocide in Rwanda, an incident which is a fundamental violation of the EU's values, could happen because the world community was not willing to intervene and to stop the atrocities. The EU learned the lesson that such a catastrophe has to be avoided in the future. The terrorist attacks of 2001 have drawn the EU's attention to diffuse and non-traditional security threats. Potential threats for the EU's security emerge in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the concentration of failed states, regional conflict and organized crime. These destabilizing effects could spill-over to Europe. To increase its own security, the EU is willing to not only tackle the root causes of these threats, but also to intervene in an open crisis. Africa gained strategic importance for the EU. The experience with ESDP operations in other regions demonstrated that a more active approach, combining civil and military means, is necessary for conflict resolution.

The third motivational factor is the national interest of certain EU Member States. All Member States try in a legitimate way to pursue their interests via the EU. This thesis shows that Great Britain and especially France try to achieve their goals in sub-Saharan Africa with the support of the EU. This offers a chance to share the financial, military and political burdens. Also, joint actions of the EU are regarded less suspiciously by the Africans, not as neocolonial endeavors but as autonomous actions by a highly respected single European entity. The use of the EU as a vehicle for the pursuit of national interests is only possible because the national interests are not contrary to the overall aims of the EU and in line with its general policy. Nevertheless, it has been shown that important improvements in military capacities as well as certain ESDP operations in sub-Saharan Africa were pushed by France, less by Great Britain.

This thesis presented the EU's basic security *concepts* regarding sub-Saharan Africa and showed that the EU acts on the basis of a comprehensive security concept, which is outlined in the European Security Strategy (ESS) and goes beyond the Realist concept of national security. The EU's security is not limited to the absence of military threats. The EU Strategy for Africa (EUSFA) builds on a concept of comprehensive security and emphasizes the importance of peace in Africa for the EU itself. The EUSFA covers the timeframe 2006 to 2015 and outlines how the EU is willing to assist Africa in its attempt to achieve lasting development, good governance and security. The recurring element in these strategies is the emphasis on development to tackle the root causes of conflict, the prerequisite of development being security. Security enables African societies to develop. The latter increases the EU's security because it eliminates the root causes of conflict, stabilizes states and reduces organized crime. The EU's concepts evolved from developmental support to a more security focused approach. Concepts were developed to stabilize post-war societies through Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration measures (DDR).

This thesis gave evidence that the EU today has a broad variety of civilian and military means, capabilities and programs – its *instruments* – available to promote its aims and that more are in the process of development. The EU disposes today, despite others, a rapid reaction force, the EUBG and a command structure including a Strategic Command, the OHQ, which enables the EU to plan and conduct autonomously military crisis management operations which are limited in time and scope. The EUBG's design makes them suitable for interventions in sub-Saharan Africa – which was the idea of the initiating nations France and Great Britain. Further military improvements are prefaced and scheduled in the European Capabilities Action Plan or the (military) Headline Goal 2010. Significant improvements have been accomplished in the EU's civilian crisis management capacities. The European Commission adjusted its agreements and programs so that they better serve the EU's overall aims. Conditional trade agreements and developmental support as well as sanctions can be applied to support the EU's policy. The new Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and the African Peace Facility (APF) are important instruments to finance emergency demands or to subsidize African

crisis management operations. In the last years the EU established unique capabilities for civil crisis management operations and is now capable to deploy at short notice police units, judicial experts and crisis response teams. The EU has a combination of instruments available which make it a unique actor. Last, but not least, the EU adapted its institutional design to be in a better position to coordinate its policies and strategies between the different pillars.

This thesis showed how the EU *implemented* its policy, how it deployed its assets into the field, focusing its analysis on the case of the EU's engagement in the DRC. It presents evidence that the EU is indeed true to its word. As outlined in the various concepts, programs, and declarations, the EU is willing to employ its capabilities. The EU's engagement in the DRC shows how the EU is able to use different civil and military capabilities in an integrated manner. The focus is on financial support in various areas such as development, SSR, DDR and the building of infrastructure. Under certain circumstance, the EU is willing to deploy military forces to sub-Saharan Africa. These deployments support the overall aims, such as the strengthening of the UN or intervention in crisis situations to avoid humanitarian disasters. I argue that the EU's engagement seems to be limited in scope, scale and time, though. The EU's strategic limitations force the EU to avoid any large scale, risky and unlimited involvement in a sub-Saharan African crisis. Despite the general commitment to sub-Saharan Africa, the EU Member States are still reluctant to participate in CMO in that region as EUFOR RD Congo gave evidence. Therefore, the EU embarked on an indirect strategy to implement its strategic goals.

Partnership and ownership are the basic principles of the EU's policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. To meet its goals, the EU places great importance on effective multilateralism, supports the organizations of the "African Peace Pyramid," the UN, AU and the sub-regional organizations. This serves the EU's interest to avoid, as long as it is possible, its own military involvement in crises on the sub-continent. Nevertheless effective multilateralism is also burdensome. The responsible organization on a global level is the UN. The UN is leading the process of state building with the aim to stabilize the DRC as well as the whole region. Taking into account the principles of subsidiarity

and solidarity, the EU has the self imposed duty to support the UN with its own assets when other options are not available, as the engagement in the DRC gives evidence. It seems that military CMO are a means of last resort for the EU; the reluctance to participate with its own capabilities in the hybrid AU-UN mission in Darfur gives evidence of that tendency. EU's CMOs in DRC are up to now unique. Other crises in sub-Saharan Africa such as in Sudan and in Somalia are obvious. The AU tries to cope with these crises, but was up to now not able to solve them. The future will prove how the EU will continue to stick to its concepts and strategies and support the AU with its own means, if assistance is requested in situations which are more demanding and challenging than the hitherto EU CMOs.

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